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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	security@kernel.org, Linux@hera.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org,
	Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Arjan@hera.kernel.org, List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alan@hera.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>, de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [Security] [patch] random: make get_random_int() more random
Date: Sat, 16 May 2009 12:39:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090516103909.GB6261@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090516100039.GA24619@1wt.eu>


* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 03:47:17PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > 
> > * Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > 
> > > On Thu, 14 May 2009, Jake Edge wrote:
> > > >
> > > > It seems like this should be queued up for stable, yes?  I 
> > > > just saw the 2.6.29.4 review patches go out, but this wasn't 
> > > > part of it ...
> > > 
> > > Well, I was hoping to maybe have actual timing numbers from 
> > > some better hash, in case Matt can make one that is efficient 
> > > enough. So I committed the randomness improvement as a clear 
> > > _improvement_ over what we had, but it may not be the final 
> > > version.
> > 
> > yep, it was just a quick hack really. If someone can do a 
> > stronger hash that also happens to be faster i guess we all will 
> > be happy campers. The performance figures showed room for 
> > improvement - how well are those hashes optimized? Many 
> > thousands of cycles ... is that really justified?
> 
> In fact we must keep in mind that those hashes produce far more 
> data than we need and we're throwing that data to the bin on every 
> call. If we use SHA1, we get 160 bits. We should save them and 
> return them by 5 packets of 32 bits, then only call SHA1 once 
> every 5 calls. That way, we get one slower exec every 5 calls but 
> faster calls on average.

Good idea ...

> And if we can't get a good hash to be fast enough, let's make this 
> configurable. Most of us won't ever care about the strength of the 
> hash. People concerned about security won't care about the slower 
> hash. If we set the slower hash by default and have a tunable for 
> it, everyone will have the solution that fits them.

Bad idea IMHO ...

It is a bad idea because such sort of tunables do not really help 
the user as those who tweak are a distinct minority.

Also, having a two-way hack _hinders_ your good idea from being 
adopted for example. Why bother with a faster hash and with using 
the resulting bits sparingly if we can get an 'easy' tunable in and 
can have two sub-par solutions instead of one (harder to implement) 
good solution?

So tunables are really counter-productive - and this is a pet peeve 
of mine.

Every time we have such a tunable for something fundamental we've 
not improved the kernel, we've documented a _failure_ in kernel 
design and implementation.

Sure, we do use tunables for physical constants, limits and other 
natural parameters - and _sometimes_ we just grudingly admit defeat 
and admit that something is really impossible to implement. IMHO 
here we are not at that point yet, at all.

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2009-05-16 10:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-05-04 18:51 [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes Jake Edge
2009-05-04 19:00 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2009-05-04 19:51   ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-04 20:20     ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-04 22:24       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-04 23:26         ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-04 23:54         ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05  7:51           ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-05 15:17             ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 15:35               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 16:18                 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 16:10               ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05  5:50         ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05  6:31           ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-05  8:14             ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-05 19:52               ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-05 20:22                 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 21:20                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-06 10:33                     ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 10:30                   ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 16:25                     ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 16:48                       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-06 17:57                         ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07  0:50                           ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 15:02                             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:14                               ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 18:21                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:41                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 19:24                                   ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 15:16                           ` Florian Weimer
2009-05-07 16:55                             ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 17:53                               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-07 18:42                                 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 20:09                         ` [patch] random: make get_random_int() more random Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:41                           ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 20:51                             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:10                               ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 21:24                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-14 22:47                           ` Jake Edge
2009-05-14 22:55                             ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2009-05-15 13:47                               ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-15 15:10                                 ` Jake Edge
2009-05-16 10:00                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 10:39                                   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2009-05-16 12:02                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-16 14:00                                       ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:28                                         ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:57                                           ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-16 15:09                                             ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:32                                       ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-16 13:58                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 15:23                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-16 15:47                                         ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 15:54                                         ` Oliver Neukum
2009-05-16 16:05                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-16 16:17                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-15  1:16                           ` Américo Wang
2009-05-06 20:25                       ` [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:52                         ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05  8:58           ` Andi Kleen

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