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From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	mhalcrow@us.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp
Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 14:46:17 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050517194616.GA14957@halcrow.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050517164922.GA29811@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>

Al -

Thank you for your feedback.  I believe that most of your concerns are
addressed with this set of patches.

On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 05:49:22PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 05:09:00PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Tue, May 17, 2005 at 10:25:46AM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote:
> > > +/**
> > > + * Claim the blockdev to exclude mounters; release on file close.
> > > + */
> > > +static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct file *filp)
> > >  {
> > > -	int holder;
> > >  	struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
> > > -	dev_t dev = inode->i_rdev;
> > > +	dev_t dev = filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev;
> > >  	bdev = open_by_devnum(dev, FMODE_WRITE);
> > >  	if (bdev) {
> > > -		if (bd_claim(bdev, &holder)) {
> > > +		if (bd_claim(bdev, filp)) {
> > >  			blkdev_put(bdev);
> > >  			return -EPERM;
> > >  		}
> > > -		/* claimed, mark it to release on close */
> > > -		inode->i_security = current;
> > > +		/* Claimed; mark it to release on close */
> > > +		filp->f_security = filp;
> > >  	}
> > >  	return 0;
> >
> > While we're at it this code is crap before and after your patch.
> > There's absolutely no point at all to use open_by_devnum if you
> > already have an inode or file that you can get the struct
> > block_device from easily.
>
> It's worse than you think.  No, they do *not* necessary have
> block_device there.  Guess what happens if some clown calls
> e.g. utime("/dev/sda", NULL)?  That's right, we go checking if we
> have write permissions on the file in question.

In my tests, utime() does not cause file_permission() to be called.

> Use of current in setting/checking ->i_security is a bad joke.

The patch fixes this:

-		/* claimed, mark it to release on close */
-		inode->i_security = current;
+		/* Claimed; mark it to release on close */
+		filp->f_security = filp
...

> d) cargo-cult programming: ->f_dentry and ->f_dentry->d_inode are
> *not* NULL, TYVM.

Exactly what code are you refering to here?

> While we are at it...  Guys, you do realize that registering an
> object and then deciding to bail out of module_init requires
> unregistering it?

Thanks; this is fixed in the next round of patches.

Mike

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-05-17 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-05-17 15:23 [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:25 ` [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 16:09   ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-05-17 16:49     ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 16:57       ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 19:46       ` Michael Halcrow [this message]
2005-05-17 20:13         ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 15:26 ` [patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:27 ` [patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:27   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2005-05-17 15:30 ` [patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:33 ` [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul dean gaudet
2005-05-19  1:29 ` Dave Hansen
2005-05-19 10:39   ` Bernd Petrovitsch
2005-05-19 20:55 ` [updated patch " Michael Halcrow
2005-05-19 21:41   ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20  5:19     ` aq
2005-05-20 15:03   ` [updated patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: bd_claim fixes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:06   ` [updated patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:09   ` [updated patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:10   ` [updated patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:13   ` [updated patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:15   ` [updated patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:20   ` [patch 8/7] BSD Secure Levels: unregister on sysfs failure Michael Halcrow

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