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From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	mhalcrow@us.ibm.com
Subject: [patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check
Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 10:27:51 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050517152750.GC2944@halcrow.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050517152303.GA2814@halcrow.us>

This is the fourth in a series of seven patches to the BSD Secure
Levels LSM.  It adds a check for a memory allocation failure
condition.  Thanks to Vesa-Matti J Kari for pointing out this problem.

Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>

Index: linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl.orig/security/seclvl.c	2005-05-16 16:28:19.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c	2005-05-16 16:28:29.000000000 -0500
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@
 static int
 plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, int len)
 {
-	char *pgVirtAddr;
+	char *pg_virt_addr;
 	struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
 	struct scatterlist sg[1];
 	if (len > PAGE_SIZE) {
@@ -327,16 +327,20 @@
 	}
 	// Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries
 	// and scatterlists.
-	pgVirtAddr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pgVirtAddr);
+	pg_virt_addr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pg_virt_addr) {
+		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR "%s: Out of memory\n", __FUNCTION__);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pg_virt_addr);
 	sg[0].offset = 0;
 	sg[0].length = len;
-	strncpy(pgVirtAddr, plaintext, len);
+	strncpy(pg_virt_addr, plaintext, len);
 	crypto_digest_init(tfm);
 	crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
 	crypto_digest_final(tfm, hash);
 	crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
-	free_page((unsigned long)pgVirtAddr);
+	free_page((unsigned long)pg_virt_addr);
 	return 0;
 }
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-05-17 15:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-05-17 15:23 [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:25 ` [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 16:09   ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-05-17 16:49     ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 16:57       ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 19:46       ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 20:13         ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 15:26 ` [patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:27 ` Michael Halcrow [this message]
2005-05-17 17:27   ` [patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Alexey Dobriyan
2005-05-17 15:30 ` [patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:33 ` [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul dean gaudet
2005-05-19  1:29 ` Dave Hansen
2005-05-19 10:39   ` Bernd Petrovitsch
2005-05-19 20:55 ` [updated patch " Michael Halcrow
2005-05-19 21:41   ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20  5:19     ` aq
2005-05-20 15:03   ` [updated patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: bd_claim fixes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:06   ` [updated patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:09   ` [updated patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:10   ` [updated patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:13   ` [updated patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:15   ` [updated patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:20   ` [patch 8/7] BSD Secure Levels: unregister on sysfs failure Michael Halcrow

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