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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access when trusted_kernel is true
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:11:11 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1393445473-15068-11-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1393445473-15068-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Permitting write access to MSRs allows userspace to modify the running
kernel. Prevent this if trusted_kernel is true. Based on a patch by Kees
Cook.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
index 05266b5..1bd5e92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int err = 0;
 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (count % 8)
 		return -EINVAL;	/* Invalid chunk size */
 
@@ -150,6 +154,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
 			err = -EBADF;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (get_trusted_kernel()) {
+			err = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			break;
-- 
1.8.5.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-02-26 20:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 19:02   ` Kees Cook
2014-03-31 14:49   ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49   ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:41   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:47     ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-02-26 22:48     ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 18:48       ` Kees Cook
2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook
2014-02-26 22:21   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:42     ` Florian Weimer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:07   ` Greg KH
2014-02-27 19:11     ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 12:50       ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28  3:03   ` James Morris
2014-02-28  4:52     ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13  5:01     ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13  6:22       ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13  9:33         ` James Morris
2014-03-13 10:12           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 15:54             ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:59           ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:24             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:28               ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:32                 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30               ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 23:21                 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14  1:57                   ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:22                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:51                       ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:23                         ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:46                           ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:54                             ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:58                               ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 16:28                           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06                         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 18:11                           ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24                             ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:37                               ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:43                                 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:58                               ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:04                                 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:48                             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:56                               ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:08                                 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:15                                   ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:31                                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:52                                       ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-19 19:50                                       ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 23:18                                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-15  0:15                                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:49                                     ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 20:16                                     ` Kees Cook
2014-03-20 14:47                                       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:55                                       ` tytso
2014-03-20 17:12                                         ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 18:13                                           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26             ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:31               ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett

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