From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future CPUs
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 12:10:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1518783021.7876.34.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d61edc94-8a51-62bd-65ed-8068451ca5b5@redhat.com>
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On Fri, 2018-02-16 at 12:04 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 16/02/2018 11:21, David Woodhouse wrote:
> >
> > Why? With IBRS_ALL the guest *never* gets to affect the actual hardware
> > MSR, which is always on. The MSR is purely an emulated no-op. Why does
> > that affect migration?
> Because even if the host has IBRS_ALL, as long as you want to migrate to
> a system without IBRS_ALL the guest will likely not have it. You can
> fake IBRS_ALL on the older system after migration, and forcing the guest
> to always run with IBRS=1 even when in user mode; that is slow. Or...
No you can't; it's also a barrier. You can't just leave it on.
> > Even if the guest doesn't have/support IBRS_ALL, and is frobbing the
> > (now emulated) MSR on every kernel entry/exit, that's *still* going to
> > be a metric shitload faster than what it *thought* it was doing.
>
> ... you are making every kernel entry/exit 3 times slower by adding two
> KVM exits (both hypervisor traps and syscalls are in the 1000-1500 clock
> cycles ballpark). That cannot be fast at all.
I'm not convinced I care. It's still on a par with the performance of
*actually* frobbing IBRS every time. If the guest cares about
performance, they'll be using retpoline instead and not doing that.
We really don't want to penalise the *host*, and other guests, for one
guest which does stupid things.
And if we have a conditional 'set IBRS back on because we're using
IBRS_ALL and the guest had access to it' in the vmexit path, only the
*first* clause (IBRS_ALL) of that condition can be done with
alternatives. The other part is necessarily a runtime thing, and thus
needs the 'else lfence' to make sure it really happens, penalising
*all* guests. (Unless there's something else guaranteed to be
serialising in that path but after Arjan mentioned it last time I took
a quick look and didn't see anything unconditional).
An alternative would be to put the SPEC_CTRL MSR into the list of MSRs
to be automatically saved/reset at vmexit, but we've already carefully
*changed* from doing that for the non-IBRS_ALL case because doing it
manually in the host is faster. I don't know that we want that
additional complexity — that might be the last straw that makes us tell
Intel "no, in that case we don't want IBRS_ALL as it is. Define a new
bit which is like IBRS_ALL but also promises that it's always like that
and the IBRS bit in the MSR is a no-op". That new bit would be set on
all future hardware except a small handful of current chips, I believe.
I think we can live with trapping and emulating SPEC_CTRL for the
guests which use it, for now.
If we *really* want to explore optimising it somehow, there's nothing
to prevent us doing that in a subsequent patch.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-16 12:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-12 15:27 [PATCH 1/2] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future CPUs David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 7:47 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-13 8:12 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 8:02 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13 8:15 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 9:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13 10:21 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 10:36 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13 10:53 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 10:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-16 9:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-16 10:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-16 10:21 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-16 11:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-16 12:10 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-02-19 23:37 ` Jon Masters
2018-02-19 23:42 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-19 23:53 ` valdis.kletnieks
2018-02-20 0:00 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20 0:13 ` Alan Cox
2018-02-20 0:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-20 1:03 ` Alan Cox
2018-02-20 1:08 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20 8:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 11:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-20 14:08 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20 14:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-20 14:59 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20 15:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-23 18:12 ` Is: RSB Alternative bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Was:Re: " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-23 18:18 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-15 15:21 ` Pavel Machek
2018-02-13 8:57 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again tip-bot for David Woodhouse
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