From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
andi@firstfloor.org, sandyinchina@gmail.com,
cryptography@lakedaemon.net, jsd@av8n.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG
Date: Wed, 04 May 2016 08:24:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1911535.59KOZ91Nl5@positron.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2341945.hVvssvnSpF@tauon.atsec.com>
Am Dienstag, 3. Mai 2016, 11:36:12 schrieb Stephan Mueller:
Hi Ted,
> > +
> > +static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
> > +{
> > + ssize_t ret = 0, i;
> > + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
> > + int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
> > +
> > + while (nbytes) {
> > + if (large_request && need_resched()) {
> > + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> > + if (ret == 0)
> > + ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + schedule();
> > + }
> > +
> > + extract_crng(tmp);
> > + i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
> > + if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
> > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + nbytes -= i;
> > + buf += i;
> > + ret += i;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Wipe data just written to memory */
> > + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
>
> Would it make sense to add another chacha20_block() call here at the end?
> Note, the one thing about the SP800-90A DRBG I really like is the enhanced
> backward secrecy support which is implemented by "updating" the internal
> state (the key / state) used for one or more random number generation
> rounds after one request for random numbers is satisfied.
>
> This means that even if the state becomes known or the subsequent caller
> manages to deduce the state of the RNG to some degree of confidence, he
> cannot backtrack the already generated random numbers.
>
> I see that the ChaCha20 RNG implicitly updates its state while it operates.
> But for the last round of the RNG, there is no more shuffling of the
> internal state. As one round is 64 bytes in size and many callers just want
> 16 or 32 bytes (as seen during testing), a lot of callers trigger only one
> round of the RNG.
After doing some performance tests, I see that we reach a performance of north
of 200 MB/s on my system (compare that to 12 MB/s for the SHA-1 version).
Thus, I would assume adding another call to chacha20_block should not hurt.
Ciao
Stephan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-04 6:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-02 6:26 [RFC PATCH 0/3] random: replace urandom pool with a CRNG Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-02 6:26 ` [PATCH 1/3] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-03 8:50 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-04 16:54 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-04 17:30 ` tytso
2016-05-04 17:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-03 9:36 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-04 6:24 ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2016-05-04 14:40 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-04 17:49 ` tytso
2016-05-04 18:22 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-04 18:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-04 19:07 ` tytso
2016-05-04 20:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-04 21:42 ` John Denker
2016-05-04 21:52 ` better patch for linux/bitops.h John Denker
2016-05-05 1:35 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-05 2:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-05 2:54 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-05 3:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-05 3:30 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-05 3:50 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-05 4:03 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-05 6:35 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-05 16:15 ` UB in general ... and linux/bitops.h in particular John Denker
2016-05-05 17:32 ` Andi Kleen
2016-05-06 2:25 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-05 21:34 ` better patch for linux/bitops.h Sandy Harris
2016-05-05 22:18 ` tytso
2016-05-05 22:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-05 22:38 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-06 0:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-04 21:56 ` [PATCH 1/3] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-04 22:06 ` linux/bitops.h John Denker
2016-05-04 23:06 ` linux/bitops.h Andi Kleen
2016-05-05 0:13 ` linux/bitops.h John Denker
2016-05-05 1:20 ` linux/bitops.h Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-05 1:27 ` linux/bitops.h H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-05 0:30 ` linux/bitops.h H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-05 0:48 ` linux/bitops.h Linus Torvalds
2016-05-06 20:08 ` linux/bitops.h Sasha Levin
2016-05-06 20:07 ` linux/bitops.h Sasha Levin
2016-05-06 20:25 ` linux/bitops.h H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-06 20:30 ` linux/bitops.h H. Peter Anvin
2016-05-02 6:26 ` [PATCH 2/3] random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-02 7:00 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-02 12:50 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-02 13:48 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-02 13:53 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-02 6:26 ` [PATCH 3/3] random: add interrupt callback to VMBus IRQ handler Theodore Ts'o
2016-05-02 9:00 ` Jeffrey Walton
2016-05-02 9:14 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-02 12:56 ` Theodore Ts'o
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