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From: "tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/mm] x86/fault: Correct a few user vs kernel checks wrt WRUSS
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 17:45:55 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <161297915574.23325.6956352117154470598.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a7b7bcea730bd4069e6b7e629236bb2cf526c2fb.1612924255.git.luto@kernel.org>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/mm branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     56e62cd28aaae2fcbec8af67b05843c47c6da170
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/56e62cd28aaae2fcbec8af67b05843c47c6da170
Author:        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 09 Feb 2021 18:33:38 -08:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 14:13:32 +01:00

x86/fault: Correct a few user vs kernel checks wrt WRUSS

In general, page fault errors for WRUSS should be just like get_user(),
etc.  Fix three bugs in this area:

There is a comment that says that, if the kernel can't handle a page fault
on a user address due to OOM, the OOM-kill-and-retry logic would be
skipped.  The code checked kernel *privilege*, not kernel mode, so it
missed WRUSS.  This means that the kernel would malfunction if it got OOM
on a WRUSS fault -- this would be a kernel-mode, user-privilege fault, and
the OOM killer would be invoked and the handler would retry the faulting
instruction.

A failed user access from kernel while a fatal signal is pending should
fail even if the instruction in question was WRUSS.

do_sigbus() should not send SIGBUS for WRUSS -- it should handle it like
any other kernel mode failure.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a7b7bcea730bd4069e6b7e629236bb2cf526c2fb.1612924255.git.luto@kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 013910b..b110484 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
 	  vm_fault_t fault)
 {
 	/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
-	if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
+	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
 		no_context(regs, error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -1217,7 +1217,14 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_kern_addr_fault);
 
-/* Handle faults in the user portion of the address space */
+/*
+ * Handle faults in the user portion of the address space.  Nothing in here
+ * should check X86_PF_USER without a specific justification: for almost
+ * all purposes, we should treat a normal kernel access to user memory
+ * (e.g. get_user(), put_user(), etc.) the same as the WRUSS instruction.
+ * The one exception is AC flag handling, which is, per the x86
+ * architecture, special for WRUSS.
+ */
 static inline
 void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
 			unsigned long error_code,
@@ -1406,14 +1413,14 @@ good_area:
 	if (likely(!(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)))
 		return;
 
-	if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
+	if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !user_mode(regs)) {
 		no_context(regs, error_code, address, 0, 0);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
 		/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
-		if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
+		if (!user_mode(regs)) {
 			no_context(regs, error_code, address,
 				   SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR);
 			return;

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-10 17:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-10  2:33 [PATCH v2 00/14] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] x86/fault: Fix AMD erratum #91 errata fixup for user code Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  7:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] x86/fault: Skip the AMD erratum #91 workaround on unaffected CPUs Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] x86/fault: Fold mm_fault_error() into do_user_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/fault/32: Move is_f00f_bug() to do_kern_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] x86/fault: Document the locking in the fault_signal_pending() path Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/fault: Correct a few user vs kernel checks wrt WRUSS Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] x86/fault: Improve kernel-executing-user-memory handling Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] x86/fault: Skip erratum #93 workaround on new CPUs Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  6:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 13:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-10 16:09       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] x86/fault: Split the OOPS code out from no_context() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] x86/fault: Bypass no_context() for implicit kernel faults from usermode Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] x86/fault: Rename no_context() to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] x86/fault: Don't look for extable entries for SMEP violations Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/fault: Don't run fixups for SMAP violations Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10  2:33 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/fault, x86/efi: Fix and rename efi_recover_from_page_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45   ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/{fault,efi}: " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-11  8:38   ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/fault, x86/efi: " Ard Biesheuvel
2021-02-10 13:57 ` [RFC][PATCH] kprobes: Remove kprobe::fault_handler Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-10 19:09   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-02-10 19:47   ` Alexei Starovoitov

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