From: "George Spelvin" <linux@horizon.com>
To: linux@horizon.com, tytso@mit.edu
Cc: hpa@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@kernel.org, price@mit.edu
Subject: Re: drivers/char/random.c: more ruminations
Date: 9 Jun 2014 23:10:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140610031017.9893.qmail@ns.horizon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140610012036.GA8092@thunk.org>
>> I have an idea for a patch to change _xfer_secondary_pool
>> to use extract_buf rather than extract_entropy; is all that
>> FIPS stuff needed for purely internal transfers?
> That's not the part of extract_entropy() which is critical. What's
> critical is the control over only transfering entropy when there is at
> least a certain minimum amount of entropy. This provides the
> Yarrow-like avalanche property which is required to provide recovery
> after the internal state of the entropy pools have been exposed.
I do understand the importance of catastrophic reseeding, but
I don't see that implemented in extract_entropy().
Extract_entropy() itself contains a call to xfer_secondary_pool, but
that is a no-op in the case I'm considering (when it's called from
_xfer_secondary_pool) because in that case, r is the the input_pool,
which doesn't have an r->pull pool.
The number of bytes transferred is adjusted by account(), but
it's only adjusted downward. (If it were adjusted up, that would be
a buffer overrun.)
Normal reads seem to ask for a reseed equal in size to read itself,
which is "ctastrophic" enough.
The only *minimum* reseed transfer size I can see is enforced in
_xfer_secondary_pool and push_to_pool, which use random_read_wakeup_bits
(default 64) as a minimum reseed. (Prehaps increase this?)
standards, IMHO.)
Now, having said all that, I'll try to avoid embarrassing myself
in public again and ask... what am I missing?
On other matters...
If I play around with getting the entropy locking right, do you
have a strong preference for the single-lock or two-lock design?
I can't decide which to start with.
The latter is an extensive core code change, but I can easily convince
myself there are no deadlock issues. That's the one I described
with separate adder and extractor locks and code paths, two "amount
of entropy ever added" variables, ane one "amont of entropy ever removed".
The single-lock design is hopefully less code, but (to me, at least) less
obviously deadlock-free.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-10 3:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-09 0:05 [RFC PATCH] drivers/char/random.c: Is reducing locking range like this safe? George Spelvin
2014-06-09 1:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 2:10 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 2:18 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 4:03 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 9:23 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 13:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 15:04 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-09 15:50 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 16:11 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-10 0:20 ` drivers/char/random.c: more ruminations George Spelvin
2014-06-10 1:20 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-10 3:10 ` George Spelvin [this message]
2014-06-10 15:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-10 20:40 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-10 21:20 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 0:10 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-11 2:08 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:58 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-11 13:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-12 0:42 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12 1:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-11 4:34 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-11 13:09 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 2:21 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-09 13:17 ` drivers/char/random.c: More futzing about George Spelvin
2014-06-11 16:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 16:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-11 19:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 20:41 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-12 0:44 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-06-12 1:51 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12 0:32 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12 3:22 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-12 4:13 ` random: Benchamrking fast_mix2 George Spelvin
2014-06-12 11:18 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12 20:17 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-12 20:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-13 0:23 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-13 15:52 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14 2:10 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14 5:25 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 6:24 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14 8:03 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 11:14 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 15:13 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-14 16:33 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-15 0:23 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-15 1:17 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-15 6:58 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-15 13:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14 6:27 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14 4:55 ` [RFC] random: is the IRQF_TIMER test working as intended? George Spelvin
2014-06-14 6:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-14 7:23 ` George Spelvin
2014-06-12 3:43 ` drivers/char/random.c: More futzing about George Spelvin
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