mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	xemul@parallels.com, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH] userns: ptrace: incorporate feedback from Eric
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2011 00:49:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110224004901.GB11822@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110218043601.GB9584@mail.hallyn.com>

same_or_ancestore_user_ns() was not an appropriate check to
constrain cap_issubset.  Rather, cap_issubset() only is
meaningful when both capsets are in the same user_ns.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 include/linux/user_namespace.h |    9 ---------
 kernel/user_namespace.c        |   16 ----------------
 security/commoncap.c           |   28 ++++++++++------------------
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 862fc59..faf4679 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -39,9 +39,6 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
 uid_t user_ns_map_uid(struct user_namespace *to, const struct cred *cred, uid_t uid);
 gid_t user_ns_map_gid(struct user_namespace *to, const struct cred *cred, gid_t gid);
 
-int same_or_ancestor_user_ns(struct task_struct *task,
-	struct task_struct *victim);
-
 #else
 
 static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -69,12 +66,6 @@ static inline gid_t user_ns_map_gid(struct user_namespace *to,
 	return gid;
 }
 
-static inline int same_or_ancestor_user_ns(struct task_struct *task,
-	struct task_struct *victim)
-{
-	return 1;
-}
-
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 0ef2258..9da289c 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -129,22 +129,6 @@ gid_t user_ns_map_gid(struct user_namespace *to, const struct cred *cred, gid_t
 	return overflowgid;
 }
 
-int same_or_ancestor_user_ns(struct task_struct *task,
-	struct task_struct *victim)
-{
-	struct user_namespace *u1 = task_cred_xxx(task, user)->user_ns;
-	struct user_namespace *u2 = task_cred_xxx(victim, user)->user_ns;
-	for (;;) {
-		if (u1 == u2)
-			return 1;
-		if (u1 == &init_user_ns)
-			return 0;
-		u1 = u1->creator->user_ns;
-	}
-	/* We never get here */
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static __init int user_namespaces_init(void)
 {
 	user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 12ff65c..526106f 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -142,19 +142,15 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
-	const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
+	const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	cred = current_cred();
-	tcred = __task_cred(child);
-	/*
-	 * The ancestor user_ns check may be gratuitous, as I think
-	 * we've already guaranteed that in kernel/ptrace.c.
-	 */
-	if (same_or_ancestor_user_ns(current, child) &&
-	    cap_issubset(tcred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+	child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+	if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
 		goto out;
-	if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		goto out;
 	ret = -EPERM;
 out:
@@ -178,19 +174,15 @@ out:
 int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
-	const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
+	const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	cred = __task_cred(parent);
-	tcred = current_cred();
-	/*
-	 * The ancestor user_ns check may be gratuitous, as I think
-	 * we've already guaranteed that in kernel/ptrace.c.
-	 */
-	if (same_or_ancestor_user_ns(parent, current) &&
-	    cap_issubset(tcred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+	child_cred = current_cred();
+	if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
 		goto out;
-	if (has_ns_capability(parent, tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		goto out;
 	ret = -EPERM;
 out:
-- 
1.7.0.4


  reply	other threads:[~2011-02-24  0:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-17 15:02 userns: targeted capabilities v5 Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-17 15:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:31   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 16:57   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:46   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:44   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 3/9] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:46   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 4/9] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:00   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  0:48     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  0:54       ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 10:55   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  2:59   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18  4:36     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  0:49       ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2011-02-24  0:56         ` [PATCH] userns: ptrace: incorporate feedback from Eric Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  3:15           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18 23:59   ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  0:43     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-19 17:49   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 6/9] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  1:57   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19  0:01   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 17:52   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 7/9] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  3:19   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 17:57   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:03 ` [PATCH 8/9] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  1:51   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-19 19:07   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-17 15:04 ` [PATCH 9/9] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-18  1:29   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18 23:59   ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-24  3:24     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24  5:08       ` Andrew Morton
2011-02-19 19:22   ` Daniel Lezcano
2011-02-18  0:21 ` userns: targeted capabilities v5 Andrew Morton
2011-02-18  3:53   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-18  4:28   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 11:40 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 12:01 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 13:43   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 12:05 ` User namespaces and keys David Howells
2011-02-23 13:58   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 14:46     ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 15:06   ` David Howells
2011-02-23 15:45     ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 15:53       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-23 19:24         ` Casey Schaufler
2011-02-23 20:55           ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 21:37             ` Casey Schaufler
2011-02-24  6:56               ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 16:59 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 17:05 ` [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces David Howells
2011-02-23 17:11 ` David Howells
2011-02-23 17:16 ` [PATCH 1/9] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-02-23 21:21   ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-23 23:19   ` David Howells
2011-02-23 23:54     ` Eric W. Biederman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20110224004901.GB11822@mail.hallyn.com \
    --to=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@osdl.org \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=kees.cook@canonical.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
    --cc=xemul@parallels.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®