From: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: ak@suse.de, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, arjan@infradead.org,
bunk@stusta.de, rlrevell@joe-job.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, alan@redhat.com, torvalds@osdl.org
Subject: Re: [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2006 18:51:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060712185103.f41b51d2.akpm@osdl.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20060712210732.GA10182@elte.hu>
On Wed, 12 Jul 2006 23:07:32 +0200
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> wrote:
> Despite good resons to apply the patch, it has not been applied yet,
> with no explanation.
I queued the below. Andrea claims that it'll reduce seccomp overhead to
literally zero.
But looking at it, I think it's a bit confused. The patch needs
s/DISABLE_TSC/ENABLE_TSC/ to make it right.
From: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Make the TSC disable purely paranoid feature optional, so by default seccomp
returns absolutely zerocost.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
---
arch/i386/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/i386/kernel/process.c | 2 ++
arch/x86_64/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
diff -puN arch/i386/Kconfig~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option arch/i386/Kconfig
--- a/arch/i386/Kconfig~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option
+++ a/arch/i386/Kconfig
@@ -737,6 +737,18 @@ config SECCOMP
If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+config SECCOMP_DISABLE_TSC
+ bool "Disable the TSC for seccomp tasks"
+ depends on SECCOMP
+ default n
+ help
+ This feature mathematically prevents covert channels
+ for tasks running under SECCOMP. This can generate
+ a minuscule overhead in the scheduler.
+
+ If you care most about performance say N. Say Y only if you're
+ paranoid about covert channels.
+
config VGA_NOPROBE
bool "Don't probe VGA at boot" if EMBEDDED
default n
diff -puN arch/i386/kernel/process.c~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option arch/i386/kernel/process.c
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option
+++ a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
@@ -572,6 +572,7 @@ handle_io_bitmap(struct thread_struct *n
static inline void disable_tsc(struct task_struct *prev_p,
struct task_struct *next_p)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_DISABLE_TSC
struct thread_info *prev, *next;
/*
@@ -590,6 +591,7 @@ static inline void disable_tsc(struct ta
has_secure_computing(next))
write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_TSD);
}
+#endif
}
/*
diff -puN arch/x86_64/Kconfig~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option arch/x86_64/Kconfig
--- a/arch/x86_64/Kconfig~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option
+++ a/arch/x86_64/Kconfig
@@ -526,6 +526,18 @@ config SECCOMP
If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+config SECCOMP_DISABLE_TSC
+ bool "Disable the TSC for seccomp tasks"
+ depends on SECCOMP
+ default n
+ help
+ This feature mathematically prevents covert channels
+ for tasks running under SECCOMP. This can generate
+ a minuscule overhead in the scheduler.
+
+ If you care most about performance say N. Say Y only if you're
+ paranoid about covert channels.
+
source kernel/Kconfig.hz
config REORDER
diff -puN arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
--- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c~add-seccomp_disable_tsc-config-option
+++ a/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
@@ -494,6 +494,35 @@ out:
}
/*
+ * This function selects if the context switch from prev to next
+ * has to tweak the TSC disable bit in the cr4.
+ */
+static inline void disable_tsc(struct task_struct *prev_p,
+ struct task_struct *next_p)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_DISABLE_TSC
+ struct thread_info *prev, *next;
+
+ /*
+ * gcc should eliminate the ->thread_info dereference if
+ * has_secure_computing returns 0 at compile time (SECCOMP=n).
+ */
+ prev = prev_p->thread_info;
+ next = next_p->thread_info;
+
+ if (has_secure_computing(prev) || has_secure_computing(next)) {
+ /* slow path here */
+ if (has_secure_computing(prev) &&
+ !has_secure_computing(next)) {
+ write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_TSD);
+ } else if (!has_secure_computing(prev) &&
+ has_secure_computing(next))
+ write_cr4((read_cr4() | X86_CR4_TSD) & ~X86_CR4_PCE);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
* This special macro can be used to load a debugging register
*/
#define loaddebug(thread,r) set_debugreg(thread->debugreg ## r, r)
@@ -622,6 +651,8 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p,
}
}
+ disable_tsc(prev_p, next_p);
+
/* If the task has used fpu the last 5 timeslices, just do a full
* restore of the math state immediately to avoid the trap; the
* chances of needing FPU soon are obviously high now
_
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-07-13 1:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-06-29 19:21 [2.6 patch] " Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30 0:44 ` Lee Revell
2006-06-30 1:07 ` Andrew Morton
2006-06-30 1:40 ` Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30 4:52 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-06-30 9:47 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-06-30 14:58 ` andrea
2006-07-11 7:36 ` [patch] " Ingo Molnar
2006-07-11 14:17 ` andrea
2006-07-11 14:32 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 15:31 ` andrea
2006-07-11 15:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:13 ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:23 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:57 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:25 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:02 ` Adrian Bunk
2006-07-11 16:16 ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:24 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 15:43 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:06 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:33 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:49 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13 3:16 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 11:23 ` Jeff Dike
2006-07-13 11:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13 3:04 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 3:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13 4:40 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 4:51 ` andrea
2006-07-13 5:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13 6:22 ` andrea
2006-07-13 1:51 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2006-07-13 2:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13 7:44 ` James Bruce
2006-07-13 8:34 ` andrea
2006-07-13 9:18 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-14 6:09 ` [PATCH] TIF_NOTSC and SECCOMP prctl andrea
2006-07-14 6:27 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-14 6:33 ` andrea
2006-07-13 12:13 ` [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:22 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:11 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-11 15:54 ` Pavel Machek
2006-06-30 12:39 ` [2.6 patch] " Alan Cox
2006-06-30 2:35 ` Randy.Dunlap
2006-06-30 15:03 ` Lee Revell
2006-07-08 9:23 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-11 1:59 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-11 4:16 ` andrea
2006-07-11 20:19 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:05 ` andrea
2006-07-12 22:02 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 23:44 ` andrea
2006-07-13 21:29 ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-13 23:11 ` andrea
2006-07-13 23:20 ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-14 0:34 ` andrea
2006-07-15 2:55 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-07-16 0:51 ` andrea
2006-07-16 1:54 ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-16 15:36 ` andrea
2006-07-13 2:56 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13 1:16 ` andrea
2006-07-13 1:37 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:37 [patch] " Chuck Ebbert
2006-07-12 21:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-12 22:48 ` andrea
2006-07-12 21:57 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-13 5:43 Albert Cahalan
2006-07-13 7:07 ` andrea
[not found] <6tgj0-8ip-19@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6xP8s-5mc-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6xUhQ-4Wx-33@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6xVdX-6oH-53@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6xVnz-6AI-21@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6xZUd-4Es-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6y7yy-7ws-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <6y7RK-7TX-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
2006-07-17 11:37 ` Bodo Eggert
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