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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 22:40:51 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 17 +++--------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index b63b6767a63d..4474bf32d0a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2633,27 +2633,16 @@ config MITIGATION_RFDS
 	  stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
 	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
 
-choice
-	prompt "Clear branch history"
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI
+	bool "Mitigate Spectre-BHB (Branch History Injection)"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
-	default SPECTRE_BHI_ON
+	default y
 	help
 	  Enable BHI mitigations. BHI attacks are a form of Spectre V2 attacks
 	  where the branch history buffer is poisoned to speculatively steer
 	  indirect branches.
 	  See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
 
-config SPECTRE_BHI_ON
-	bool "on"
-	help
-	  Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=on command line parameter.
-config SPECTRE_BHI_OFF
-	bool "off"
-	help
-	  Equivalent to setting spectre_bhi=off command line parameter.
-
-endchoice
-
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 74ade6d7caa3..4c46fa2d08c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ enum bhi_mitigations {
 };
 
 static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI_ON) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 {
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11  5:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11  5:40 [PATCH 0/7] x86/bugs: BHI fixes / improvements Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86/bugs: BHI documentation fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:21   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:22   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  7:32   ` [PATCH 2b/7] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Cache the value of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86/bugs: Fix BHI handling of RRSBA Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:02   ` [PATCH 3/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:34     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:20   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11 15:08     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11 10:06   ` [PATCH 5/7] " Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 15:38     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:24       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12  0:15   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12  3:57     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  4:17       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  5:20         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:36           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-12 20:24             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12  5:27       ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12 10:07       ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-12  6:28   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-12  6:37     ` Pawan Gupta
2024-04-11  5:40 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  6:23   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12   ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  5:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-04-11  7:48   ` [PATCH 7/7] x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI Ingo Molnar
2024-04-11  8:18     ` Ingo Molnar
2024-04-17  5:35       ` Reinette Chatre
2024-04-11 15:24     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-11  8:40   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-12 10:12   ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf

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