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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4/3] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 15:03:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150725130340.GA17257@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150725075052.GA3918@1wt.eu>

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On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 09:50:52AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 11:44:52PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I'm all for it, but I think it should be hard-disablable in config,
> > too, for the -tiny people.
> 
> I totally agree.
> 
> > If we add a runtime disable, let's do a
> > separate patch, and you and Kees can fight over how general it should
> > be.
> 
> Initially I was thinking about changing it for a 3-state option but
> that would prevent X86_16BIT from being hard-disablable, so I'll do
> something completely separate.

So here comes the proposed patch. It adds a default setting for the
sysctl when the option is not hard-disabled (eg: distros not wanting
to take risks with legacy apps). It suggests to leave the option off.
In case a syscall is blocked, a printk_ratelimited() is called with
relevant info (program name, pid, uid) so that the admin can decide
whether it's a legitimate call or not. Eg:

  Denied a call to modify_ldt() from a.out[1736] (uid: 100). Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.

I personally think it completes well your series, hence the 4/3 numbering.
Feel free to adopt it if you cycle another round and if you're OK with it
of course.

CCing Kees as well.

Willy


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>From 93cadf50b56a1f2f1e43137503edc1242f8476a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
Subject: x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
+such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
+some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ede52be..37f83d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	 surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	 Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	 If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..cb64b85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..3dcf8e4 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1


  reply	other threads:[~2015-07-25 13:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-07-25  5:36 [PATCH v4 0/3] x86: modify_ldt improvement, test, and config option Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25  5:36 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt synchronous Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25  9:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2015-07-25  5:36 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt optional Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25  6:23   ` Willy Tarreau
2015-07-25  6:44     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25  7:50       ` Willy Tarreau
2015-07-25 13:03         ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2015-07-25 16:08           ` [PATCH 4/3] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25 16:33             ` Willy Tarreau
2015-07-25 17:42               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25 18:45                 ` Willy Tarreau
2015-07-27 19:04           ` Kees Cook
2015-07-27 21:37             ` Willy Tarreau
2015-07-25  9:15   ` [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt optional Borislav Petkov
2015-07-25 16:03     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25 16:35       ` Willy Tarreau
2015-07-25  5:36 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86, x86/ldt: Add a selftest for modify_ldt Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-27 15:52   ` [PATCH v4.1 3.3] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-25  6:27 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] x86: modify_ldt improvement, test, and config option Willy Tarreau
2015-07-27 15:36 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-27 15:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-27 16:18     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-28  2:20       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-28  3:16         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-28  3:23           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-28  3:43           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-28 10:29           ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-28 14:05             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-28 14:35               ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-28 14:50                 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-28 15:15                   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2015-07-28 15:39                     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-28 15:23                   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-28 15:59                     ` [Xen-devel] " Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-28 15:43             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-28 16:30               ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-28 17:07                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-28 17:10                   ` [Xen-devel] " Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29  0:21                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-29  0:47                       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-29  3:01                         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29  4:26                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-29  5:28                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-29 14:21                             ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-29 14:43                               ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29 19:03                                 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-29 21:23                                   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29 21:26                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-29 21:33                                       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29 21:37                                       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-29 22:05                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-29 22:11                                           ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-29 22:40                                             ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29 22:46                                             ` David Vrabel
2015-07-29 22:49                                               ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-29 22:55                                                 ` David Vrabel
2015-07-29 23:02                                                 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-29 23:13                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-30  0:29                                                     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-30 18:30                                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-30 18:54                                                         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-07-30 20:01                                                           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-07-30 20:05                                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-30 20:18                                                               ` Boris Ostrovsky

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