Re: [PATCH] MODSIGN: flag modules that use cryptoapi and only panic if those are unsigned

[Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>]

On 25.01.2013 04:20:07, +0100, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> wrote:

Hi Matthew,
> On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 12:14:54AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> 
>> You can't rely on someone trying to sneak a dodgy crypto module in to set the
>> flag when they build it.  The detection thus needs to be done in the kernel
>> during the module load.
>>
>> Can you search the module image for "crypto_register_" I wonder?  If that's
>> there, it's a crypto module.
> 
> If you're trying to protect against malice rather than accident, what's 
> going to stop the module from just finding and modifying data structures 
> itself? If you want to panic if you've just loaded something that might 
> compromise your crypto implementations, you've got to panic on all 
> unsigned module loads.

That is the issue here. We want to protect against accidental changes
and modifications. Malicious attacks will never be caught by the FIPS
requirements where a module is allowed to check itself.

If an attacker is able to load any kind of kernel module, we have lost.
Period.

Thus, from a FIPS point of view the latest patch from Kyle is also
appropriate, provided the concerns I raised there are covered.

Ciao
Stephan