From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
To: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
rusty@rustcorp.com.au, jstancek@redhat.com,
herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au
Subject: [RFC PATCH] fips: check whether a module registering an alg or template is signed
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 17:58:30 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130205225830.GH3751@redacted.bos.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5102781D.9000408@atsec.com>
fips mode needs to prevent unsigned modules from registering crypto
algorithms, and currently panics if an unsigned module is attempted to
be loaded. Instead, forbid (by returning -EINVAL) registering a crypto
alg or template if fips mode is enabled and the module signature is not
valid.
crypto_sig_check should return 1 (and allow the registration) if any
of the following are true:
1/ fips is not enabled (but CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS is enabled.)
2/ the algorithm is built into the kernel (THIS_MODULE == NULL)
3/ the algorithm is in a module, and the module sig check passes
and fail in any of the other cases.
Checking in crypto_check_alg and crypto_register_template seems to hit
the callpoints as far as I can see.
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
---
rusty,
How about something like this? It keeps the FIPS mess in the
crypto/fips.c file (aside from something that goes away entirely in the
!CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS case.)
regards, Kyle
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ static int crypto_check_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
if (alg->cra_priority < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!crypto_sig_check(alg->cra_module))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return crypto_set_driver_name(alg);
}
@@ -435,6 +438,11 @@ int crypto_register_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl)
goto out;
}
+ if (!crypto_sig_check(tmpl->module)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
list_add(&tmpl->list, &crypto_template_list);
crypto_notify(CRYPTO_MSG_TMPL_REGISTER, tmpl);
err = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/fips.c b/crypto/fips.c
index 5539700..2ebbe0f 100644
--- a/crypto/fips.c
+++ b/crypto/fips.c
@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@
int fips_enabled;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips_enabled);
+/* forbid loading modules in fips mode if the module is not signed */
+int crypto_sig_check(struct module *m)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+ if (!fips_enabled || !m || (m && m->sig_ok))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
/* Process kernel command-line parameter at boot time. fips=0 or fips=1 */
static int fips_enable(char *str)
{
diff --git a/crypto/internal.h b/crypto/internal.h
index 9ebedae..937bfaf 100644
--- a/crypto/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/internal.h
@@ -139,5 +139,14 @@ static inline void crypto_notify(unsigned long val, void *v)
blocking_notifier_call_chain(&crypto_chain, val, v);
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)
+int crypto_sig_check(struct module *m);
+#else
+static inline int crypto_sig_check(struct module *m)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_H */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-02-05 22:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-01-22 18:43 [PATCH] MODSIGN: only panic in fips mode if sig_enforce is set Kyle McMartin
2013-01-22 23:17 ` Rusty Russell
2013-01-23 11:26 ` David Howells
2013-01-23 15:18 ` Stephan Mueller
2013-01-24 14:59 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-01-25 11:28 ` Stephan Mueller
2013-01-24 19:06 ` [PATCH] MODSIGN: flag modules that use cryptoapi and only panic if those are unsigned Kyle McMartin
2013-01-24 19:21 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-01-24 23:36 ` Rusty Russell
2013-01-25 5:45 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-01-25 12:42 ` Stephan Mueller
2013-02-03 23:34 ` Rusty Russell
2013-01-25 12:46 ` Stephan Mueller
2013-01-25 12:18 ` Stephan Mueller
2013-02-05 22:58 ` Kyle McMartin [this message]
2013-02-06 8:02 ` [RFC PATCH] fips: check whether a module registering an alg or template is signed Stephan Mueller
2013-02-06 16:15 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-02-06 17:45 ` Stephan Mueller
2013-02-06 18:18 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-01-25 0:14 ` [PATCH] MODSIGN: flag modules that use cryptoapi and only panic if those are unsigned David Howells
2013-01-25 3:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-01-25 12:23 ` Stephan Mueller
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