From: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
To: andrea@cpushare.com
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
ajwade@cpe001346162bf9-cm0011ae8cd564.cpe.net.cable.rogers.com,
Lee Revell <rlrevell@joe-job.com>,
"Randy.Dunlap" <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
bunk@stusta.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@elte.hu
Subject: Re: [2.6 patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 21:29:41 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060713212940.GB4101@ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20060712234441.GA9102@opteron.random>
Hi!
> > Actually measuring time through the network is extremely doable given
> > enough samples as is communication through delay perturbation. A good
> > viterbi encoder/decoder will fish a signal out of very high noise. Yes
> > you pay a lot in data rate at that point but it works.
>
> Currently the bandwidth is free, I'll charge for the transaction
> associated bandwidth only if I'm forced to (which would happen quickly
> if people starts doing the above ;).
>
> The way the current transactions are running as we speak, is not like
> in a full peer to peer system. It's half peer to peer, a trusted node
> always sits in between buyer and seller. I need this for a multitude
> of reasons (I could offload the middle node in a p3p system that is
> reliable as long as only 1 of the 3 is malicious but it's certainly
> more secure if the node in the middle is fully trusted so I'll try to
> avoid that). So if you are right, my trusted node will simply add
> /dev/urandom delay as needed before forwarding any packet, to prevent
> any meaningful measurement. Any network side channel can be solved in
> a few liner patch and very quickly.
Actually random delays are unlike to help (much). You have just added
noise, but you can still decode original signal...
--
Thanks for all the (sleeping) penguins.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-07-13 21:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-06-29 19:21 Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30 0:44 ` Lee Revell
2006-06-30 1:07 ` Andrew Morton
2006-06-30 1:40 ` Adrian Bunk
2006-06-30 4:52 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-06-30 9:47 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-06-30 14:58 ` andrea
2006-07-11 7:36 ` [patch] " Ingo Molnar
2006-07-11 14:17 ` andrea
2006-07-11 14:32 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 15:31 ` andrea
2006-07-11 15:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:13 ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:23 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-07-11 16:57 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:25 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-11 16:02 ` Adrian Bunk
2006-07-11 16:16 ` andrea
2006-07-11 16:24 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 15:43 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:06 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:33 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 22:49 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13 3:16 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 11:23 ` Jeff Dike
2006-07-13 11:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13 3:04 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 3:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13 4:40 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-13 4:51 ` andrea
2006-07-13 5:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13 6:22 ` andrea
2006-07-13 1:51 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-13 2:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2006-07-13 7:44 ` James Bruce
2006-07-13 8:34 ` andrea
2006-07-13 9:18 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-14 6:09 ` [PATCH] TIF_NOTSC and SECCOMP prctl andrea
2006-07-14 6:27 ` Andrew Morton
2006-07-14 6:33 ` andrea
2006-07-13 12:13 ` [patch] let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n Andi Kleen
2006-07-12 21:22 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-12 22:11 ` Andi Kleen
2006-07-11 15:54 ` Pavel Machek
2006-06-30 12:39 ` [2.6 patch] " Alan Cox
2006-06-30 2:35 ` Randy.Dunlap
2006-06-30 15:03 ` Lee Revell
2006-07-08 9:23 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2006-07-11 1:59 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-11 4:16 ` andrea
2006-07-11 20:19 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:05 ` andrea
2006-07-12 22:02 ` Alan Cox
2006-07-12 23:44 ` andrea
2006-07-13 21:29 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2006-07-13 23:11 ` andrea
2006-07-13 23:20 ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-14 0:34 ` andrea
2006-07-15 2:55 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-07-16 0:51 ` andrea
2006-07-16 1:54 ` Pavel Machek
2006-07-16 15:36 ` andrea
2006-07-13 2:56 ` Andrew James Wade
2006-07-12 21:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2006-07-13 1:16 ` andrea
2006-07-13 1:37 ` Andrew James Wade
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-06-26 16:26 Adrian Bunk
2006-04-27 20:33 Adrian Bunk
2006-04-18 22:07 Adrian Bunk
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