From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when trusted_kernel is true.
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:11:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1393445473-15068-8-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1393445473-15068-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
makes it possible for a user to execute arbitrary code in the kernel.
Disable this when trusted_kernel is true.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index fc1aa79..087a351 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
- if (acpi_rsdp)
+ if (acpi_rsdp && !get_trusted_kernel())
return acpi_rsdp;
#endif
--
1.8.5.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-02-26 20:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook
2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:07 ` Greg KH
2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 12:50 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 3:03 ` James Morris
2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris
2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso
2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
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