Re: mlock(1)

[Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@novell.com>]

On Mon, Sep 27, 2004 at 05:25:06PM +0200, Stefan Seyfried wrote:
> Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
> >On Mon, Sep 27, 2004 at 04:34:54PM +0200, Stefan Seyfried wrote:
> 
> >Your "close-lid with suspend-to-disk" without ever asking password in
> >suspend is fundamentally unfixable, unless you use public key
> 
> or unless i enter it on every boot.

yes.

> >Probably the next best thing you can do is to ask a preventive suspend
> >password during boot, for the suspend-capable-machines. That would be
> >more reasonable since I'd leave it disabled on my desktop.
> 
> or just enter the cryptoswap password on every boot / resume :-)

but I don't need to, so I'd leave it disabled instead.

I'd also really leave the two things separated. There's no reason the
user should ever know the cryptoswap password. it only needs to know the
suspend/resume password. This way the cryptoswap password can be
choosen very big randomly and in turn with a lot more random bits than
what an user could remember by memory.

So you should only consider asking a "preventive" suspend password,
never the cryptoswap password, the latter will be transparent to the
user. suspend will automatically store safely the cryptoswap password on
disk, so you shouldn't even notice the swap methods are encrypting data.