From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>,
mhalcrow@us.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp
Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 14:46:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050517194616.GA14957@halcrow.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050517164922.GA29811@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Al -
Thank you for your feedback. I believe that most of your concerns are
addressed with this set of patches.
On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 05:49:22PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 05:09:00PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 10:25:46AM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote:
> > > +/**
> > > + * Claim the blockdev to exclude mounters; release on file close.
> > > + */
> > > +static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct file *filp)
> > > {
> > > - int holder;
> > > struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
> > > - dev_t dev = inode->i_rdev;
> > > + dev_t dev = filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev;
> > > bdev = open_by_devnum(dev, FMODE_WRITE);
> > > if (bdev) {
> > > - if (bd_claim(bdev, &holder)) {
> > > + if (bd_claim(bdev, filp)) {
> > > blkdev_put(bdev);
> > > return -EPERM;
> > > }
> > > - /* claimed, mark it to release on close */
> > > - inode->i_security = current;
> > > + /* Claimed; mark it to release on close */
> > > + filp->f_security = filp;
> > > }
> > > return 0;
> >
> > While we're at it this code is crap before and after your patch.
> > There's absolutely no point at all to use open_by_devnum if you
> > already have an inode or file that you can get the struct
> > block_device from easily.
>
> It's worse than you think. No, they do *not* necessary have
> block_device there. Guess what happens if some clown calls
> e.g. utime("/dev/sda", NULL)? That's right, we go checking if we
> have write permissions on the file in question.
In my tests, utime() does not cause file_permission() to be called.
> Use of current in setting/checking ->i_security is a bad joke.
The patch fixes this:
- /* claimed, mark it to release on close */
- inode->i_security = current;
+ /* Claimed; mark it to release on close */
+ filp->f_security = filp
...
> d) cargo-cult programming: ->f_dentry and ->f_dentry->d_inode are
> *not* NULL, TYVM.
Exactly what code are you refering to here?
> While we are at it... Guys, you do realize that registering an
> object and then deciding to bail out of module_init requires
> unregistering it?
Thanks; this is fixed in the next round of patches.
Mike
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-05-17 19:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-05-17 15:23 [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:25 ` [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 16:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-05-17 16:49 ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 16:57 ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 19:46 ` Michael Halcrow [this message]
2005-05-17 20:13 ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 15:26 ` [patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:27 ` [patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:27 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2005-05-17 15:30 ` [patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:33 ` [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul dean gaudet
2005-05-19 1:29 ` Dave Hansen
2005-05-19 10:39 ` Bernd Petrovitsch
2005-05-19 20:55 ` [updated patch " Michael Halcrow
2005-05-19 21:41 ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 5:19 ` aq
2005-05-20 15:03 ` [updated patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: bd_claim fixes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:06 ` [updated patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:09 ` [updated patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:10 ` [updated patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:13 ` [updated patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:15 ` [updated patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:20 ` [patch 8/7] BSD Secure Levels: unregister on sysfs failure Michael Halcrow
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