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From: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: s390: Honor storage keys when accessing guest memory
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 09:58:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <16b309d4-4427-284f-3b8b-507e66a96863@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3e50722f-0b96-78ce-6d5a-6b6f9931f218@linux.ibm.com>

On 1/20/22 09:50, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
> 
> 
> Am 20.01.22 um 09:11 schrieb Janis Schoetterl-Glausch:
>> On 1/19/22 20:27, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
>>> Am 18.01.22 um 10:52 schrieb Janis Schoetterl-Glausch:
>>>> Storage key checking had not been implemented for instructions emulated
>>>> by KVM. Implement it by enhancing the functions used for guest access,
>>>> in particular those making use of access_guest which has been renamed
>>>> to access_guest_with_key.
>>>> Accesses via access_guest_real should not be key checked.
>>>>
>>>> For actual accesses, key checking is done by __copy_from/to_user_with_key
>>>> (which internally uses MVCOS/MVCP/MVCS).
>>>> In cases where accessibility is checked without an actual access,
>>>> this is performed by getting the storage key and checking
>>>> if the access key matches.
>>>> In both cases, if applicable, storage and fetch protection override
>>>> are honored.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/s390/include/asm/ctl_reg.h |   2 +
>>>>    arch/s390/include/asm/page.h    |   2 +
>>>>    arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c         | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>>>    arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.h         |  78 ++++++++++++--
>>>>    arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c       |  12 +--
>>>>    arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c        |   4 +-
>>>>    6 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/ctl_reg.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/ctl_reg.h
>>>> index 04dc65f8901d..c800199a376b 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/ctl_reg.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/ctl_reg.h
>>>> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
>>>>      #define CR0_CLOCK_COMPARATOR_SIGN    BIT(63 - 10)
>>>>    #define CR0_LOW_ADDRESS_PROTECTION    BIT(63 - 35)
>>>> +#define CR0_FETCH_PROTECTION_OVERRIDE    BIT(63 - 38)
>>>> +#define CR0_STORAGE_PROTECTION_OVERRIDE    BIT(63 - 39)
>>>>    #define CR0_EMERGENCY_SIGNAL_SUBMASK    BIT(63 - 49)
>>>>    #define CR0_EXTERNAL_CALL_SUBMASK    BIT(63 - 50)
>>>>    #define CR0_CLOCK_COMPARATOR_SUBMASK    BIT(63 - 52)
>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
>>>> index d98d17a36c7b..cfc4d6fb2385 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
>>>> @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
>>>>    #define PAGE_SIZE    _PAGE_SIZE
>>>>    #define PAGE_MASK    _PAGE_MASK
>>>>    #define PAGE_DEFAULT_ACC    0
>>>> +/* storage-protection override */
>>>> +#define PAGE_SPO_ACC        9
>>>>    #define PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY    (PAGE_DEFAULT_ACC << 4)
>>>>      #define HPAGE_SHIFT    20
>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
>>>> index 4460808c3b9a..92ab96d55504 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gaccess.c
>>>> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
>>>>    #include <linux/mm_types.h>
>>>>    #include <linux/err.h>
>>>>    #include <linux/pgtable.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/bitfield.h>
>>>>      #include <asm/gmap.h>
>>>>    #include "kvm-s390.h"
>>>> @@ -794,6 +795,79 @@ static int low_address_protection_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>>        return 1;
>>>>    }
>>>>    +static bool fetch_prot_override_applicable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum gacc_mode mode,
>>>> +                       union asce asce)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    psw_t *psw = &vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw;
>>>> +    unsigned long override;
>>>> +
>>>> +    if (mode == GACC_FETCH || mode == GACC_IFETCH) {
>>>> +        /* check if fetch protection override enabled */
>>>> +        override = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0];
>>>> +        override &= CR0_FETCH_PROTECTION_OVERRIDE;
>>>> +        /* not applicable if subject to DAT && private space */
>>>> +        override = override && !(psw_bits(*psw).dat && asce.p);
>>>> +        return override;
>>>> +    }
>>>> +    return false;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static bool fetch_prot_override_applies(unsigned long ga, unsigned int len)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    return ga < 2048 && ga + len <= 2048;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static bool storage_prot_override_applicable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    /* check if storage protection override enabled */
>>>> +    return vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0] & CR0_STORAGE_PROTECTION_OVERRIDE;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static bool storage_prot_override_applies(char access_control)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    /* matches special storage protection override key (9) -> allow */
>>>> +    return access_control == PAGE_SPO_ACC;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int vcpu_check_access_key(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char access_key,
>>>> +                 enum gacc_mode mode, union asce asce, gpa_t gpa,
>>>> +                 unsigned long ga, unsigned int len)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    unsigned char storage_key, access_control;
>>>> +    unsigned long hva;
>>>> +    int r;
>>>> +
>>>> +    /* access key 0 matches any storage key -> allow */
>>>> +    if (access_key == 0)
>>>> +        return 0;
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * caller needs to ensure that gfn is accessible, so we can
>>>> +     * assume that this cannot fail
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    hva = gfn_to_hva(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
>>>> +    mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
>>>> +    r = get_guest_storage_key(current->mm, hva, &storage_key);
>>>> +    mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
>>>> +    if (r)
>>>> +        return r;
>>>> +    access_control = FIELD_GET(_PAGE_ACC_BITS, storage_key);
>>>> +    /* access key matches storage key -> allow */
>>>> +    if (access_control == access_key)
>>>> +        return 0;
>>>> +    if (mode == GACC_FETCH || mode == GACC_IFETCH) {
>>>> +        /* mismatching keys, no fetch protection -> allowed */
>>>> +        if (!(storage_key & _PAGE_FP_BIT))
>>>> +            return 0;
>>>> +        if (fetch_prot_override_applicable(vcpu, mode, asce))
>>>> +            if (fetch_prot_override_applies(ga, len))
>>>> +                return 0;
>>>> +    }
>>>> +    if (storage_prot_override_applicable(vcpu))
>>>> +        if (storage_prot_override_applies(access_control))
>>>> +            return 0;
>>>> +    return PGM_PROTECTION;
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> This function is just a pre-check (and early-exit) and we do an additional final check
>>> in the MVCOS routing later on, correct? It might actually be faster to get rid of this
>>
>> No, this exists for those cases that do not do an actual access, that is MEMOPs with
>> the check only flag, as well as the TEST PROTECTION emulation. access_guest_with_key
>> passes key 0 so we take the early return. It's easy to miss so Janosch suggested a comment there.
> 
> Dont we always call it in guest_range_to_gpas, which is also called for the memory access in
> access_guest_with_key?
@@ -904,16 +1018,37 @@ int access_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long ga, u8 ar, void *data,
 		gpas = vmalloc(array_size(nr_pages, sizeof(unsigned long)));
 	if (!gpas)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	try_fetch_prot_override = fetch_prot_override_applicable(vcpu, mode, asce);
+	try_storage_prot_override = storage_prot_override_applicable(vcpu);
 	need_ipte_lock = psw_bits(*psw).dat && !asce.r;
 	if (need_ipte_lock)
 		ipte_lock(vcpu);
-	rc = guest_range_to_gpas(vcpu, ga, ar, gpas, len, asce, mode);
-	for (idx = 0; idx < nr_pages && !rc; idx++) {
+	rc = guest_range_to_gpas(vcpu, ga, ar, gpas, len, asce, mode, 0);

Yes, but the key is 0 in that case, so we don't do any key checking.  ^
> 
>>
>>> pre-test and simply rely on MVCOS. MVCOS is usually just some cycles while ISKE to read
>>> the key is really slow path and take hundreds of cycles. This would even simplify the
>>> patch (assuming that we do proper key checking all the time).
>>


  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-20  8:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-18  9:52 [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] KVM: s390: Do storage key checking Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/10] s390/uaccess: Add storage key checked access to user memory Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18 13:18   ` Janosch Frank
2022-01-18 15:37   ` Sven Schnelle
2022-01-18 15:52     ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-19  9:48   ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-19 11:02     ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-19 13:20       ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-20  8:34         ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-20 12:56           ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-20 18:19             ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-21  7:32               ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-21 11:04                 ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-21 13:46                   ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-21 14:26                     ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-24 10:38                       ` [RFC PATCH] uaccess: Add mechanism for " Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-24 17:41                         ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-25 12:35                           ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-25 13:23                             ` Heiko Carstens
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: s390: Honor storage keys when accessing guest memory Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18 14:38   ` Janosch Frank
2022-01-20 10:27     ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-20 10:30       ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-19 19:27   ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-20  8:11     ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-20  8:50       ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-20  8:58         ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch [this message]
2022-01-20  9:06           ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/10] KVM: s390: handle_tprot: Honor storage keys Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/10] KVM: s390: selftests: Test TEST PROTECTION emulation Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-20 15:40   ` Janosch Frank
2022-01-21 11:03     ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-21 12:28       ` Claudio Imbrenda
2022-01-21 13:50         ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/10] KVM: s390: Add optional storage key checking to MEMOP IOCTL Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18 11:51   ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: s390: Add vm IOCTL for key checked guest absolute memory access Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-19 11:52   ` Thomas Huth
2022-01-19 12:46     ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-19 12:53       ` Thomas Huth
2022-01-19 13:17         ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-20 10:38   ` Thomas Huth
2022-01-20 11:20     ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-20 12:23     ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-25 12:00       ` Thomas Huth
2022-01-27 16:29         ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-27 17:34           ` Claudio Imbrenda
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/10] KVM: s390: Rename existing vcpu memop functions Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/10] KVM: s390: selftests: Test memops with storage keys Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/10] KVM: s390: Add capability for storage key extension of MEM_OP IOCTL Janis Schoetterl-Glausch
2022-01-18 15:12   ` Christian Borntraeger
2022-01-18  9:52 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/10] KVM: s390: selftests: Make use of capability in MEM_OP test Janis Schoetterl-Glausch

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