* [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode
@ 2007-07-19 21:24 Michael Halcrow
2007-07-19 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring Michael Halcrow
` (7 more replies)
0 siblings, 8 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm
Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh,
mhalcrow, mike
This series of patches to eCryptfs introduces support for associating
multiple keys with individual files. When mounting, eCryptfs will
register one key for each key signature/identifier specified by an
ecryptfs_sig= mount option. These keys will all be used to encrypt the
FEK for each eCryptfs inode. This patch set also adds support for
searching the user's keyring for keys when opening existing files;
this allows the user to add keys to his keyring at any time, and
eCryptfs will use those keys to open files protected by those keys.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread* [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:25 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-20 13:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2007-07-20 22:26 ` Andrew Morton 2007-07-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 2/8] eCryptfs: Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping auth toks Michael Halcrow ` (6 subsequent siblings) 7 siblings, 2 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 208 ++++++++++-- fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 71 ++++- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 743 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 121 +++----- 4 files changed, 742 insertions(+), 401 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c index 6ac6306..4f7d895 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c @@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ void ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) { memset((void *)crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&crypt_stat->keysig_list); + mutex_init(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex); mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex); mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_hash_tfm_mutex); @@ -218,20 +220,41 @@ ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) */ void ecryptfs_destruct_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) { + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig, *key_sig_tmp; + if (crypt_stat->tfm) crypto_free_blkcipher(crypt_stat->tfm); if (crypt_stat->hash_tfm) crypto_free_hash(crypt_stat->hash_tfm); + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_sig, key_sig_tmp, + &crypt_stat->keysig_list, crypt_stat_list) { + list_del(&key_sig->crypt_stat_list); + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, key_sig); + } + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); } void ecryptfs_destruct_mount_crypt_stat( struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) { - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key) - key_put(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key); - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) - crypto_free_blkcipher(mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm); + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *auth_tok, *auth_tok_tmp; + + if (!(mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED)) + return; + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok, auth_tok_tmp, + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, + mount_crypt_stat_list) { + list_del(&auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list); + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks--; + if (auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key + && !(auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID)) + key_put(auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key); + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, auth_tok); + } + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); memset(mount_crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat)); } @@ -931,6 +954,30 @@ static void ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags( crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_VIEW_AS_ENCRYPTED; } +static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs( + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) +{ + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; + int rc = 0; + + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, + mount_crypt_stat_list) { + rc = ecryptfs_add_keysig(crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); + mutex_unlock( + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + goto out; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); +out: + return rc; +} + /** * ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals * @crypt_stat @@ -973,46 +1020,44 @@ static void ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals( /* Associate an authentication token(s) with the file */ int ecryptfs_new_file_context(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) { - int rc = 0; struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat; struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; int cipher_name_len; + int rc = 0; ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(crypt_stat, mount_crypt_stat); - /* See if there are mount crypt options */ - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing context for new " - "file using mount_crypt_stat\n"); - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; - ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, - mount_crypt_stat); - memcpy(crypt_stat->keysigs[crypt_stat->num_keysigs++], - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); - cipher_name_len = - strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); - memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, - cipher_name_len); - crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; - crypt_stat->key_size = - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; - ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); - } else - /* We should not encounter this scenario since we - * should detect lack of global_auth_tok at mount time - * TODO: Applies to 0.1 release only; remove in future - * release */ - BUG(); + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0); + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; + ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, + mount_crypt_stat); + rc = ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(crypt_stat, + mount_crypt_stat); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to copy mount-wide key sigs " + "to the inode key sigs; rc = [%d]\n", rc); + goto out; + } + cipher_name_len = + strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); + memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, + cipher_name_len); + crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; + crypt_stat->key_size = + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; + ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat); if (rc) ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error initializing cryptographic " "context for cipher [%s]: rc = [%d]\n", crypt_stat->cipher, rc); +out: return rc; } @@ -1776,7 +1821,7 @@ out: } /** - * ecryptfs_process_cipher - Perform cipher initialization. + * ecryptfs_process_key_cipher - Perform key cipher initialization. * @key_tfm: Crypto context for key material, set by this function * @cipher_name: Name of the cipher * @key_size: Size of the key in bytes @@ -1786,8 +1831,8 @@ out: * event, regardless of whether this function succeeds for fails. */ int -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, - size_t *key_size) +ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size) { char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; char *full_alg_name; @@ -1829,3 +1874,98 @@ ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, out: return rc; } + +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; +struct list_head key_tfm_list; +struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; + +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void) +{ + mutex_init(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key_tfm_list); + return 0; +} + +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void) +{ + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm, *key_tfm_tmp; + + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_tfm, key_tfm_tmp, &key_tfm_list, + key_tfm_list) { + list_del(&key_tfm->key_tfm_list); + if (key_tfm->key_tfm) + crypto_free_blkcipher(key_tfm->key_tfm); + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, key_tfm); + } + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + return 0; +} + +int +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, + size_t key_size) +{ + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *tmp_tfm; + int rc = 0; + + tmp_tfm = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + if (key_tfm != NULL) + (*key_tfm) = tmp_tfm; + if (!tmp_tfm) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to allocate from " + "ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache\n"); + goto out; + } + mutex_init(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_mutex); + strncpy(tmp_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name, + ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE); + tmp_tfm->key_size = key_size; + if ((rc = ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm, + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, + &tmp_tfm->key_size))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize key TFM " + "cipher with name = [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, rc); + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, tmp_tfm); + if (key_tfm != NULL) + (*key_tfm) = NULL; + goto out; + } + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + list_add(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_list, &key_tfm_list); + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); +out: + return rc; +} + +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm, + struct mutex **tfm_mutex, + char *cipher_name) +{ + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm; + int rc = 0; + + (*tfm) = NULL; + (*tfm_mutex) = NULL; + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + list_for_each_entry(key_tfm, &key_tfm_list, key_tfm_list) { + if (strcmp(key_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name) == 0) { + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm; + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex; + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + goto out; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(&key_tfm, cipher_name, 0))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding new key_tfm to list; rc = [%d]\n", + rc); + goto out; + } + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm; + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex; +out: + return rc; +} diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h index 1b9dd9a..6ddab6c 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h @@ -48,10 +48,12 @@ #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH 0x00000004 #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY 0x00000008 #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR 0x00000010 +#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY 0x00000020 #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK (ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE \ | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH \ | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR) + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR \ + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY) #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 64 #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSPHRASE_BYTES ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE 8 @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_private_key { struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { u16 version; /* 8-bit major and 8-bit minor */ u16 token_type; +#define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_ONLY 0x00000001 u32 flags; struct ecryptfs_session_key session_key; u8 reserved[32]; @@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { } token; } __attribute__ ((packed)); +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); extern void ecryptfs_to_hex(char *dst, char *src, size_t src_size); extern void ecryptfs_from_hex(char *dst, char *src, int dst_size); @@ -194,7 +198,6 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024 #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE 32 #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_ENC_KEYS 64 -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS 2 /* TODO: Make this a linked list */ #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES 16 /* 128 bits */ #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_BYTES 2 #define MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER 0x3c81b7f5 @@ -212,6 +215,11 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) #define ECRYPTFS_TAG_67_PACKET_TYPE 0x43 #define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16 +struct ecryptfs_key_sig { + struct list_head crypt_stat_list; + char keysig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; +}; + /** * This is the primary struct associated with each encrypted file. * @@ -231,7 +239,6 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat { u32 flags; unsigned int file_version; size_t iv_bytes; - size_t num_keysigs; size_t header_extent_size; size_t num_header_extents_at_front; size_t extent_size; /* Data extent size; default is 4096 */ @@ -245,7 +252,8 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat { unsigned char cipher[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE]; unsigned char key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; unsigned char root_iv[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES]; - unsigned char keysigs[ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS][ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; + struct list_head keysig_list; + struct mutex keysig_list_mutex; struct mutex cs_tfm_mutex; struct mutex cs_hash_tfm_mutex; struct mutex cs_mutex; @@ -265,6 +273,26 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info { struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat; }; +struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok { +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 + u32 flags; + struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list; + struct key *global_auth_tok_key; + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; + unsigned char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; +}; + +struct ecryptfs_key_tfm { + struct crypto_blkcipher *key_tfm; + size_t key_size; + struct mutex key_tfm_mutex; + struct list_head key_tfm_list; + unsigned char cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1]; +}; + +extern struct list_head key_tfm_list; +extern struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; + /** * This struct is to enable a mount-wide passphrase/salt combo. This * is more or less a stopgap to provide similar functionality to other @@ -276,15 +304,14 @@ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat { #define ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED 0x00000001 #define ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED 0x00000002 #define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED 0x00000004 +#define ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 u32 flags; - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; - struct key *global_auth_tok_key; + struct list_head global_auth_tok_list; + struct mutex global_auth_tok_list_mutex; + size_t num_global_auth_toks; size_t global_default_cipher_key_size; - struct crypto_blkcipher *global_key_tfm; - struct mutex global_key_tfm_mutex; unsigned char global_default_cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1]; - unsigned char global_auth_tok_sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; }; /* superblock private data. */ @@ -468,6 +495,9 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_2; extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_xattr_cache; extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_lower_page_cache; extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_record_cache; +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; int ecryptfs_interpose(struct dentry *hidden_dentry, struct dentry *this_dentry, struct super_block *sb, @@ -538,9 +568,8 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, unsigned char *src, struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry); int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length); -int -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, - size_t *key_size); +int ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size); int ecryptfs_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *candidate_lower_inode); int ecryptfs_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *lower_inode); void ecryptfs_init_inode(struct inode *inode, struct inode *lower_inode); @@ -580,6 +609,24 @@ void ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, size_t *written); +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig); +int +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, + char *sig); +int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig( + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok, + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig); +int +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, + size_t key_size); +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void); +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void); +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm, + struct mutex **tfm_mutex, + char *cipher_name); +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, + char *sig); int ecryptfs_write_zeros(struct file *file, pgoff_t index, int start, int num_zeros); diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index b550dea..ef4904a 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -402,20 +402,24 @@ out: * * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. */ -static int decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key( - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) +static int +decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) { u16 cipher_code = 0; struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx; struct ecryptfs_message *msg = NULL; + char *auth_tok_sig; char *netlink_message; size_t netlink_message_length; int rc; - rc = write_tag_64_packet(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, - &(auth_tok->session_key), + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&auth_tok_sig, auth_tok))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Unrecognized auth tok type: [%d]\n", + auth_tok->token_type); + goto out; + } + rc = write_tag_64_packet(auth_tok_sig, &(auth_tok->session_key), &netlink_message, &netlink_message_length); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Failed to write tag 64 packet"); @@ -921,126 +925,241 @@ out: return rc; } +static int +ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig( + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok, + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig) +{ + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *walker; + int rc = 0; + + (*global_auth_tok) = NULL; + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + list_for_each_entry(walker, + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, + mount_crypt_stat_list) { + if (memcmp(walker->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX) == 0) { + (*global_auth_tok) = walker; + goto out; + } + } + rc = -EINVAL; +out: + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + return rc; +} + /** - * decrypt_session_key - Decrypt the session key with the given auth_tok. + * ecryptfs_verify_version + * @version: The version number to confirm + * + * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise + */ +static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version) +{ + int rc = 0; + unsigned char major; + unsigned char minor; + + major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF); + minor = (version & 0xFF); + if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) { + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. " + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) { + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. " + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } +out: + return rc; +} + +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, + char *sig) +{ + int rc = 0; + + (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL); + if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n", + sig); + process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key)); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + (*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(*auth_tok_key); + if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "Data structure version mismatch. " + "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs " + "kernel module with major version [%d] " + "and minor version [%d]\n", + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if ((*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD + && (*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid auth_tok structure " + "returned from key query\n"); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } +out: + return rc; +} + +/** + * ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig + * @auth_tok: Set to the matching auth_tok; NULL if not found + * @crypt_stat: inode crypt_stat crypto context + * @sig: Sig of auth_tok to find + * + * For now, this function simply looks at the registered auth_tok's + * linked off the mount_crypt_stat, so all the auth_toks that can be + * used must be registered at mount time. This function could + * potentially try a lot harder to find auth_tok's (e.g., by calling + * out to ecryptfsd to dynamically retrieve an auth_tok object) so + * that static registration of auth_tok's will no longer be necessary. + * + * Returns zero on no error; non-zero on error + */ +static int +ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig( + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig) +{ + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat; + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; + int rc = 0; + + (*auth_tok) = NULL; + if (ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok, + mount_crypt_stat, sig)) { + struct key *auth_tok_key; + + rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(&auth_tok_key, auth_tok, + sig); + } else + (*auth_tok) = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok; + return rc; +} + +/** + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key + * with the given auth_tok. * * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. */ -static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) +static int +decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) { - struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr; - struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2]; + struct scatterlist dst_sg; + struct scatterlist src_sg; struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; - char *encrypted_session_key; - char *session_key; struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP }; int rc = 0; - password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password; - if (password_s_ptr->flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key " - "set; skipping key generation\n"); - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])" - ":\n", - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_bytes); - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) - ecryptfs_dump_hex(password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key, - password_s_ptr-> - session_key_encryption_key_bytes); - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name) - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) { - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm; - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex; - } else { - char *full_alg_name; - - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, - crypt_stat->cipher, - "ecb"); - if (rc) - goto out; - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - kfree(full_alg_name); - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm); - printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating crypto context; " - "rc = [%d]\n", rc); - goto out; - } - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { + ecryptfs_printk( + KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d]):\n", + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); + ecryptfs_dump_hex( + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); + } + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex, + crypt_stat->cipher); + if (unlikely(rc)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get " + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", + crypt_stat->cipher, rc); + goto out; } - if (tfm_mutex) - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); - rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key, - crypt_stat->key_size); - if (rc < 0) { + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size, + &src_sg, 1)) != 1) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert " + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key to scatterlist; " + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. " + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = [%d]\n", rc, + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); + goto out; + } + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size, + &dst_sg, 1)) != 1) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert " + "auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key to scatterlist; " + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]\n", rc); + goto out; + } + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); + rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey( + desc.tfm, auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, + crypt_stat->key_size); + if (unlikely(rc < 0)) { + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); printk(KERN_ERR "Error setting key for crypto context\n"); rc = -EINVAL; - goto out_free_tfm; - } - /* TODO: virt_to_scatterlist */ - encrypted_session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!encrypted_session_key) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n"); - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free_tfm; + goto out; } - session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!session_key) { - kfree(encrypted_session_key); - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n"); - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free_tfm; - } - memcpy(encrypted_session_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); - src_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(encrypted_session_key); - src_sg[0].offset = 0; - BUG_ON(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); - src_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; - dst_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(session_key); - dst_sg[0].offset = 0; - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; - dst_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; - rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, dst_sg, src_sg, + rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); - if (rc) { + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); + if (unlikely(rc)) { printk(KERN_ERR "Error decrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc); - goto out_free_memory; + goto out; } - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; - memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, session_key, - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size); auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY; memcpy(crypt_stat->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size); crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypted session key:\n"); - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%d]:\n", + crypt_stat->key_size); ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key, crypt_stat->key_size); -out_free_memory: - memset(encrypted_session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); - free_page((unsigned long)encrypted_session_key); - memset(session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); - free_page((unsigned long)session_key); -out_free_tfm: - if (tfm_mutex) - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); - else - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); + } out: return rc; } +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok) +{ + int rc = 0; + + (*sig) = NULL; + switch (auth_tok->token_type) { + case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD: + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature; + break; + case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY: + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.private_key.signature; + break; + default: + printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot get sig for auth_tok of type [%d]\n", + auth_tok->token_type); + rc = -EINVAL; + } + return rc; +} + /** * ecryptfs_parse_packet_set * @dest: The header page in memory @@ -1058,25 +1177,22 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) { size_t i = 0; - size_t found_auth_tok = 0; + size_t found_auth_tok; size_t next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet; - char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; struct list_head auth_tok_list; - struct list_head *walker; - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL; - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = - &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( - ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *matching_auth_tok = NULL; struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL; + char *candidate_auth_tok_sig; size_t packet_size; struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; unsigned char sig_tmp_space[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE]; + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; size_t tag_11_contents_size; size_t tag_11_packet_size; int rc = 0; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&auth_tok_list); - /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can, these will be + /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can; these will be * added the our &auth_tok_list */ next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 1; while (next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet) { @@ -1155,73 +1271,86 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, } } if (list_empty(&auth_tok_list)) { - rc = -EINVAL; /* Do not support non-encrypted files in - * the 0.1 release */ + printk(KERN_ERR "The lower file appears to be a non-encrypted " + "eCryptfs file; this is not supported in this version " + "of the eCryptfs kernel module\n"); + rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - /* If we have a global auth tok, then we should try to use - * it */ - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { - memcpy(sig, mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); - chosen_auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok; - } else - BUG(); /* We should always have a global auth tok in - * the 0.1 release */ - /* Scan list to see if our chosen_auth_tok works */ - list_for_each(walker, &auth_tok_list) { - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; - auth_tok_list_item = - list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item, - list); + /* auth_tok_list contains the set of authentication tokens + * parsed from the metadata. We need to find a matching + * authentication token that has the secret component(s) + * necessary to decrypt the EFEK in the auth_tok parsed from + * the metadata. There may be several potential matches, but + * just one will be sufficient to decrypt to get the FEK. */ +find_next_matching_auth_tok: + found_auth_tok = 0; + list_for_each_entry(auth_tok_list_item, &auth_tok_list, list) { candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok; if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Considering cadidate auth tok:\n"); ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok); } - /* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */ - if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature, - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) { - found_auth_tok = 1; - goto leave_list; - /* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the - * crypt_stat salt */ - } else if ((candidate_auth_tok->token_type - == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key.signature, - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) { + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&candidate_auth_tok_sig, + candidate_auth_tok))) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "Unrecognized candidate auth tok type: [%d]\n", + candidate_auth_tok->token_type); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_wipe_list; + } + if ((rc = ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig( + &matching_auth_tok, crypt_stat, + candidate_auth_tok_sig))) + rc = 0; + if (matching_auth_tok) { found_auth_tok = 1; - goto leave_list; + goto found_matching_auth_tok; } } if (!found_auth_tok) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find authentication " - "token on temporary list for sig [%.*s]\n", - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, sig); + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find a usable " + "authentication token\n"); rc = -EIO; goto out_wipe_list; } -leave_list: - rc = -ENOTSUPP; +found_matching_auth_tok: if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key), - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.private_key), + &(matching_auth_tok->token.private_key), sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key)); - rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(mount_crypt_stat, - candidate_auth_tok, + rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); } else if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password), - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.password), + &(matching_auth_tok->token.password), sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password)); - rc = decrypt_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); + rc = decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key( + candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); } if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error decrypting the " - "session key; rc = [%d]\n", rc); - goto out_wipe_list; + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp; + + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error decrypting the " + "session key for authentication token with sig " + "[%.*s]; rc = [%d]. Removing auth tok " + "candidate from the list and searching for " + "the next match.\n", candidate_auth_tok_sig, + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, rc); + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok_list_item, + auth_tok_list_item_tmp, + &auth_tok_list, list) { + if (candidate_auth_tok + == &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok) { + list_del(&auth_tok_list_item->list); + kmem_cache_free( + ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, + auth_tok_list_item); + goto find_next_matching_auth_tok; + } + } + BUG(); } rc = ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat); if (rc) { @@ -1240,6 +1369,7 @@ out_wipe_list: out: return rc; } + static int pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, @@ -1291,15 +1421,15 @@ out: * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. */ static int -write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, +write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) { size_t i; size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; - size_t key_rec_size; size_t packet_size_length; + size_t max_packet_size; int rc = 0; (*packet_size) = 0; @@ -1329,37 +1459,23 @@ write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, key_rec->enc_key_size); } encrypted_session_key_set: - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the - * key_rec set. */ - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record) - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES - + (key_rec->enc_key_size)); - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions - * later than 0.1 */ - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n"); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - /* ***** TAG 1 Packet Format ***** - * | version number | 1 byte | - * | key ID | 8 bytes | - * | public key algorithm | 1 byte | - * | encrypted session key | arbitrary | - */ - if ((0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, - "Authentication token is too large\n"); + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 1 */ + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 1 identifier */ + + 3 /* Max Tag 1 packet size */ + + 1 /* Version */ + + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE /* Key identifier */ + + 1 /* Cipher identifier */ + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */ + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet length larger than maximum allowable; " + "need up to [%d] bytes, but there are only [%d] " + "available\n", max_packet_size, (*remaining_bytes)); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE; - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 - * packet tag 1 */ - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], - (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + - key_rec->enc_key_size), + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4), &packet_size_length); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 1 packet " @@ -1377,6 +1493,8 @@ encrypted_session_key_set: out: if (rc) (*packet_size) = 0; + else + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size); return rc; } @@ -1448,19 +1566,22 @@ write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int max, char *contents, size_t contents_length, * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. */ static int -write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, +write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) { size_t i; size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; char session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; - struct scatterlist dest_sg[2]; - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; + struct scatterlist dst_sg; + struct scatterlist src_sg; struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; - size_t key_rec_size; - size_t packet_size_length; size_t cipher_code; + size_t packet_size_length; + size_t max_packet_size; + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat; struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = NULL, .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP @@ -1470,16 +1591,25 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, (*packet_size) = 0; ecryptfs_from_hex(key_rec->sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE); - encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; - for (i = 0; i < crypt_stat->key_size; i++) - encrypted_session_key_valid |= - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i]; - if (encrypted_session_key_valid) { - memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); - goto encrypted_session_key_set; + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex, + crypt_stat->cipher); + if (unlikely(rc)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get " + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", + crypt_stat->cipher, rc); + goto out; + } + if (mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size == 0) { + struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(desc.tfm); + + printk(KERN_WARNING "No key size specified at mount; " + "defaulting to [%d]\n", alg->max_keysize); + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = + alg->max_keysize; } + if (crypt_stat->key_size == 0) + crypt_stat->key_size = + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0) auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = crypt_stat->key_size; @@ -1487,9 +1617,24 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, && strcmp("aes", crypt_stat->cipher) == 0) { memset((crypt_stat->key + 24), 0, 8); auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 32; - } + } else + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = crypt_stat->key_size; key_rec->enc_key_size = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; + encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; + for (i = 0; i < auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; i++) + encrypted_session_key_valid |= + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i]; + if (encrypted_session_key_valid) { + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "encrypted_session_key_valid != 0; " + "using auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, " + "where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", + key_rec->enc_key_size); + memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, + key_rec->enc_key_size); + goto encrypted_session_key_set; + } if (auth_tok->token.password.flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Using previously generated " @@ -1508,54 +1653,32 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key:\n"); ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16); } - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key, - key_rec->enc_key_size, src_sg, 2); - if (!rc) { + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key, + key_rec->enc_key_size, &src_sg, 1)) + != 1) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist " - "for crypt_stat session key\n"); + "for crypt_stat session key; expected rc = 1; " + "got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", + rc, key_rec->enc_key_size); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key, - key_rec->enc_key_size, dest_sg, 2); - if (!rc) { + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key, + key_rec->enc_key_size, &dst_sg, 1)) + != 1) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist " - "for crypt_stat encrypted session key\n"); + "for crypt_stat encrypted session key; " + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. " + "key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", rc, + key_rec->enc_key_size); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name) - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) { - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm; - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex; - } else { - char *full_alg_name; - - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, - crypt_stat->cipher, - "ecb"); - if (rc) - goto out; - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - kfree(full_alg_name); - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm); - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not initialize crypto " - "context for cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", - crypt_stat->cipher, rc); - goto out; - } - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); - } - if (tfm_mutex) - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, session_key_encryption_key, crypt_stat->key_size); if (rc < 0) { - if (tfm_mutex) - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key for crypto " "context; rc = [%d]\n", rc); goto out; @@ -1563,56 +1686,53 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, rc = 0; ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n", crypt_stat->key_size); - rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, dest_sg, src_sg, + rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg, (*key_rec).enc_key_size); + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "Error encrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc); goto out; } - if (tfm_mutex) - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This should be the encrypted key:\n"); - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) + if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) { + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%d]:\n", + key_rec->enc_key_size); ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, key_rec->enc_key_size); -encrypted_session_key_set: - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the - * key_rec set. */ - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record) - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES - + (key_rec->enc_key_size)); - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions - * later than 0.1 */ - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n"); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; } - /* TODO: Packet size limit */ - /* We have 5 bytes of surrounding packet data */ - if ((0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE - + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Authentication token is too " - "large\n"); +encrypted_session_key_set: + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 3 */ + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 3 identifier */ + + 3 /* Max Tag 3 packet size */ + + 1 /* Version */ + + 1 /* Cipher code */ + + 1 /* S2K specifier */ + + 1 /* Hash identifier */ + + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE /* Salt */ + + 1 /* Hash iterations */ + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */ + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet too large; need up to [%d] bytes, but " + "there are only [%d] available\n", max_packet_size, + (*remaining_bytes)); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 - * packet tag 3 */ dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE; - /* ver+cipher+s2k+hash+salt+iter+enc_key */ - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], - (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE - + key_rec->enc_key_size), + /* Chop off the Tag 3 identifier(1) and Tag 3 packet size(3) + * to get the number of octets in the actual Tag 3 packet */ + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4), &packet_size_length); if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 3 packet " - "header; cannot generate packet length\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Error generating tag 3 packet header; cannot " + "generate packet length. rc = [%d]\n", rc); goto out; } (*packet_size) += packet_size_length; dest[(*packet_size)++] = 0x04; /* version 4 */ + /* TODO: Break from RFC2440 so that arbitrary ciphers can be + * specified with strings */ cipher_code = ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(crypt_stat); if (cipher_code == 0) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unable to generate code for " @@ -1631,10 +1751,10 @@ encrypted_session_key_set: key_rec->enc_key_size); (*packet_size) += key_rec->enc_key_size; out: - if (desc.tfm && !tfm_mutex) - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); if (rc) (*packet_size) = 0; + else + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size); return rc; } @@ -1662,24 +1782,43 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, size_t max) { struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok; + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; size_t written; struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec; + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig; int rc = 0; (*len) = 0; + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); key_rec = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key_rec) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { - auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok; + list_for_each_entry(key_sig, &crypt_stat->keysig_list, + crypt_stat_list) { + memset(key_rec, 0, sizeof(*key_rec)); + rc = ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok, + mount_crypt_stat, + key_sig->keysig); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to get the global " + "auth_tok; rc = [%d]\n", rc); + goto out_free; + } + if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "Skipping invalid auth tok with sig = [%s]\n", + global_auth_tok->sig); + continue; + } + auth_tok = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok; if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { rc = write_tag_3_packet((dest_base + (*len)), - max, auth_tok, + &max, auth_tok, crypt_stat, key_rec, &written); if (rc) { @@ -1689,10 +1828,9 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, } (*len) += written; /* Write auth tok signature packet */ - rc = write_tag_11_packet( - (dest_base + (*len)), - (max - (*len)), - key_rec->sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written); + rc = write_tag_11_packet((dest_base + (*len)), &max, + key_rec->sig, + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing " "auth tok signature packet\n"); @@ -1701,9 +1839,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, (*len) += written; } else if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len), - max, auth_tok, - crypt_stat,mount_crypt_stat, - key_rec, &written); + &max, auth_tok, + crypt_stat, key_rec, &written); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error " "writing tag 1 packet\n"); @@ -1716,19 +1853,69 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } - } else - BUG(); - if (likely((max - (*len)) > 0)) { + } + if (likely(max > 0)) { dest_base[(*len)] = 0x00; } else { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing boundary byte\n"); rc = -EIO; } - out_free: kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, key_rec); out: if (rc) (*len) = 0; + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); + return rc; +} + +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; + +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig) +{ + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *new_key_sig; + int rc = 0; + + new_key_sig = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_key_sig) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + printk(KERN_ERR + "Error allocating from ecryptfs_key_sig_cache\n"); + goto out; + } + memcpy(new_key_sig->keysig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); + list_add(&new_key_sig->crypt_stat_list, &crypt_stat->keysig_list); + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); +out: return rc; } + +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; + +int +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, + char *sig) +{ + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; + int rc = 0; + + new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_auth_tok) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating from " + "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache\n"); + goto out; + } + memcpy(new_auth_tok->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); + new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list, + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list); + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks++; + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); +out: + return rc; +} + diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c index 606128f..5da6180 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c @@ -179,38 +179,40 @@ static match_table_t tokens = { {ecryptfs_opt_err, NULL} }; -/** - * ecryptfs_verify_version - * @version: The version number to confirm - * - * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise - */ -static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version) +static int ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks( + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) { + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; int rc = 0; - unsigned char major; - unsigned char minor; - - major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF); - minor = (version & 0xFF); - if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. " - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. " - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; + + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, + mount_crypt_stat_list) { + if ((rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig( + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key, + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok, + global_auth_tok->sig))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find valid key in user " + "session keyring for sig specified in mount " + "option: [%s]\n", global_auth_tok->sig); + global_auth_tok->flags |= ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID; + rc = 0; + } else + global_auth_tok->flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID; } -out: return rc; } +static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat( + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) +{ + memset((void *)mount_crypt_stat, 0, + sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list); + mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); + mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED; +} + /** * ecryptfs_parse_options * @sb: The ecryptfs super block @@ -264,14 +266,13 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) case ecryptfs_opt_sig: case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig: sig_src = args[0].from; - sig_dst = - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig; - memcpy(sig_dst, sig_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); - sig_dst[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, - "The mount_crypt_stat " - "global_auth_tok_sig set to: " - "[%s]\n", sig_dst); + rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat, + sig_src); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " + "global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); + goto out; + } sig_set = 1; break; case ecryptfs_opt_debug: @@ -358,55 +359,21 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) if (!cipher_key_bytes_set) { mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0; } - rc = ecryptfs_process_cipher( - &mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm, - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, - &mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size); - if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher [%s] " - "with key size [%Zd] bytes; rc = [%d]\n", + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm( + NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size))) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher with " + "name = [%s] and key size = [%d]; rc = [%d]\n", mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size, rc); - mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm = NULL; - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = NULL; - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex); - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Requesting the key with description: " - "[%s]\n", mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig); - /* The reference to this key is held until umount is done The - * call to key_put is done in ecryptfs_put_super() */ - auth_tok_key = request_key(&key_type_user, - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, - NULL); - if (!auth_tok_key || IS_ERR(auth_tok_key)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find key with " - "description: [%s]\n", - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig); - process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(auth_tok_key)); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key); - if (ecryptfs_verify_version(auth_tok->version)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Data structure version mismatch. " - "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs kernel " - "module with major version [%d] and minor " - "version [%d]\n", ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - if (auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD - && auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Invalid auth_tok structure " - "returned from key query\n"); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; + if ((rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not " + "properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc); } - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = auth_tok_key; - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok = auth_tok; + rc = 0; out: return rc; } -- 1.5.1.6 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring 2007-07-19 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-20 13:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2007-07-20 22:26 ` Andrew Morton 1 sibling, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2007-07-20 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Halcrow Cc: akpm, linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Quoting Michael Halcrow (mhalcrow@us.ibm.com): > Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in Excellent. Very glad to see this implemented. A few comments inline. > crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that > should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key > (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide > crypt_stat struct, via the > ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. > > This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide > crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing > with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's > keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user > can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. > > Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we > need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code > for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits > more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. > > Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> > --- > fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 208 ++++++++++-- > fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 71 ++++- > fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 743 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 121 +++----- > 4 files changed, 742 insertions(+), 401 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c > index 6ac6306..4f7d895 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c > @@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ void > ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > memset((void *)crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&crypt_stat->keysig_list); > + mutex_init(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex); > mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex); > mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_hash_tfm_mutex); > @@ -218,20 +220,41 @@ ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > */ > void ecryptfs_destruct_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig, *key_sig_tmp; > + > if (crypt_stat->tfm) > crypto_free_blkcipher(crypt_stat->tfm); > if (crypt_stat->hash_tfm) > crypto_free_hash(crypt_stat->hash_tfm); > + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); Curious - at this point you know you have the last reference to the inode, right? And you're not decrementing a use count on the crypt_stats, you're just zeroing it out. So you must not think anyone else has references to it. So why do you need to grab the mutex here? > + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_sig, key_sig_tmp, > + &crypt_stat->keysig_list, crypt_stat_list) { > + list_del(&key_sig->crypt_stat_list); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, key_sig); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat)); > } > > void ecryptfs_destruct_mount_crypt_stat( > struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > { > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key) > - key_put(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key); > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) > - crypto_free_blkcipher(mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm); > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *auth_tok, *auth_tok_tmp; > + > + if (!(mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED)) > + return; > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); Same question here - after all it's called from put_super... So if not having the mutex cause the problem doesn't that mean the mutex is papering over some other problem? > + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok, auth_tok_tmp, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + list_del(&auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list); > + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks--; > + if (auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key > + && !(auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID)) > + key_put(auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, auth_tok); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > memset(mount_crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat)); > } > > @@ -931,6 +954,30 @@ static void ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags( > crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_VIEW_AS_ENCRYPTED; > } > > +static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs( > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + int rc = 0; > + > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + rc = ecryptfs_add_keysig(crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + mutex_unlock( > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + goto out; > + } > + } > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > * ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals > * @crypt_stat > @@ -973,46 +1020,44 @@ static void ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals( > /* Associate an authentication token(s) with the file */ > int ecryptfs_new_file_context(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) > { > - int rc = 0; > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = > &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat; > struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > int cipher_name_len; > + int rc = 0; > > ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(crypt_stat, mount_crypt_stat); > - /* See if there are mount crypt options */ > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing context for new " > - "file using mount_crypt_stat\n"); > - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; > - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > - ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, > - mount_crypt_stat); > - memcpy(crypt_stat->keysigs[crypt_stat->num_keysigs++], > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > - cipher_name_len = > - strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); > - memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, > - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > - cipher_name_len); > - crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; > - crypt_stat->key_size = > - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > - ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); > - } else > - /* We should not encounter this scenario since we > - * should detect lack of global_auth_tok at mount time > - * TODO: Applies to 0.1 release only; remove in future > - * release */ > - BUG(); > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0); > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > + ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, > + mount_crypt_stat); > + rc = ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(crypt_stat, > + mount_crypt_stat); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to copy mount-wide key sigs " > + "to the inode key sigs; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > + cipher_name_len = > + strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); > + memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > + cipher_name_len); > + crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; > + crypt_stat->key_size = > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > + ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); > rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat); > if (rc) > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error initializing cryptographic " > "context for cipher [%s]: rc = [%d]\n", > crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > +out: > return rc; > } > > @@ -1776,7 +1821,7 @@ out: > } > > /** > - * ecryptfs_process_cipher - Perform cipher initialization. > + * ecryptfs_process_key_cipher - Perform key cipher initialization. > * @key_tfm: Crypto context for key material, set by this function > * @cipher_name: Name of the cipher > * @key_size: Size of the key in bytes > @@ -1786,8 +1831,8 @@ out: > * event, regardless of whether this function succeeds for fails. > */ > int > -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > - size_t *key_size) > +ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, > + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size) > { > char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; > char *full_alg_name; > @@ -1829,3 +1874,98 @@ ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > out: > return rc; > } > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; > +struct list_head key_tfm_list; > +struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; > + > +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void) > +{ > + mutex_init(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key_tfm_list); > + return 0; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm, *key_tfm_tmp; > + > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_tfm, key_tfm_tmp, &key_tfm_list, > + key_tfm_list) { > + list_del(&key_tfm->key_tfm_list); > + if (key_tfm->key_tfm) > + crypto_free_blkcipher(key_tfm->key_tfm); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, key_tfm); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + return 0; > +} > + > +int > +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > + size_t key_size) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *tmp_tfm; > + int rc = 0; > + > + tmp_tfm = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (key_tfm != NULL) > + (*key_tfm) = tmp_tfm; > + if (!tmp_tfm) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to allocate from " > + "ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + mutex_init(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_mutex); > + strncpy(tmp_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name, > + ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE); > + tmp_tfm->key_size = key_size; > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm, > + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, > + &tmp_tfm->key_size))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize key TFM " > + "cipher with name = [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, rc); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, tmp_tfm); > + if (key_tfm != NULL) > + (*key_tfm) = NULL; > + goto out; > + } > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_add(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_list, &key_tfm_list); > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm, > + struct mutex **tfm_mutex, > + char *cipher_name) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm; > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*tfm) = NULL; > + (*tfm_mutex) = NULL; > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(key_tfm, &key_tfm_list, key_tfm_list) { > + if (strcmp(key_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name) == 0) { > + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm; > + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex; > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + goto out; > + } > + } > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(&key_tfm, cipher_name, 0))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding new key_tfm to list; rc = [%d]\n", > + rc); > + goto out; > + } > + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm; > + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex; > +out: > + return rc; > +} > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > index 1b9dd9a..6ddab6c 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > @@ -48,10 +48,12 @@ > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH 0x00000004 > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY 0x00000008 > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR 0x00000010 > +#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY 0x00000020 > #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK (ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE \ > | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH \ > | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY \ > - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR) > + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR \ > + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY) > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 64 > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSPHRASE_BYTES ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH > #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE 8 > @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_private_key { > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { > u16 version; /* 8-bit major and 8-bit minor */ > u16 token_type; > +#define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_ONLY 0x00000001 > u32 flags; > struct ecryptfs_session_key session_key; > u8 reserved[32]; > @@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { > } token; > } __attribute__ ((packed)); > > +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); > void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); > extern void ecryptfs_to_hex(char *dst, char *src, size_t src_size); > extern void ecryptfs_from_hex(char *dst, char *src, int dst_size); > @@ -194,7 +198,6 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024 > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE 32 > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_ENC_KEYS 64 > -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS 2 /* TODO: Make this a linked list */ > #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES 16 /* 128 bits */ > #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_BYTES 2 > #define MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER 0x3c81b7f5 > @@ -212,6 +215,11 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) > #define ECRYPTFS_TAG_67_PACKET_TYPE 0x43 > #define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16 > > +struct ecryptfs_key_sig { > + struct list_head crypt_stat_list; > + char keysig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > +}; > + > /** > * This is the primary struct associated with each encrypted file. > * > @@ -231,7 +239,6 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat { > u32 flags; > unsigned int file_version; > size_t iv_bytes; > - size_t num_keysigs; > size_t header_extent_size; > size_t num_header_extents_at_front; > size_t extent_size; /* Data extent size; default is 4096 */ > @@ -245,7 +252,8 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat { > unsigned char cipher[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE]; > unsigned char key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; > unsigned char root_iv[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES]; > - unsigned char keysigs[ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS][ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > + struct list_head keysig_list; > + struct mutex keysig_list_mutex; > struct mutex cs_tfm_mutex; > struct mutex cs_hash_tfm_mutex; > struct mutex cs_mutex; > @@ -265,6 +273,26 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info { > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat; > }; > > +struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok { > +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 > + u32 flags; > + struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list; > + struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + unsigned char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > +}; > + > +struct ecryptfs_key_tfm { > + struct crypto_blkcipher *key_tfm; > + size_t key_size; > + struct mutex key_tfm_mutex; > + struct list_head key_tfm_list; > + unsigned char cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1]; > +}; > + > +extern struct list_head key_tfm_list; > +extern struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; > + > /** > * This struct is to enable a mount-wide passphrase/salt combo. This > * is more or less a stopgap to provide similar functionality to other > @@ -276,15 +304,14 @@ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat { > #define ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED 0x00000001 > #define ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED 0x00000002 > #define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED 0x00000004 > +#define ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 > u32 flags; > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > - struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > + struct list_head global_auth_tok_list; > + struct mutex global_auth_tok_list_mutex; > + size_t num_global_auth_toks; > size_t global_default_cipher_key_size; > - struct crypto_blkcipher *global_key_tfm; > - struct mutex global_key_tfm_mutex; > unsigned char global_default_cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE > + 1]; > - unsigned char global_auth_tok_sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > }; > > /* superblock private data. */ > @@ -468,6 +495,9 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_2; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_xattr_cache; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_lower_page_cache; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_record_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; > > int ecryptfs_interpose(struct dentry *hidden_dentry, > struct dentry *this_dentry, struct super_block *sb, > @@ -538,9 +568,8 @@ int > ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > unsigned char *src, struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry); > int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length); > -int > -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > - size_t *key_size); > +int ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, > + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size); > int ecryptfs_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *candidate_lower_inode); > int ecryptfs_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *lower_inode); > void ecryptfs_init_inode(struct inode *inode, struct inode *lower_inode); > @@ -580,6 +609,24 @@ void > ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > size_t *written); > +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig); > +int > +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > + char *sig); > +int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig( > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig); > +int > +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > + size_t key_size); > +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void); > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void); > +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm, > + struct mutex **tfm_mutex, > + char *cipher_name); > +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, > + char *sig); > int ecryptfs_write_zeros(struct file *file, pgoff_t index, int start, > int num_zeros); > > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c > index b550dea..ef4904a 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c > @@ -402,20 +402,24 @@ out: > * > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > */ > -static int decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key( > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > +static int > +decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > u16 cipher_code = 0; > struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx; > struct ecryptfs_message *msg = NULL; > + char *auth_tok_sig; > char *netlink_message; > size_t netlink_message_length; > int rc; > > - rc = write_tag_64_packet(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - &(auth_tok->session_key), > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&auth_tok_sig, auth_tok))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Unrecognized auth tok type: [%d]\n", > + auth_tok->token_type); > + goto out; > + } > + rc = write_tag_64_packet(auth_tok_sig, &(auth_tok->session_key), > &netlink_message, &netlink_message_length); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Failed to write tag 64 packet"); > @@ -921,126 +925,241 @@ out: > return rc; > } > > +static int > +ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig( > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *walker; > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*global_auth_tok) = NULL; > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(walker, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + if (memcmp(walker->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX) == 0) { > + (*global_auth_tok) = walker; > + goto out; > + } > + } > + rc = -EINVAL; > +out: > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > - * decrypt_session_key - Decrypt the session key with the given auth_tok. > + * ecryptfs_verify_version > + * @version: The version number to confirm > + * > + * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise > + */ > +static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + unsigned char major; > + unsigned char minor; > + > + major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF); > + minor = (version & 0xFF); > + if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. " > + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. " > + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, > + char *sig) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL); > + if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n", > + sig); > + process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key)); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + (*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(*auth_tok_key); > + if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR > + "Data structure version mismatch. " > + "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs " > + "kernel module with major version [%d] " > + "and minor version [%d]\n", > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, > + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + if ((*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD > + && (*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid auth_tok structure " > + "returned from key query\n"); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > + * ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig > + * @auth_tok: Set to the matching auth_tok; NULL if not found > + * @crypt_stat: inode crypt_stat crypto context > + * @sig: Sig of auth_tok to find > + * > + * For now, this function simply looks at the registered auth_tok's > + * linked off the mount_crypt_stat, so all the auth_toks that can be > + * used must be registered at mount time. This function could > + * potentially try a lot harder to find auth_tok's (e.g., by calling > + * out to ecryptfsd to dynamically retrieve an auth_tok object) so > + * that static registration of auth_tok's will no longer be necessary. > + * > + * Returns zero on no error; non-zero on error > + */ > +static int > +ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig( > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat; > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*auth_tok) = NULL; > + if (ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok, > + mount_crypt_stat, sig)) { > + struct key *auth_tok_key; > + > + rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(&auth_tok_key, auth_tok, > + sig); > + } else > + (*auth_tok) = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok; > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key > + * with the given auth_tok. > * > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > */ > -static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > +static int > +decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > - struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr; > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2]; > + struct scatterlist dst_sg; > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; > - char *encrypted_session_key; > - char *session_key; > struct blkcipher_desc desc = { > .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP > }; > int rc = 0; > > - password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password; > - if (password_s_ptr->flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key " > - "set; skipping key generation\n"); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])" > - ":\n", > - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) > - ecryptfs_dump_hex(password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key, > - password_s_ptr-> > - session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, > - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name) > - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) { > - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm; > - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex; > - } else { > - char *full_alg_name; > - > - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, > - crypt_stat->cipher, > - "ecb"); > - if (rc) > - goto out; > - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, > - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); > - kfree(full_alg_name); > - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) { > - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm); > - printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating crypto context; " > - "rc = [%d]\n", rc); > - goto out; > - } > - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); > + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { > + ecryptfs_printk( > + KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d]):\n", > + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > + ecryptfs_dump_hex( > + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, > + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes); > + } > + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex, > + crypt_stat->cipher); > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get " > + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > + crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > + goto out; > } > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > - rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, > - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key, > - crypt_stat->key_size); > - if (rc < 0) { > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size, > + &src_sg, 1)) != 1) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert " > + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key to scatterlist; " > + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. " > + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = [%d]\n", rc, > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > + goto out; > + } > + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, > + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size, > + &dst_sg, 1)) != 1) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert " > + "auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key to scatterlist; " > + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > + rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey( > + desc.tfm, auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key, > + crypt_stat->key_size); > + if (unlikely(rc < 0)) { > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > printk(KERN_ERR "Error setting key for crypto context\n"); > rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out_free_tfm; > - } > - /* TODO: virt_to_scatterlist */ > - encrypted_session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!encrypted_session_key) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n"); > - rc = -ENOMEM; > - goto out_free_tfm; > + goto out; > } > - session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!session_key) { > - kfree(encrypted_session_key); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n"); > - rc = -ENOMEM; > - goto out_free_tfm; > - } > - memcpy(encrypted_session_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > - src_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(encrypted_session_key); > - src_sg[0].offset = 0; > - BUG_ON(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); > - src_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - dst_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(session_key); > - dst_sg[0].offset = 0; > - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - dst_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, dst_sg, src_sg, > + rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg, > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > - if (rc) { > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > printk(KERN_ERR "Error decrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > - goto out_free_memory; > + goto out; > } > - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size = > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > - memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, session_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size); > auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY; > memcpy(crypt_stat->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, > auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size); > crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypted session key:\n"); > - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) > + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%d]:\n", > + crypt_stat->key_size); > ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key, > crypt_stat->key_size); > -out_free_memory: > - memset(encrypted_session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); > - free_page((unsigned long)encrypted_session_key); > - memset(session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); > - free_page((unsigned long)session_key); > -out_free_tfm: > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > - else > - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); > + } > out: > return rc; > } > > +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*sig) = NULL; > + switch (auth_tok->token_type) { > + case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD: > + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature; > + break; > + case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY: > + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.private_key.signature; > + break; > + default: > + printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot get sig for auth_tok of type [%d]\n", > + auth_tok->token_type); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + } > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > * ecryptfs_parse_packet_set > * @dest: The header page in memory > @@ -1058,25 +1177,22 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) > { > size_t i = 0; > - size_t found_auth_tok = 0; > + size_t found_auth_tok; > size_t next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet; > - char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > struct list_head auth_tok_list; > - struct list_head *walker; > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL; > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > - &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > - ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *matching_auth_tok = NULL; > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL; > + char *candidate_auth_tok_sig; > size_t packet_size; > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; > unsigned char sig_tmp_space[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE]; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; > size_t tag_11_contents_size; > size_t tag_11_packet_size; > int rc = 0; > > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&auth_tok_list); > - /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can, these will be > + /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can; these will be > * added the our &auth_tok_list */ > next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 1; > while (next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet) { > @@ -1155,73 +1271,86 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > } > } > if (list_empty(&auth_tok_list)) { > - rc = -EINVAL; /* Do not support non-encrypted files in > - * the 0.1 release */ > + printk(KERN_ERR "The lower file appears to be a non-encrypted " > + "eCryptfs file; this is not supported in this version " > + "of the eCryptfs kernel module\n"); > + rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > - /* If we have a global auth tok, then we should try to use > - * it */ > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { > - memcpy(sig, mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > - chosen_auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok; > - } else > - BUG(); /* We should always have a global auth tok in > - * the 0.1 release */ > - /* Scan list to see if our chosen_auth_tok works */ > - list_for_each(walker, &auth_tok_list) { > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; > - auth_tok_list_item = > - list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item, > - list); > + /* auth_tok_list contains the set of authentication tokens > + * parsed from the metadata. We need to find a matching > + * authentication token that has the secret component(s) > + * necessary to decrypt the EFEK in the auth_tok parsed from > + * the metadata. There may be several potential matches, but > + * just one will be sufficient to decrypt to get the FEK. */ > +find_next_matching_auth_tok: > + found_auth_tok = 0; > + list_for_each_entry(auth_tok_list_item, &auth_tok_list, list) { > candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok; > if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, > "Considering cadidate auth tok:\n"); > ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok); > } > - /* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */ > - if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD > - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature, > - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) { > - found_auth_tok = 1; > - goto leave_list; > - /* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the > - * crypt_stat salt */ > - } else if ((candidate_auth_tok->token_type > - == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) > - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key.signature, > - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) { > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&candidate_auth_tok_sig, > + candidate_auth_tok))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR > + "Unrecognized candidate auth tok type: [%d]\n", > + candidate_auth_tok->token_type); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto out_wipe_list; > + } > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig( > + &matching_auth_tok, crypt_stat, > + candidate_auth_tok_sig))) > + rc = 0; > + if (matching_auth_tok) { > found_auth_tok = 1; > - goto leave_list; > + goto found_matching_auth_tok; > } > } > if (!found_auth_tok) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find authentication " > - "token on temporary list for sig [%.*s]\n", > - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, sig); > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find a usable " > + "authentication token\n"); > rc = -EIO; > goto out_wipe_list; > } > -leave_list: > - rc = -ENOTSUPP; > +found_matching_auth_tok: > if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key), > - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.private_key), > + &(matching_auth_tok->token.private_key), > sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key)); > - rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(mount_crypt_stat, > - candidate_auth_tok, > + rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, > crypt_stat); > } else if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { > memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password), > - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.password), > + &(matching_auth_tok->token.password), > sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password)); > - rc = decrypt_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); > + rc = decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key( > + candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); > } > if (rc) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error decrypting the " > - "session key; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > - goto out_wipe_list; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp; > + > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error decrypting the " > + "session key for authentication token with sig " > + "[%.*s]; rc = [%d]. Removing auth tok " > + "candidate from the list and searching for " > + "the next match.\n", candidate_auth_tok_sig, > + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, rc); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok_list_item, > + auth_tok_list_item_tmp, > + &auth_tok_list, list) { > + if (candidate_auth_tok > + == &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok) { > + list_del(&auth_tok_list_item->list); > + kmem_cache_free( > + ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, > + auth_tok_list_item); > + goto find_next_matching_auth_tok; > + } > + } > + BUG(); > } > rc = ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat); > if (rc) { > @@ -1240,6 +1369,7 @@ out_wipe_list: > out: > return rc; > } > + > static int > pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > @@ -1291,15 +1421,15 @@ out: > * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. > */ > static int > -write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > +write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) > { > size_t i; > size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > - size_t key_rec_size; > size_t packet_size_length; > + size_t max_packet_size; > int rc = 0; > > (*packet_size) = 0; > @@ -1329,37 +1459,23 @@ write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, key_rec->enc_key_size); > } > encrypted_session_key_set: > - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the > - * key_rec set. */ > - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record) > - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES > - + (key_rec->enc_key_size)); > - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this > - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions > - * later than 0.1 */ > - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n"); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - /* ***** TAG 1 Packet Format ***** > - * | version number | 1 byte | > - * | key ID | 8 bytes | > - * | public key algorithm | 1 byte | > - * | encrypted session key | arbitrary | > - */ > - if ((0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, > - "Authentication token is too large\n"); > + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > + * packet tag 1 */ > + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 1 identifier */ > + + 3 /* Max Tag 1 packet size */ > + + 1 /* Version */ > + + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE /* Key identifier */ > + + 1 /* Cipher identifier */ > + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */ > + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet length larger than maximum allowable; " > + "need up to [%d] bytes, but there are only [%d] " > + "available\n", max_packet_size, (*remaining_bytes)); > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE; > - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > - * packet tag 1 */ > - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], > - (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + > - key_rec->enc_key_size), > + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4), > &packet_size_length); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 1 packet " > @@ -1377,6 +1493,8 @@ encrypted_session_key_set: > out: > if (rc) > (*packet_size) = 0; > + else > + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1448,19 +1566,22 @@ write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int max, char *contents, size_t contents_length, > * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. > */ > static int > -write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > +write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) > { > size_t i; > size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > char session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; > - struct scatterlist dest_sg[2]; > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; > + struct scatterlist dst_sg; > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; > - size_t key_rec_size; > - size_t packet_size_length; > size_t cipher_code; > + size_t packet_size_length; > + size_t max_packet_size; > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat; > struct blkcipher_desc desc = { > .tfm = NULL, > .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP > @@ -1470,16 +1591,25 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > (*packet_size) = 0; > ecryptfs_from_hex(key_rec->sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature, > ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE); > - encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > - for (i = 0; i < crypt_stat->key_size; i++) > - encrypted_session_key_valid |= > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i]; > - if (encrypted_session_key_valid) { > - memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); > - goto encrypted_session_key_set; > + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex, > + crypt_stat->cipher); > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get " > + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > + crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > + goto out; > + } > + if (mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size == 0) { > + struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(desc.tfm); > + > + printk(KERN_WARNING "No key size specified at mount; " > + "defaulting to [%d]\n", alg->max_keysize); > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = > + alg->max_keysize; > } > + if (crypt_stat->key_size == 0) > + crypt_stat->key_size = > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0) > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = > crypt_stat->key_size; > @@ -1487,9 +1617,24 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > && strcmp("aes", crypt_stat->cipher) == 0) { > memset((crypt_stat->key + 24), 0, 8); > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 32; > - } > + } else > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = crypt_stat->key_size; > key_rec->enc_key_size = > auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; > + encrypted_session_key_valid = 0; > + for (i = 0; i < auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; i++) > + encrypted_session_key_valid |= > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i]; > + if (encrypted_session_key_valid) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "encrypted_session_key_valid != 0; " > + "using auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, " > + "where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > + memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, > + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > + goto encrypted_session_key_set; > + } > if (auth_tok->token.password.flags & > ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Using previously generated " > @@ -1508,54 +1653,32 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key:\n"); > ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16); > } > - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key, > - key_rec->enc_key_size, src_sg, 2); > - if (!rc) { > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key, > + key_rec->enc_key_size, &src_sg, 1)) > + != 1) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist " > - "for crypt_stat session key\n"); > + "for crypt_stat session key; expected rc = 1; " > + "got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", > + rc, key_rec->enc_key_size); > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > } > - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key, > - key_rec->enc_key_size, dest_sg, 2); > - if (!rc) { > + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key, > + key_rec->enc_key_size, &dst_sg, 1)) > + != 1) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist " > - "for crypt_stat encrypted session key\n"); > + "for crypt_stat encrypted session key; " > + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. " > + "key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", rc, > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > } > - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher, > - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name) > - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) { > - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm; > - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex; > - } else { > - char *full_alg_name; > - > - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, > - crypt_stat->cipher, > - "ecb"); > - if (rc) > - goto out; > - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, > - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); > - kfree(full_alg_name); > - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) { > - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not initialize crypto " > - "context for cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", > - crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > - goto out; > - } > - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); > - } > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex); > rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, session_key_encryption_key, > crypt_stat->key_size); > if (rc < 0) { > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key for crypto " > "context; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > @@ -1563,56 +1686,53 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > rc = 0; > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n", > crypt_stat->key_size); > - rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, dest_sg, src_sg, > + rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg, > (*key_rec).enc_key_size); > + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > if (rc) { > printk(KERN_ERR "Error encrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > } > - if (tfm_mutex) > - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex); > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This should be the encrypted key:\n"); > - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) > + if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) { > + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%d]:\n", > + key_rec->enc_key_size); > ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, > key_rec->enc_key_size); > -encrypted_session_key_set: > - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the > - * key_rec set. */ > - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record) > - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES > - + (key_rec->enc_key_size)); > - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this > - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions > - * later than 0.1 */ > - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n"); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > } > - /* TODO: Packet size limit */ > - /* We have 5 bytes of surrounding packet data */ > - if ((0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE > - + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Authentication token is too " > - "large\n"); > +encrypted_session_key_set: > + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > + * packet tag 3 */ > + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 3 identifier */ > + + 3 /* Max Tag 3 packet size */ > + + 1 /* Version */ > + + 1 /* Cipher code */ > + + 1 /* S2K specifier */ > + + 1 /* Hash identifier */ > + + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE /* Salt */ > + + 1 /* Hash iterations */ > + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */ > + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet too large; need up to [%d] bytes, but " > + "there are only [%d] available\n", max_packet_size, > + (*remaining_bytes)); > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 > - * packet tag 3 */ > dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE; > - /* ver+cipher+s2k+hash+salt+iter+enc_key */ > - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], > - (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE > - + key_rec->enc_key_size), > + /* Chop off the Tag 3 identifier(1) and Tag 3 packet size(3) > + * to get the number of octets in the actual Tag 3 packet */ > + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4), > &packet_size_length); > if (rc) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 3 packet " > - "header; cannot generate packet length\n"); > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error generating tag 3 packet header; cannot " > + "generate packet length. rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > } > (*packet_size) += packet_size_length; > dest[(*packet_size)++] = 0x04; /* version 4 */ > + /* TODO: Break from RFC2440 so that arbitrary ciphers can be > + * specified with strings */ > cipher_code = ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(crypt_stat); > if (cipher_code == 0) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unable to generate code for " > @@ -1631,10 +1751,10 @@ encrypted_session_key_set: > key_rec->enc_key_size); > (*packet_size) += key_rec->enc_key_size; > out: > - if (desc.tfm && !tfm_mutex) > - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm); > if (rc) > (*packet_size) = 0; > + else > + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size); > return rc; > } > > @@ -1662,24 +1782,43 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > size_t max) > { > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok; > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > size_t written; > struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec; > + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig; > int rc = 0; > > (*len) = 0; > + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > key_rec = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, GFP_KERNEL); > if (!key_rec) { > rc = -ENOMEM; > goto out; > } > - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) { > - auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok; > + list_for_each_entry(key_sig, &crypt_stat->keysig_list, > + crypt_stat_list) { > + memset(key_rec, 0, sizeof(*key_rec)); > + rc = ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok, > + mount_crypt_stat, > + key_sig->keysig); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to get the global " > + "auth_tok; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out_free; > + } > + if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID) { > + printk(KERN_WARNING > + "Skipping invalid auth tok with sig = [%s]\n", > + global_auth_tok->sig); > + continue; > + } > + auth_tok = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok; > if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { > rc = write_tag_3_packet((dest_base + (*len)), > - max, auth_tok, > + &max, auth_tok, > crypt_stat, key_rec, > &written); > if (rc) { > @@ -1689,10 +1828,9 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > } > (*len) += written; > /* Write auth tok signature packet */ > - rc = write_tag_11_packet( > - (dest_base + (*len)), > - (max - (*len)), > - key_rec->sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written); > + rc = write_tag_11_packet((dest_base + (*len)), &max, > + key_rec->sig, > + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing " > "auth tok signature packet\n"); > @@ -1701,9 +1839,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > (*len) += written; > } else if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len), > - max, auth_tok, > - crypt_stat,mount_crypt_stat, > - key_rec, &written); > + &max, auth_tok, > + crypt_stat, key_rec, &written); > if (rc) { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error " > "writing tag 1 packet\n"); > @@ -1716,19 +1853,69 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out_free; > } > - } else > - BUG(); > - if (likely((max - (*len)) > 0)) { > + } > + if (likely(max > 0)) { > dest_base[(*len)] = 0x00; > } else { > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing boundary byte\n"); > rc = -EIO; > } > - > out_free: > kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, key_rec); > out: > if (rc) > (*len) = 0; > + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > + return rc; > +} > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; > + > +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *new_key_sig; > + int rc = 0; > + > + new_key_sig = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!new_key_sig) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + printk(KERN_ERR > + "Error allocating from ecryptfs_key_sig_cache\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + memcpy(new_key_sig->keysig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > + list_add(&new_key_sig->crypt_stat_list, &crypt_stat->keysig_list); > + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); > +out: > return rc; > } > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; > + > +int > +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, > + char *sig) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok; > + int rc = 0; > + > + new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!new_auth_tok) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating from " > + "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + memcpy(new_auth_tok->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > + new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list); > + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks++; > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c > index 606128f..5da6180 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c > @@ -179,38 +179,40 @@ static match_table_t tokens = { > {ecryptfs_opt_err, NULL} > }; > > -/** > - * ecryptfs_verify_version > - * @version: The version number to confirm > - * > - * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise > - */ > -static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version) > +static int ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks( > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > { > + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > int rc = 0; > - unsigned char major; > - unsigned char minor; > - > - major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF); > - minor = (version & 0xFF); > - if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. " > - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. " > - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n", > - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > + > + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, > + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, > + mount_crypt_stat_list) { > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig( > + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key, > + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok, > + global_auth_tok->sig))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find valid key in user " > + "session keyring for sig specified in mount " > + "option: [%s]\n", global_auth_tok->sig); > + global_auth_tok->flags |= ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID; > + rc = 0; > + } else > + global_auth_tok->flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID; > } > -out: > return rc; > } > > +static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat( > + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat) > +{ > + memset((void *)mount_crypt_stat, 0, > + sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat)); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list); > + mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED; > +} > + > /** > * ecryptfs_parse_options > * @sb: The ecryptfs super block > @@ -264,14 +266,13 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) > case ecryptfs_opt_sig: > case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig: > sig_src = args[0].from; > - sig_dst = > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig; > - memcpy(sig_dst, sig_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX); > - sig_dst[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, > - "The mount_crypt_stat " > - "global_auth_tok_sig set to: " > - "[%s]\n", sig_dst); > + rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat, > + sig_src); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " > + "global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > sig_set = 1; > break; > case ecryptfs_opt_debug: > @@ -358,55 +359,21 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) > if (!cipher_key_bytes_set) { > mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0; > } > - rc = ecryptfs_process_cipher( > - &mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm, > - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > - &mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size); > - if (rc) { > - printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher [%s] " > - "with key size [%Zd] bytes; rc = [%d]\n", > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm( > + NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size))) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher with " > + "name = [%s] and key size = [%d]; rc = [%d]\n", > mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size, rc); > - mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm = NULL; > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = NULL; > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex); > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Requesting the key with description: " > - "[%s]\n", mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig); > - /* The reference to this key is held until umount is done The > - * call to key_put is done in ecryptfs_put_super() */ > - auth_tok_key = request_key(&key_type_user, > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig, > - NULL); > - if (!auth_tok_key || IS_ERR(auth_tok_key)) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find key with " > - "description: [%s]\n", > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig); > - process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(auth_tok_key)); > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out; > } > - auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key); > - if (ecryptfs_verify_version(auth_tok->version)) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Data structure version mismatch. " > - "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs kernel " > - "module with major version [%d] and minor " > - "version [%d]\n", ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, > - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > - if (auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD > - && auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Invalid auth_tok structure " > - "returned from key query\n"); > - rc = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > + if ((rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat))) { > + printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not " > + "properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > } > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = auth_tok_key; > - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok = auth_tok; > + rc = 0; > out: > return rc; > } > -- > 1.5.1.6 > > - > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring 2007-07-19 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring Michael Halcrow 2007-07-20 13:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn @ 2007-07-20 22:26 ` Andrew Morton 1 sibling, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Andrew Morton @ 2007-07-20 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Halcrow Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike On Thu, 19 Jul 2007 16:25:46 -0500 Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> wrote: > Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in > crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that > should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key > (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide > crypt_stat struct, via the > ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. > > This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide > crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing > with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's > keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user > can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. > > Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we > need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code > for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits > more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. > You have a few common coding-style slips in this patchset, which scripts/checkpatch.pl will detect. Please make checkpatch a part of your normal patch preparation process. > > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0); > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); That's odd-looking. If it was a bug for num_global_auth_toks to be zero, and if that mutex protects num_global_auth_toks then as soon as the lock gets dropped, another thread can make num_global_auth_toks zero, hence the bug is present. Perhaps? > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; Maybe the compiler can optimise those two statements, but we'd normally provide it with some manual help. > + ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat, > + mount_crypt_stat); > + rc = ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(crypt_stat, > + mount_crypt_stat); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to copy mount-wide key sigs " > + "to the inode key sigs; rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + goto out; > + } > + cipher_name_len = > + strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name); > + memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name, > + cipher_name_len); > + crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0'; > + crypt_stat->key_size = > + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size; > + ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat); > rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat); > if (rc) > ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error initializing cryptographic " > "context for cipher [%s]: rc = [%d]\n", > crypt_stat->cipher, rc); > +out: > return rc; > } > > @@ -1829,3 +1874,98 @@ ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name, > out: > return rc; > } > + > +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; > +struct list_head key_tfm_list; > +struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; > + > +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void) > +{ > + mutex_init(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key_tfm_list); > + return 0; > +} > + > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void) ecryptfs_destroy_crypto would be more grammatically correct ;) > +{ > + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm, *key_tfm_tmp; > + > + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_tfm, key_tfm_tmp, &key_tfm_list, > + key_tfm_list) { > + list_del(&key_tfm->key_tfm_list); > + if (key_tfm->key_tfm) > + crypto_free_blkcipher(key_tfm->key_tfm); > + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, key_tfm); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex); > + return 0; > +} > + > > ... > > +struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok { > +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 > + u32 flags; > + struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list; > + struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > + unsigned char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > +}; > + > +struct ecryptfs_key_tfm { > + struct crypto_blkcipher *key_tfm; > + size_t key_size; > + struct mutex key_tfm_mutex; > + struct list_head key_tfm_list; > + unsigned char cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1]; > +}; Please consider commenting your struct fields carefully: it's a great way to help other to understand your code. > +extern struct list_head key_tfm_list; > +extern struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex; > + > /** > * This struct is to enable a mount-wide passphrase/salt combo. This > * is more or less a stopgap to provide similar functionality to other > @@ -276,15 +304,14 @@ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat { > #define ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED 0x00000001 > #define ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED 0x00000002 > #define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED 0x00000004 > +#define ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 > u32 flags; > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > - struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > + struct list_head global_auth_tok_list; > + struct mutex global_auth_tok_list_mutex; > + size_t num_global_auth_toks; > size_t global_default_cipher_key_size; > - struct crypto_blkcipher *global_key_tfm; > - struct mutex global_key_tfm_mutex; > unsigned char global_default_cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE > + 1]; > - unsigned char global_auth_tok_sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > }; > > /* superblock private data. */ > @@ -468,6 +495,9 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_2; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_xattr_cache; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_lower_page_cache; > extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_record_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache; > +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache; gosh ecryptfs has a lot of slab caches. Generally one only creates a custom cache when we expect there to be a "lot" of obejcts concurrently allocated. Please check that this describes all the caches which ecryptfs implements. Otherwise, plain old kmalloc can be used. They just changed the kmem_cache_create() signature so I might have a build error to fix here. Have already fixed at least thirty such failures from that change, sigh. > +/** > + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key > + * with the given auth_tok. > * > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > */ That comment purports to be a kerneldoc-style comment. But - kerneldoc doesn't support multiple lines on the introductory line which identifies the name of the function (alas). So you'll need to overflow 80 cols here. - the function args weren't documented But the return value is! People regularly forget to do that. And they frequently forget to document the locking prerequisites and the permissible calling contexts (process/might_sleep/hardirq, etc) (please check all ecryptfs kerneldoc for this stuff sometime) > -static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > +static int > +decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, > + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat) > { > - struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr; > - struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2]; > + struct scatterlist dst_sg; > + struct scatterlist src_sg; > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; This initialisation looks like it's here to kill bogus gcc warning (if it is, it should have been commented). Please investigate uninitialized_var() and __maybe_unused sometime. Then again, maybe it isn't ;) > +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + (*sig) = NULL; > + switch (auth_tok->token_type) { > + case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD: > + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature; > + break; > + case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY: > + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.private_key.signature; > + break; > + default: > + printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot get sig for auth_tok of type [%d]\n", > + auth_tok->token_type); > + rc = -EINVAL; > + } > + return rc; > +} Please check that all the newly-added global symbols do indeed need to be global. (I think they are OK, but I'm lazy). > /** > * ecryptfs_parse_packet_set > * @dest: The header page in memory > @@ -1058,25 +1177,22 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, > struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry) > { > size_t i = 0; > - size_t found_auth_tok = 0; > + size_t found_auth_tok; > size_t next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet; > - char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX]; > struct list_head auth_tok_list; > - struct list_head *walker; > - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL; > - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = > - &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private( > - ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat; > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *matching_auth_tok = NULL; > struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL; Again, we might have some gcc-squashing going on here. When really bored you might want to grep the fs for "= NULL;" and have a think about the result. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/8] eCryptfs: Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping auth toks 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:26 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:27 ` [PATCH 3/8] eCryptfs: kmem_cache objects for multiple keys; init/exit functions Michael Halcrow ` (5 subsequent siblings) 7 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping the authentication token list. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 15 ++++----------- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index ef4904a..590f29c 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -469,26 +469,19 @@ out: static void wipe_auth_tok_list(struct list_head *auth_tok_list_head) { - struct list_head *walker; struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item; + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp; - walker = auth_tok_list_head->next; - while (walker != auth_tok_list_head) { - auth_tok_list_item = - list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item, - list); - walker = auth_tok_list_item->list.next; - memset(auth_tok_list_item, 0, - sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item)); + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok_list_item, auth_tok_list_item_tmp, + auth_tok_list_head, list) { + list_del(&auth_tok_list_item->list); kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, auth_tok_list_item); } - auth_tok_list_head->next = NULL; } struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache; - /** * parse_tag_1_packet * @crypt_stat: The cryptographic context to modify based on packet -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/8] eCryptfs: kmem_cache objects for multiple keys; init/exit functions 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 2/8] eCryptfs: Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping auth toks Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:27 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code Michael Halcrow ` (4 subsequent siblings) 7 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:27 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Introduce kmem_cache objects for handling multiple keys per inode. Add calls in the module init and exit code to call the key list initialization/destruction functions. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c index 5da6180..dd9d7b5 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c @@ -240,14 +240,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) int cipher_name_set = 0; int cipher_key_bytes; int cipher_key_bytes_set = 0; - struct key *auth_tok_key = NULL; - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok = NULL; struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(sb)->mount_crypt_stat; substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; int token; char *sig_src; - char *sig_dst; char *debug_src; char *cipher_name_dst; char *cipher_name_src; @@ -258,6 +255,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } + ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(mount_crypt_stat); while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) { if (!*p) continue; @@ -334,12 +332,10 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) p); } } - /* Do not support lack of mount-wide signature in 0.1 - * release */ if (!sig_set) { rc = -EINVAL; - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply a valid " - "passphrase auth tok signature as a mount " + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply at least one valid " + "auth tok signature as a mount " "parameter; see the eCryptfs README\n"); goto out; } @@ -615,6 +611,21 @@ static struct ecryptfs_cache_info { .name = "ecryptfs_key_record_cache", .size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record), }, + { + .cache = &ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, + .name = "ecryptfs_key_sig_cache", + .size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_sig), + }, + { + .cache = &ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, + .name = "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache", + .size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok), + }, + { + .cache = &ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, + .name = "ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache", + .size = sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm), + }, }; static void ecryptfs_free_kmem_caches(void) @@ -717,7 +728,8 @@ static struct ecryptfs_version_str_map_elem { {ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY, "pubkey"}, {ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH, "plaintext passthrough"}, {ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY, "policy"}, - {ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR, "metadata in extended attribute"} + {ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR, "metadata in extended attribute"}, + {ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY, "multiple keys per file"} }; static ssize_t version_str_show(struct ecryptfs_obj *obj, char *buff) @@ -820,6 +832,11 @@ static int __init ecryptfs_init(void) if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Failure occured while attempting to " "initialize the eCryptfs netlink socket\n"); + goto out; + } + if ((rc = ecryptfs_init_crypto())) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Failure whilst attempting to init crypto; " + "rc = [%d]\n", rc); } out: return rc; @@ -827,6 +844,12 @@ out: static void __exit ecryptfs_exit(void) { + int rc; + + if ((rc = ecryptfs_destruct_crypto())) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Failure whilst attempting to destruct crypto; " + "rc = [%d]\n", rc); + } sysfs_remove_file(&ecryptfs_subsys.kobj, &sysfs_attr_version.attr); sysfs_remove_file(&ecryptfs_subsys.kobj, -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow ` (2 preceding siblings ...) 2007-07-19 21:27 ` [PATCH 3/8] eCryptfs: kmem_cache objects for multiple keys; init/exit functions Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:28 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:41 ` Josef Sipek 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 5/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 3 " Michael Halcrow ` (3 subsequent siblings) 7 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:28 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Initialize the new auth_tok's flags. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index 590f29c..d84292d 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -512,72 +512,64 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, (*packet_size) = 0; (*new_auth_tok) = NULL; - - /* we check that: - * one byte for the Tag 1 ID flag - * two bytes for the body size - * do not exceed the maximum_packet_size + /** + * This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 1 + * + * Tag 1 identifier (1 byte) + * Max Tag 1 packet size (max 3 bytes) + * Version (1 byte) + * Key identifier (8 bytes; ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE) + * Cipher identifier (1 byte) + * Encrypted key size (arbitrary) + * + * 12 bytes minimum packet size */ - if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + if (unlikely(max_packet_size < 12)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid max packet size; must be >=12\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - /* check for Tag 1 identifier - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n", - ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE); + printk(KERN_ERR "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n", + ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } /* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or * at end of function upon failure */ auth_tok_list_item = - kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, - GFP_KERNEL); + kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!auth_tok_list_item) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Unable to allocate memory\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate memory\n"); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - memset(auth_tok_list_item, 0, - sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item)); (*new_auth_tok) = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok; - /* check for body size - one to two bytes - * - * ***** TAG 1 Packet Format ***** - * | version number | 1 byte | - * | key ID | 8 bytes | - * | public key algorithm | 1 byte | - * | encrypted session key | arbitrary | - */ - rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, - &length_size); - if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error parsing packet length; " - "rc = [%d]\n", rc); + if ((rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, + &length_size))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Error parsing packet length; " + "rc = [%d]\n", rc); goto out_free; } - if (unlikely(body_size < (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE))) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", - body_size); + if (unlikely(body_size < (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", body_size); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } (*packet_size) += length_size; if (unlikely((*packet_size) + body_size > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Packet size exceeds max\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } - /* Version 3 (from RFC2440) - one byte */ if (unlikely(data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x03)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Unknown version number " - "[%d]\n", data[(*packet_size) - 1]); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown version number [%d]\n", + data[(*packet_size) - 1]); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } - /* Read Signature */ ecryptfs_to_hex((*new_auth_tok)->token.private_key.signature, &data[(*packet_size)], ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE); *packet_size += ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE; @@ -585,27 +577,23 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, * know which public key encryption algorithm was used */ (*packet_size)++; (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size = - body_size - (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE); + body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2); if ((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size > ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Tag 1 packet contains key larger " - "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Tag 1 packet contains key larger " + "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypted key size = [%d]\n", - (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size); memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key, - &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - 0x02 - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE)); + &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2))); (*packet_size) += (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size; (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY; (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY; (*new_auth_tok)->token_type = ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY; - (*new_auth_tok)->flags |= ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY; - /* TODO: Why are we setting this flag here? Don't we want the - * userspace to decrypt the session key? */ + (*new_auth_tok)->flags = 0; (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT); (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &= -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:41 ` Josef Sipek 2007-07-19 21:53 ` Michael Halcrow 0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread From: Josef Sipek @ 2007-07-19 21:41 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Halcrow Cc: akpm, linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike On Thu, Jul 19, 2007 at 04:28:01PM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote: > Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries > more explicitly. Initialize the new auth_tok's flags. ... > - if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) { > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); > + if (unlikely(max_packet_size < 12)) { > + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid max packet size; must be >=12\n"); Hardcoded 12? Josef 'Jeff' Sipek. -- Humans were created by water to transport it upward. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code 2007-07-19 21:41 ` Josef Sipek @ 2007-07-19 21:53 ` Michael Halcrow 0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Josef Sipek Cc: akpm, linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike On Thu, Jul 19, 2007 at 05:41:16PM -0400, Josef Sipek wrote: > On Thu, Jul 19, 2007 at 04:28:01PM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote: > > Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries > > more explicitly. Initialize the new auth_tok's flags. > ... > > - if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) { > > - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); > > + if (unlikely(max_packet_size < 12)) { > > + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid max packet size; must be >=12\n"); > > Hardcoded 12? It's not so much a magic number if you preserve the comment immediately above it. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 3 parsing code 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow ` (3 preceding siblings ...) 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:28 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:29 ` [PATCH 6/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 " Michael Halcrow ` (2 subsequent siblings) 7 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:28 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Fix up the Tag 3 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index d84292d..4caa45d 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -643,22 +643,30 @@ parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, (*packet_size) = 0; (*new_auth_tok) = NULL; - - /* we check that: - * one byte for the Tag 3 ID flag - * two bytes for the body size - * do not exceed the maximum_packet_size + /** + *This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 3 + * + * Tag 3 identifier (1 byte) + * Max Tag 3 packet size (max 3 bytes) + * Version (1 byte) + * Cipher code (1 byte) + * S2K specifier (1 byte) + * Hash identifier (1 byte) + * Salt (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE) + * Hash iterations (1 byte) + * Encrypted key (arbitrary) + * + * (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE + 7) minimum packet size */ - if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + if (max_packet_size < (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE + 7)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Max packet size too large\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* check for Tag 3 identifyer - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n", - ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE); + printk(KERN_ERR "First byte != 0x%.2x; invalid packet\n", + ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -667,56 +675,36 @@ parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, auth_tok_list_item = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache, GFP_KERNEL); if (!auth_tok_list_item) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Unable to allocate memory\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate memory\n"); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } (*new_auth_tok) = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok; - - /* check for body size - one to two bytes */ - rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, - &length_size); - if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error parsing packet length; " - "rc = [%d]\n", rc); + if ((rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, + &length_size))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Error parsing packet length; rc = [%d]\n", + rc); goto out_free; } - if (unlikely(body_size < (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE))) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", - body_size); + if (unlikely(body_size < (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE + 5))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", body_size); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } (*packet_size) += length_size; - - /* now we know the length of the remainting Tag 3 packet size: - * 5 fix bytes for: version string, cipher, S2K ID, hash algo, - * number of hash iterations - * ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE bytes for salt - * body_size bytes minus the stuff above is the encrypted key size - */ if (unlikely((*packet_size) + body_size > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet size exceeds max\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } - - /* There are 5 characters of additional information in the - * packet */ (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size = - body_size - (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE); - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypted key size = [%d]\n", - (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size); - - /* Version 4 (from RFC2440) - one byte */ + (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE + 5)); if (unlikely(data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x04)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Unknown version number " - "[%d]\n", data[(*packet_size) - 1]); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown version number [%d]\n", + data[(*packet_size) - 1]); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } - - /* cipher - one byte */ ecryptfs_cipher_code_to_string(crypt_stat->cipher, (u16)data[(*packet_size)]); /* A little extra work to differentiate among the AES key @@ -730,33 +718,26 @@ parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size; } ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat); - /* S2K identifier 3 (from RFC2440) */ if (unlikely(data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x03)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Only S2K ID 3 is currently " - "supported\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Only S2K ID 3 is currently supported\n"); rc = -ENOSYS; goto out_free; } - /* TODO: finish the hash mapping */ - /* hash algorithm - one byte */ switch (data[(*packet_size)++]) { case 0x01: /* See RFC2440 for these numbers and their mappings */ /* Choose MD5 */ - /* salt - ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE bytes */ memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->token.password.salt, &data[(*packet_size)], ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE); (*packet_size) += ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE; - /* This conversion was taken straight from RFC2440 */ - /* number of hash iterations - one byte */ (*new_auth_tok)->token.password.hash_iterations = ((u32) 16 + (data[(*packet_size)] & 15)) << ((data[(*packet_size)] >> 4) + 6); (*packet_size)++; - - /* encrypted session key - - * (body_size-5-ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE) bytes */ + /* Friendly reminder: + * (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size = + * (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE + 5)); */ memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key, &data[(*packet_size)], (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key_size); @@ -766,7 +747,7 @@ parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, ~ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY; (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY; - (*new_auth_tok)->token.password.hash_algo = 0x01; + (*new_auth_tok)->token.password.hash_algo = 0x01; /* MD5 */ break; default: ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Unsupported hash algorithm: " -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 parsing code 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow ` (4 preceding siblings ...) 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 5/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 3 " Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:29 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:30 ` [PATCH 7/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 writing code Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:30 ` [PATCH 8/8] eCryptfs: Update comment and debug statement Michael Halcrow 7 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:29 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Fix up the Tag 11 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Pay attention to *8* bytes for the key identifier (literal data), no more, no less. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index 4caa45d..8c695e3 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -803,82 +803,60 @@ parse_tag_11_packet(unsigned char *data, unsigned char *contents, (*packet_size) = 0; (*tag_11_contents_size) = 0; - - /* check that: - * one byte for the Tag 11 ID flag - * two bytes for the Tag 11 length - * do not exceed the maximum_packet_size + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 11 + * + * Tag 11 identifier (1 byte) + * Max Tag 11 packet size (max 3 bytes) + * Binary format specifier (1 byte) + * Filename length (1 byte) + * Filename ("_CONSOLE") (8 bytes) + * Modification date (4 bytes) + * Literal data (arbitrary) + * + * We need at least 16 bytes of data for the packet to even be + * valid. */ - if (unlikely((*packet_size) + 3 > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + if (max_packet_size < 16) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Maximum packet size too small\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* check for Tag 11 identifyer - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != ECRYPTFS_TAG_11_PACKET_TYPE) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, - "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* get Tag 11 content length - one or two bytes */ - rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, - &length_size); - if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, - "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); + if ((rc = parse_packet_length(&data[(*packet_size)], &body_size, + &length_size))) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid tag 11 packet format\n"); goto out; } - (*packet_size) += length_size; - - if (body_size < 13) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", - body_size); + if (body_size < 14) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "Invalid body size ([%d])\n", body_size); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - /* We have 13 bytes of surrounding packet values */ - (*tag_11_contents_size) = (body_size - 13); - - /* now we know the length of the remainting Tag 11 packet size: - * 14 fix bytes for: special flag one, special flag two, - * 12 skipped bytes - * body_size bytes minus the stuff above is the Tag 11 content - */ - /* FIXME why is the body size one byte smaller than the actual - * size of the body? - * this seems to be an error here as well as in - * write_tag_11_packet() */ + (*packet_size) += length_size; + (*tag_11_contents_size) = (body_size - 14); if (unlikely((*packet_size) + body_size + 1 > max_packet_size)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet size exceeds max\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet size exceeds max\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* special flag one - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x62) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unrecognizable packet\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecognizable packet\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* special flag two - one byte */ if (data[(*packet_size)++] != 0x08) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unrecognizable packet\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecognizable packet\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - - /* skip the next 12 bytes */ - (*packet_size) += 12; /* We don't care about the filename or - * the timestamp */ - - /* get the Tag 11 contents - tag_11_contents_size bytes */ + (*packet_size) += 12; /* Ignore filename and modification date */ memcpy(contents, &data[(*packet_size)], (*tag_11_contents_size)); (*packet_size) += (*tag_11_contents_size); - out: if (rc) { (*packet_size) = 0; -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 7/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 writing code 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow ` (5 preceding siblings ...) 2007-07-19 21:29 ` [PATCH 6/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 " Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:30 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:30 ` [PATCH 8/8] eCryptfs: Update comment and debug statement Michael Halcrow 7 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:30 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Fix up the Tag 11 writing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. It looks like the packet length was 1 shorter than it should have been, chopping off the last byte of the key identifier. This is largely inconsequential, since it is not much more likely that a key identifier collision will occur with 7 bytes rather than 8. This patch fixes the packet to use the full number of bytes that were originally intended to be used for the key identifier. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index 8c695e3..8485e77 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -1449,47 +1449,52 @@ out: * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error. */ static int -write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int max, char *contents, size_t contents_length, - size_t *packet_length) +write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int *remaining_bytes, char *contents, + size_t contents_length, size_t *packet_length) { size_t packet_size_length; + size_t max_packet_size; int rc = 0; (*packet_length) = 0; - if ((13 + contents_length) > max) { + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440 + * packet tag 11 */ + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 11 identifier */ + + 3 /* Max Tag 11 packet size */ + + 1 /* Binary format specifier */ + + 1 /* Filename length */ + + 8 /* Filename ("_CONSOLE") */ + + 4 /* Modification date */ + + contents_length); /* Literal data */ + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet length larger than maximum allowable; " + "need up to [%d] bytes, but there are only [%d] " + "available\n", max_packet_size, (*remaining_bytes)); rc = -EINVAL; - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Packet length larger than " - "maximum allowable\n"); goto out; } - /* General packet header */ - /* Packet tag */ dest[(*packet_length)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_11_PACKET_TYPE; - /* Packet length */ rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_length)], - (13 + contents_length), &packet_size_length); + (max_packet_size - 4), &packet_size_length); if (rc) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 11 packet " - "header; cannot generate packet length\n"); + printk(KERN_ERR "Error generating tag 11 packet header; cannot " + "generate packet length. rc = [%d]\n", rc); goto out; } (*packet_length) += packet_size_length; - /* Tag 11 specific */ - /* One-octet field that describes how the data is formatted */ - dest[(*packet_length)++] = 0x62; /* binary data */ - /* One-octet filename length followed by filename */ + dest[(*packet_length)++] = 0x62; /* binary data format specifier */ dest[(*packet_length)++] = 8; memcpy(&dest[(*packet_length)], "_CONSOLE", 8); (*packet_length) += 8; - /* Four-octet number indicating modification date */ memset(&dest[(*packet_length)], 0x00, 4); (*packet_length) += 4; - /* Remainder is literal data */ memcpy(&dest[(*packet_length)], contents, contents_length); (*packet_length) += contents_length; out: if (rc) (*packet_length) = 0; + else + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_length); return rc; } -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 8/8] eCryptfs: Update comment and debug statement 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow ` (6 preceding siblings ...) 2007-07-19 21:30 ` [PATCH 7/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 writing code Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:30 ` Michael Halcrow 7 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread From: Michael Halcrow @ 2007-07-19 21:30 UTC (permalink / raw) To: akpm; +Cc: linux-kernel, tchicks, trevor.highland, pregan, toml, sergeh, mike Trivial updates to comment and debug statement. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> --- fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 2 -- fs/ecryptfs/debug.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c index 4f7d895..129ed13 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c @@ -1267,8 +1267,6 @@ static int ecryptfs_read_header_region(char *data, struct dentry *dentry, lower_file->f_pos = 0; oldfs = get_fs(); set_fs(get_ds()); - /* For releases 0.1 and 0.2, all of the header information - * fits in the first data extent-sized region. */ rc = lower_file->f_op->read(lower_file, (char __user *)data, ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE, &lower_file->f_pos); set_fs(oldfs); diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c b/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c index 434c7ef..3d2bdf5 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c @@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok) auth_tok); if (auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * private key type\n"); - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * (NO PRIVATE KEY SUPPORT " - "IN ECRYPTFS VERSION 0.1)\n"); } else { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * passphrase type\n"); ecryptfs_to_hex(salt, auth_tok->token.password.salt, -- 1.4.4.4 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2007-07-20 22:28 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 13+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2007-07-19 21:24 [PATCH 0/8] eCryptfs: Support multiple keys per inode Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:25 ` [PATCH 1/8] eCryptfs: Add key list structure; search keyring Michael Halcrow 2007-07-20 13:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2007-07-20 22:26 ` Andrew Morton 2007-07-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 2/8] eCryptfs: Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping auth toks Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:27 ` [PATCH 3/8] eCryptfs: kmem_cache objects for multiple keys; init/exit functions Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 4/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 1 parsing code Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:41 ` Josef Sipek 2007-07-19 21:53 ` Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:28 ` [PATCH 5/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 3 " Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:29 ` [PATCH 6/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 " Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:30 ` [PATCH 7/8] eCryptfs: Fix Tag 11 writing code Michael Halcrow 2007-07-19 21:30 ` [PATCH 8/8] eCryptfs: Update comment and debug statement Michael Halcrow
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