[RFC RFT PATCH] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[RFC RFT PATCH] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.

This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.

This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.

Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.

---
[RFC]:
The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
this inode.

Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.
---

Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..d4142ff9ce65 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,12 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		goto bail;
 	}
 
+	if (unlikely(le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) == 0)) {
+		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: i_mode is zero!\n",
+                           (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+		rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		goto bail;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [RFC RFT PATCH] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Joseph Qi]

On 2025/10/23 06:27, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> 
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> 
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> 
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
> ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
> 
> ---
> [RFC]:
> The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
> by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
> make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
> entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
> filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
> this inode.
> 
> Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
> corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
> explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
> the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
> Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
> handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.
> ---
> 
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> ---
>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 6 ++++++
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..d4142ff9ce65 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1456,6 +1456,12 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>  		goto bail;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (unlikely(le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) == 0)) {

It seems the buggy image is carefully crafted so that it can pass the
OCFS2_VALID_FL check.
Checking i_mode here looks wried. Could we check i_links_count instead?

Thanks,
Joseph

> +		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: i_mode is zero!\n",
> +                           (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> +		rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> +		goto bail;
> +	}
>  	/*
>  	 * Errors after here are fatal.
>  	 */

[PATCH v2] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.

This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.

This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.

Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.

---
[RFC]:
The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
this inode.

Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.
---
v2:
 - Reviewed how ext4 handling same situation and we come up with this
   solution
---
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..6c936f62b169 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,15 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
 		goto bail;
 	}
-
+	if (di->i_links_count == 0) {
+		if (le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) == 0 ||
+			!(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
+			mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: i_mode is zero!\n",
+			           (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+			rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			goto bail;
+		}
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v2] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Joseph Qi]

On 2025/10/24 10:30, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> 
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> 
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> 
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
> ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
> 
> ---
> [RFC]:
> The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
> by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
> make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
> entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
> filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
> this inode.
> 
> Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
> corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
> explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
> the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
> Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
> handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.
> ---
> v2:
>  - Reviewed how ext4 handling same situation and we come up with this
>    solution
> ---

The version change log should be after your SOB.

> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> ---
>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 +++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..6c936f62b169 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1455,7 +1455,15 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>  		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
>  		goto bail;
>  	}
> -
> +	if (di->i_links_count == 0) {
> +		if (le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) == 0 ||
> +			!(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {

Why not put those in a single check?
BTW, i_links_count is little endian and should convert to host endian first.
And we'd prefer the following alignment:

if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
    !(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL))
	......

Thanks,
Joseph


> +			mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: i_mode is zero!\n",
> +			           (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> +			rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> +			goto bail;
> +		}
> +	}
>  	/*
>  	 * Errors after here are fatal.
>  	 */

[PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.

This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.

This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.

Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.

---
[RFC]:
The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
this inode.

Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
v2:
 - Reviewed how ext4 handling same situation and we come up with this
   solution
---
v3:
 - Implement combined check for nlink=0, mode=0 and non-orphan
   as requested.
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..3feeaa475b62 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
 		goto bail;
 	}
-
+	if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
+		!(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
+			mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+				"Corrupt state (nlink=0, mode=0, !orphan) detected!\n",
+			        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+			rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			goto bail;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Joseph Qi]

On 2025/10/25 19:13, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> 
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> 
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> 
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
> ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
> 
> ---
> [RFC]:
> The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
> by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
> make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
> entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
> filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
> this inode.
> 
> Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
> corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
> explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
> the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
> Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
> handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.
> 
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> ---
> v2:
>  - Reviewed how ext4 handling same situation and we come up with this
>    solution
> ---
> v3:
>  - Implement combined check for nlink=0, mode=0 and non-orphan
>    as requested.
> ---
>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..3feeaa475b62 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1455,7 +1455,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>  		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
>  		goto bail;
>  	}
> -
> +	if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
> +		!(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {

	    ^Better to align here.

> +			mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "

One tab is engough.

Joseph
> +				"Corrupt state (nlink=0, mode=0, !orphan) detected!\n",
> +			        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> +			rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> +			goto bail;
> +	}
>  	/*
>  	 * Errors after here are fatal.
>  	 */

[PATCH v4] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.

This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.

This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.

Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.

---
[RFC]:
The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
this inode.

Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
v2:
 - Reviewed how ext4 handling same situation and we come up with this
   solution
---
v3:
 - Implement combined check for nlink=0, mode=0 and non-orphan
   as requested.
---
v4:
 - Fix code alignment issues
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..d966df3aa605 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
 		goto bail;
 	}
-
+	if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
+		!(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
+		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+			"Corrupt state (nlink=0, mode=0, !orphan) detected!\n",
+		        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+		rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		goto bail;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0

[RFT PATCH] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.

This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.

This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.

Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan) 
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..d966df3aa605 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
 		goto bail;
 	}
-
+	if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
+		!(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
+		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+			"Corrupt state (nlink=0, mode=0, !orphan) detected!\n",
+		        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+		rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		goto bail;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.

This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.

This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.

Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
v2:
 - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
 - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
 - Tested with ocfs2-test
---
v3:
 - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		goto bail;
 	}
 
+	if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
+		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+			"Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
+		        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+		rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		goto bail;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Errors after here are fatal.
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Heming Zhao]

On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 01:17:24AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> 
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> 
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> 
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
> 
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> v2:
>  - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
>  - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
>  - Tested with ocfs2-test
> ---
> v3:
>  - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> ---
>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>  		goto bail;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {

the code logic looks good to me, but I prefer the following code to save a few
cpu cycles.

```
/* only check if the "link count" or i_mode is ZERO */
if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode)
```

@Joseph
which do you like?

- Heming
> +		mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> +			"Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
> +		        (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> +		rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> +		goto bail;
> +	}
>  	/*
>  	 * Errors after here are fatal.
>  	 */
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 
> 

Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

Hi all,

Just a kind reminder regarding this patch.

Since We are participating in the Linux Kernel Mentorship Program and have
a nearing deadline, your feedback would be incredibly helpful for us to
move forward.

Thanks,
Ahmet Eray

Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Heming Zhao]

On Fri, Nov 28, 2025 at 05:36:06PM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> Just a kind reminder regarding this patch.
> 
> Since We are participating in the Linux Kernel Mentorship Program and have
> a nearing deadline, your feedback would be incredibly helpful for us to
> move forward.
> 
> Thanks,
> Ahmet Eray

I have provided my comment on the v3 patch. The sanity check is expensive,
costing about six lines of asm code for ocfs2_read_links_count() on a big-endian
architecture.

Also, since I'm not the maintainer, if Joseph agrees with your patch, he can
provide his Reviewed-by tag.

PS: Kindly note that the kernel mailing list generally discourages separate
emails for patch review threads.

Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Joseph Qi]

On 2025/11/20 10:32, Heming Zhao wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 01:17:24AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
>> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
>> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>>
>> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
>> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
>> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
>> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
>> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>>
>> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
>> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>>
>> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
>> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
>> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
>> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
>> the cache.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
>> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
>> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
>> ---
>> v2:
>>  - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
>>  - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
>>  - Tested with ocfs2-test
>> ---
>> v3:
>>  - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
>> ---
>>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
>>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>>  		goto bail;
>>  	}
>>  
>> +	if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
> 
> the code logic looks good to me, but I prefer the following code to save a few
> cpu cycles.
> 
> ```
> /* only check if the "link count" or i_mode is ZERO */
> if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode)
> ```
> 
> @Joseph
> which do you like?
> 
Sorry to miss this thread discuss.
The above check looks wried since "(di->i_links_count|di->i_links_count_hi)"
is meaningless, though it may work well...
So I'd prefer the code readability first.

BTW, from the syzbot report, I haven't seen where to show i_mode=0 or
i_nlink=0. Am I missing something?

Thanks,
Joseph

Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read

[Ahmet Eray Karadag]

On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 09:25:14AM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2025/11/20 10:32, Heming Zhao wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 01:17:24AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> >> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> >> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> >>
> >> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> >> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> >> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> >> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> >> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> >>
> >> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> >> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> >>
> >> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> >> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> >> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> >> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> >> the cache.
> >>
> >> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> >> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> >> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> >> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> >> ---
> >> v2:
> >>  - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> >>  - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> >>  - Tested with ocfs2-test
> >> ---
> >> v3:
> >>  - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> >> ---
> >>  fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
> >>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> >> index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
> >> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> >> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> >> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> >>  		goto bail;
> >>  	}
> >>  
> >> +	if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
> > 
> > the code logic looks good to me, but I prefer the following code to save a few
> > cpu cycles.
> > 
> > ```
> > /* only check if the "link count" or i_mode is ZERO */
> > if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode)
> > ```
> > 
> > @Joseph
> > which do you like?
> > 
> Sorry to miss this thread discuss.
> The above check looks wried since "(di->i_links_count|di->i_links_count_hi)"
> is meaningless, though it may work well...
> So I'd prefer the code readability first.
> 
> BTW, from the syzbot report, I haven't seen where to show i_mode=0 or
> i_nlink=0. Am I missing something?

You are right, the syzbot report itself doesn't explicitly dump the inode 
values. I reproduced the issue locally and debugged ocfs2_unlink() to 
inspect the inode attributes just before the crash.
The debug output confirmed that the inode had:
   i_ino = 17057
   i_nlink = 0
   i_mode = 0

It appears the inode block read succeeds (physically), but due to corruption, 
validation was insufficient, allowing a zeroed/corrupted inode struct to be 
initialized in the VFS cache.

> 
> Thanks,
> Joseph
>

Regarding the patch logic: We had previously discussed and seemed to agree 
on an approach in the thread linked below, but since I didn't get a 
final response there, I refreshed the patch here.

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/

Thanks,
Eray