From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>, Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net>,
security@kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
mingo@redhat.com, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>, Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 12:33:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090506103316.GB25203@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m1skjjtff4.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org>
* Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> writes:
>
> > On Tue, May 05, 2009 at 09:52:46PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> >>
> >> * Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> > Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> writes:
> >> >
> >> > > * Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > >> As to what's the appropriate sort of RNG for ASLR to use, finding
> >> > >> a balance between too strong and too weak is tricky. [...]
> >> > >
> >> > > In exec-shield i mixed 'easily accessible and fast' semi-random
> >> > > state to the get_random_int() result: xor-ed the cycle counter, the
> >> > > pid and a kernel address to it. That strengthened the result in a
> >> > > pretty practical way (without strengthening the theoretical
> >> > > randomless - each of those items are considered guessable) and does
> >> > > so without weakening the entropy of the random pool.
> >> >
> >> > The trouble is, that thinking completely misses the problem, and I
> >> > expect that is why we have a problem. Throwing a bunch of
> >> > possibly truly random values into the pot for luck is nice. But
> >> > you didn't throw in a pseudo random number generator. An
> >> > unpredictable sequence that is guaranteed to change from one
> >> > invocation to the next.
> >>
> >> Alas, i did - it got 'reviewed' out of existence ;)
> >>
> >> I still have the backups, here's the original exec-shield RNG:
> >>
> >> +/*
> >> + * Get a random word:
> >> + */
> >> +static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
> >> +{
> >> + unsigned int val = 0;
> >> +
> >> + if (!exec_shield_randomize)
> >> + return 0;
> >> +
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_HAS_TSC
> >> + rdtscl(val);
> >> +#endif
> >> + val += current->pid + jiffies + (int)&val;
> >> +
> >> + /*
> >> + * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself
> >> + * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited
> >> + * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We
> >> + * also spice it with the TSC (if available), jiffies, PID and the
> >> + * stack address:
> >> + */
> >> + return secure_ip_id(val);
> >> +}
> >
> > Ingo, what are you on about? On every architecture but X86 with TSC
> > this is identical to the broken code.
>
> Well it has the val = (int)&val bit.
>
> However you are quite right the original get_random_int does not
> have any state that persists from one call to the next. Ingo you
> failed to copy that from the way ip uses secure_ip_id.
>
> Which ultimately means get_random_int has never had a pseudo
> random number generator in it.
Indeed, good point. But, practical randomness was still saved by the
other layers. Which what it is really about: adding different
sources of semi-random values really increases attack complexity,
and is cheap.
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-05-06 10:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-05-04 18:51 Jake Edge
2009-05-04 19:00 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2009-05-04 19:51 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-04 20:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-04 22:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-04 23:26 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-04 23:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 7:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-05 15:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 15:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 16:18 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 16:10 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 5:50 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 6:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-05 8:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-05 19:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-05 20:22 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 21:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-06 10:33 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2009-05-06 10:30 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 16:25 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 16:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-06 17:57 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 0:50 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 15:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:14 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 18:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:41 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 19:24 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 15:16 ` Florian Weimer
2009-05-07 16:55 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 17:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-07 18:42 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 20:09 ` [patch] random: make get_random_int() more random Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:41 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 20:51 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:10 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 21:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-14 22:47 ` Jake Edge
2009-05-14 22:55 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2009-05-15 13:47 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-15 15:10 ` Jake Edge
2009-05-16 10:00 ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 10:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-16 12:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-16 14:00 ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:28 ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:57 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-16 15:09 ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:32 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-16 13:58 ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 15:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-16 15:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 15:54 ` Oliver Neukum
2009-05-16 16:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-16 16:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-15 1:16 ` Américo Wang
2009-05-06 20:25 ` [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:52 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 8:58 ` Andi Kleen
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