From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
tglx@linutronix.de, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 22:11:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515363085-4219-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
This is a mitigation for the 'variant 2' attack described in
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
Using GCC patches available from the hjl/indirect/gcc-7-branch/master
branch of https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commits/hjl and by manually
patching assembler code, all vulnerable indirect branches (that occur
after userspace first runs) are eliminated from the kernel.
They are replaced with a 'retpoline' call sequence which deliberately
prevents speculation.
Fedora 27 packages of the updated compiler are available at
https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=24065739
v1: Initial post.
v2: Add CONFIG_RETPOLINE to build kernel without it.
Change warning messages.
Hide modpost warning message
v3: Update to the latest CET-capable retpoline version
Reinstate ALTERNATIVE support
v4: Finish reconciling Andi's and my patch sets, bug fixes.
Exclude objtool support for now
Add 'noretpoline' boot option
Add AMD retpoline alternative
v5: Silence MODVERSIONS warnings
Use pause;jmp loop instead of lfence;jmp
Switch to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE positive feature logic
Emit thunks inline from assembler macros
Merge AMD support into initial patch
v6: Update to latest GCC patches with no dots in symbols
Fix MODVERSIONS properly(ish)
Fix typo breaking 32-bit, introduced in V5
Never set X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD yet, pending confirmation
Andi Kleen (3):
x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline: Add boot time option to disable retpoline
x86/retpoline: Exclude objtool with retpoline
David Woodhouse (7):
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 ++++-
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug | 6 +-
arch/x86/Makefile | 10 +++
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 5 +-
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S | 3 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 5 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 12 +++-
arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 25 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 18 ++---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 11 +++
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S | 6 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S | 8 +--
arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 9 +--
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 7 +-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 48 +++++++++++++
23 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-07 22:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-07 22:11 David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 10:53 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 11:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 12:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:42 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 13:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 13:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08 14:26 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 21:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 12:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 13:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 13:40 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 13:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/retpoline: Add boot time option to disable retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 22:11 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] x86/retpoline: Exclude objtool with retpoline David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:25 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-08 13:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-07 22:22 ` [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 10:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 17:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 21:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:34 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:38 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-08 10:45 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 10:42 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 11:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-08 11:25 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 16:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 15:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-10 15:31 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-08 10:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 10:53 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-08 12:49 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:44 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 23:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:58 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 0:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 0:42 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 0:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 0:55 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 0:44 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 0:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 1:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 3:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-09 13:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 13:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 17:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-09 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-16 8:58 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-09 1:16 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 1:21 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch II Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 1:23 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 1:49 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-09 1:53 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-09 1:18 ` [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows on context switch Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 0:06 ` Andi Kleen
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