From: "tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 08:40:23 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <171282482362.10875.17185203405613428370.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30
Author: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
AuthorDate: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 22:40:45 -07:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 10:30:25 +02:00
x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 15 ++++++++-------
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++-----
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index b70b1d8..3cf18e4 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -439,11 +439,11 @@ The possible values in this file are:
- System is protected by retpoline
* - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
- System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
- * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
- System is protected by software clearing sequence
* - BHI: Syscall hardening
- Syscalls are hardened against BHI
- * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop
+ * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop
- System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
@@ -666,13 +666,14 @@ kernel command line.
of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
on
- unconditionally enable.
+ (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+ needed.
off
- unconditionally disable.
+ Disable the mitigation.
auto
- enable if hardware mitigation
- control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise
- enable alternate mitigation in KVM.
+ Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
+ *don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM.
+ The system may be vulnerable.
For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 70046a0..a029ad6 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3444,6 +3444,7 @@
retbleed=off [X86]
spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+ spectre_bhi=off [X86]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
@@ -6069,11 +6070,12 @@
deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
clearing sequence.
- on - unconditionally enable.
- off - unconditionally disable.
- auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation
- (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable
- alternate mitigation in KVM.
+ on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
+ as needed.
+ off - Disable the mitigation.
+ auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
+ *don't* enable the SW mitigation except
+ for KVM. The system may be vulnerable.
spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-11 8:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 5:40 [PATCH 0/7] x86/bugs: BHI fixes / improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/bugs: BHI documentation fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 8:40 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:22 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 7:32 ` [PATCH 2b/7] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' tip-bot2 for Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:02 ` [PATCH 3/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:34 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:20 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 15:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:06 ` [PATCH 5/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 0:15 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 3:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 4:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 5:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 20:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 5:27 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 10:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-12 6:28 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 6:37 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 6:23 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 5:40 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 7:48 ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11 8:18 ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-17 5:35 ` Reinette Chatre
2024-04-11 15:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 8:40 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
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