From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
xemul@parallels.com, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2011 15:04:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110217150406.GI26395@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110217150224.GA26334@mail.hallyn.com>
Cheat for now and say all files belong to init_user_ns. Next
step will be to let superblocks belong to a user_ns, and derive
inode_userns(inode) from inode->i_sb->s_user_ns. Finally we'll
introduce more flexible arrangements.
Changelog:
Feb 15: make is_owner_or_cap take const struct inode
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
fs/inode.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
fs/namei.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
include/linux/fs.h | 9 +++++++--
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index da85e56..1930b45 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/async.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
/*
* This is needed for the following functions:
@@ -1722,3 +1723,19 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the
+ * file, or owns the file.
+ */
+int is_owner_or_cap(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode);
+
+ if (current_user_ns() == ns && current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
+ return 1;
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_owner_or_cap);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 9e701e2..cfac5b4 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flag
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
+ if (current_user_ns() != inode_userns(inode))
+ goto other_perms;
+
if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
mode >>= 6;
else {
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flag
mode >>= 3;
}
+other_perms:
/*
* If the DACs are ok we don't need any capability check.
*/
@@ -230,7 +234,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags,
* Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
- if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
/*
@@ -238,7 +242,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags,
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ || (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !(mask & MAY_WRITE)))
- if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@@ -675,6 +679,7 @@ force_reval_path(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode);
if (inode->i_op->permission) {
ret = inode->i_op->permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags);
@@ -687,7 +692,7 @@ static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
if (ret == -ECHILD)
return ret;
- if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
goto ok;
return ret;
@@ -1940,11 +1945,15 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
if (!(dir->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
return 0;
+ if (current_user_ns() != inode_userns(inode))
+ goto other_userns;
if (inode->i_uid == fsuid)
return 0;
if (dir->i_uid == fsuid)
return 0;
- return !capable(CAP_FOWNER);
+
+other_userns:
+ return !ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_FOWNER);
}
/*
@@ -2635,7 +2644,8 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
if (error)
return error;
- if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
+ if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) &&
+ !ns_capable(inode_userns(dir), CAP_MKNOD))
return -EPERM;
if (!dir->i_op->mknod)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index bd32159..c84417a 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1446,8 +1446,13 @@ enum {
#define put_fs_excl() atomic_dec(¤t->fs_excl)
#define has_fs_excl() atomic_read(¤t->fs_excl)
-#define is_owner_or_cap(inode) \
- ((current_fsuid() == (inode)->i_uid) || capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+/*
+ * until VFS tracks user namespaces for inodes, just make all files
+ * belong to init_user_ns
+ */
+extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
+#define inode_userns(inode) (&init_user_ns)
+extern int is_owner_or_cap(const struct inode *inode);
/* not quite ready to be deprecated, but... */
extern void lock_super(struct super_block *);
--
1.7.0.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-02-17 15:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-02-17 15:02 userns: targeted capabilities v5 Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-17 15:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 3:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 16:57 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 23:59 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 3:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:44 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 23:59 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 3/9] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 3:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:46 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 4/9] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 3:00 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24 0:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 0:54 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 10:55 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 2:59 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 4:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 0:49 ` [PATCH] userns: ptrace: incorporate feedback from Eric Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 0:56 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24 3:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 23:59 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Andrew Morton
2011-02-24 0:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-19 17:49 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 6/9] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 0:01 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 17:52 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 7/9] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 3:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 17:57 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 8/9] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 1:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-19 19:07 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2011-02-18 1:29 ` [PATCH 9/9] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24 3:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 5:08 ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 19:22 ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 0:21 ` userns: targeted capabilities v5 Andrew Morton
2011-02-18 3:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 4:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 11:40 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 12:01 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 13:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 12:05 ` User namespaces and keys David Howells
2011-02-23 13:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 14:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 15:06 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 15:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 15:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 19:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2011-02-23 20:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 21:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2011-02-24 6:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 16:59 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 17:05 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces David Howells
2011-02-23 17:11 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 17:16 ` [PATCH 1/9] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 21:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 23:19 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 23:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
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