From: Al Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
To: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp
Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 21:13:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050517201310.GD29811@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050517194616.GA14957@halcrow.us>
On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 02:46:17PM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote:
> In my tests, utime() does not cause file_permission() to be called.
> > Use of current in setting/checking ->i_security is a bad joke.
OK, these applied to the original. Now to the patched version:
a) ->file_permission() is called on every write(2). So you get
an open() for each write(). And only one matching close() (aka. blkdev_put())
b) ->file_permission() is *not* called on mmap() path. So much for
protection, exclusion, etc.
c) you get bd_claim() on each write(); subsequent ones work just
fine, since you use the same holder. On close() you undo one of those.
Leaving the rest there, with holder pointing to freed-and-soon-to-be-reused
struct file.
> > d) cargo-cult programming: ->f_dentry and ->f_dentry->d_inode are
> > *not* NULL, TYVM.
>
> Exactly what code are you refering to here?
seclvl_file_free_security(), but I have to lift that objection in part - this
crap gets called from put_filp(), so ->f_dentry might be NULL. If it is not
NULL, though, we are guaranteed that ->f_dentry->d_inode will *not* be NULL.
BTW, all your checks in that path can be replaced with a single check for
f->f_security being non-NULL. Not that it helped, though - see (a) and (c)
above.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-05-17 20:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-05-17 15:23 [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:25 ` [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 16:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-05-17 16:49 ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 16:57 ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 19:46 ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 20:13 ` Al Viro [this message]
2005-05-17 15:26 ` [patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:27 ` [patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:27 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2005-05-17 15:30 ` [patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:33 ` [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul dean gaudet
2005-05-19 1:29 ` Dave Hansen
2005-05-19 10:39 ` Bernd Petrovitsch
2005-05-19 20:55 ` [updated patch " Michael Halcrow
2005-05-19 21:41 ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 5:19 ` aq
2005-05-20 15:03 ` [updated patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: bd_claim fixes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:06 ` [updated patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:09 ` [updated patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:10 ` [updated patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:13 ` [updated patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:15 ` [updated patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:20 ` [patch 8/7] BSD Secure Levels: unregister on sysfs failure Michael Halcrow
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