From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/fault: Correct a few user vs kernel checks wrt WRUSS
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 18:33:38 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a7b7bcea730bd4069e6b7e629236bb2cf526c2fb.1612924255.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1612924255.git.luto@kernel.org>
In general, page fault errors for WRUSS should be just like get_user(),
etc. Fix three bugs in this area:
There is a comment that says that, if the kernel can't handle a page fault
on a user address due to OOM, the OOM-kill-and-retry logic would be
skipped. The code checked kernel *privilege*, not kernel mode, so it
missed WRUSS. This means that the kernel would malfunction if it got OOM
on a WRUSS fault -- this would be a kernel-mode, user-privilege fault, and
the OOM killer would be invoked and the handler would retry the faulting
instruction.
A failed user access from kernel while a fatal signal is pending should
fail even if the instruction in question was WRUSS.
do_sigbus() should not send SIGBUS for WRUSS -- it should handle it like
any other kernel mode failure.
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 15 +++++++++++----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 013910b7b93f..b1104844260d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
vm_fault_t fault)
{
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
- if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
+ if (!user_mode(regs)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR);
return;
}
@@ -1217,7 +1217,14 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_kern_addr_fault);
-/* Handle faults in the user portion of the address space */
+/*
+ * Handle faults in the user portion of the address space. Nothing in here
+ * should check X86_PF_USER without a specific justification: for almost
+ * all purposes, we should treat a normal kernel access to user memory
+ * (e.g. get_user(), put_user(), etc.) the same as the WRUSS instruction.
+ * The one exception is AC flag handling, which is, per the x86
+ * architecture, special for WRUSS.
+ */
static inline
void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long error_code,
@@ -1406,14 +1413,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
if (likely(!(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)))
return;
- if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !user_mode(regs)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address, 0, 0);
return;
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
- if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
+ if (!user_mode(regs)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR);
return;
--
2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-10 2:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-10 2:33 [PATCH v2 00/14] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] x86/fault: Fix AMD erratum #91 errata fixup for user code Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 7:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] x86/fault: Skip the AMD erratum #91 workaround on unaffected CPUs Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] x86/fault: Fold mm_fault_error() into do_user_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/fault/32: Move is_f00f_bug() to do_kern_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] x86/fault: Document the locking in the fault_signal_pending() path Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/fault: Correct a few user vs kernel checks wrt WRUSS tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] x86/fault: Improve kernel-executing-user-memory handling Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] x86/fault: Skip erratum #93 workaround on new CPUs Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 6:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 13:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-10 16:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] x86/fault: Split the OOPS code out from no_context() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] x86/fault: Bypass no_context() for implicit kernel faults from usermode Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] x86/fault: Rename no_context() to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] x86/fault: Don't look for extable entries for SMEP violations Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/fault: Don't run fixups for SMAP violations Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 2:33 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/fault, x86/efi: Fix and rename efi_recover_from_page_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-10 17:45 ` [tip: x86/mm] x86/{fault,efi}: " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-11 8:38 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/fault, x86/efi: " Ard Biesheuvel
2021-02-10 13:57 ` [RFC][PATCH] kprobes: Remove kprobe::fault_handler Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-10 19:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-02-10 19:47 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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