From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
To: mtk.manpages@gmail.com
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothberg@suse.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>, Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH] ioctl_tty.2: add TIOCGPTPEER documentation
Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2017 03:01:47 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170609170147.32311-1-asarai@suse.de> (raw)
The feature this patch references has currently only been accepted into
tty-testing, but Greg told me to kick this down to man-pages. As a
result, I can't reference upstream commit id's because the code isn't in
Linus' tree yet -- should I resend this once it lands in tty-next or
Linus' tree?
Also obviously the release version is a bit of a lie.
8<-----------------------------------------------------------------------
This is an ioctl(2) recently added by myself, to allow for container
runtimes and other programs that interact with (potentially hostile)
Linux namespaces to safely create {master,slave} pseudoterminal pairs
without needing to open potentially unsafe /dev/pts/... filenames that
may be malicious mountpoints or similar in an untrusted namespace
(avoiding the endless issues with ptsname(3) and similar approaches).
Cc: <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
---
man2/ioctl_tty.2 | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/man2/ioctl_tty.2 b/man2/ioctl_tty.2
index d280beacf..61e147d99 100644
--- a/man2/ioctl_tty.2
+++ b/man2/ioctl_tty.2
@@ -380,6 +380,21 @@ Place the current lock state of the pseudoterminal slave device
in the location pointed to by
.IR argp
(since Linux 3.8).
+.TP
+.BI "TIOCGPTPEER int " flags
+Opens and returns a new file handle to the pseudoterminal slave
+device with the given
+.BR open (2)-style
+.IR flags ,
+regardless of whether the path is accessible through the calling process's
+mount namespaces.
+
+Security-conscious programs interacting with namespaces may wish to use this
+over
+.BR open (2)
+with the path provided by
+.BR ptsname (3),
+and similar library methods that have insecure APIs (since Linux 4.13).
.PP
The BSD ioctls
.BR TIOCSTOP ,
--
2.13.1
next reply other threads:[~2017-06-09 17:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-09 17:01 Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2017-06-09 18:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-08-15 19:27 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2017-08-16 4:43 ` Aleksa Sarai
2017-08-16 16:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-08-16 16:54 ` Aleksa Sarai
2017-08-16 17:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-20 10:20 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2017-11-20 12:15 ` Christian Brauner
2017-11-20 17:06 ` Eric W. Biederman
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