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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	xemul@parallels.com, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2011 19:00:44 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <m162si9hcz.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110217150325.GD26395@mail.hallyn.com> (Serge E. Hallyn's message of "Thu, 17 Feb 2011 15:03:25 +0000")

"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:

> Changelog:
> 	Dec  8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
> 	        Eric Biederman.
> 	Dec 13: Apply Eric's suggestion to pass target task into kill_ok_by_cred()
> 	        for clarity
> 	Dec 31: address comment by Eric Biederman:
> 		don't need cred/tcred in check_kill_permission.
> 	Jan  1: use const cred struct.
> 	Jan 11: Per Bastian Blank's advice, clean up kill_ok_by_cred().
> 	Feb 16: kill_ok_by_cred: fix bad parentheses

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> ---
>  kernel/signal.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index 4e3cff1..ffe4bdf 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -636,13 +636,33 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info)
>  }
>  
>  /*
> + * called with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission()
> + */
> +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred(struct task_struct *t)
> +{
> +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> +	const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
> +
> +	if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
> +	    (cred->euid == tcred->suid ||
> +	     cred->euid == tcred->uid ||
> +	     cred->uid  == tcred->suid ||
> +	     cred->uid  == tcred->uid))
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
>   * Bad permissions for sending the signal
>   * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
>   */
>  static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
>  				 struct task_struct *t)
>  {
> -	const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
>  	struct pid *sid;
>  	int error;
>  
> @@ -656,14 +676,8 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
>  
> -	cred = current_cred();
> -	tcred = __task_cred(t);
>  	if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
> -	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
> -	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
> -	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
> -	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
> -	    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
> +	    !kill_ok_by_cred(t)) {
>  		switch (sig) {
>  		case SIGCONT:
>  			sid = task_session(t);

  reply	other threads:[~2011-02-18  3:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-17 15:02 userns: targeted capabilities v5 Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-17 15:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:31   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 16:57   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:46   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:44   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 3/9] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:46   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 4/9] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:00   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  0:48     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  0:54       ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 10:55   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  2:59   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18  4:36     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  0:49       ` [PATCH] userns: ptrace: incorporate feedback from Eric Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  0:56         ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  3:15           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 23:59   ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  0:43     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-19 17:49   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 6/9] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  1:57   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19  0:01   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 17:52   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 7/9] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:19   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 17:57   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 8/9] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  1:51   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-19 19:07   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:04 ` [PATCH 9/9] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  1:29   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  3:24     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  5:08       ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 19:22   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18  0:21 ` userns: targeted capabilities v5 Andrew Morton
2011-02-18  3:53   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18  4:28   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 11:40 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 12:01 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 13:43   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 12:05 ` User namespaces and keys David Howells
2011-02-23 13:58   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 14:46     ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 15:06   ` David Howells
2011-02-23 15:45     ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 15:53       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 19:24         ` Casey Schaufler
2011-02-23 20:55           ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 21:37             ` Casey Schaufler
2011-02-24  6:56               ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 16:59 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 17:05 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces David Howells
2011-02-23 17:11 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 17:16 ` [PATCH 1/9] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 21:21   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 23:19   ` David Howells
2011-02-23 23:54     ` Eric W. Biederman

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