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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>, Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 23:10:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180107221038.GB9996@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180107185511.3r73spn4ylxgmd4u@pd.tnic>

On Sun, Jan 07, 2018 at 07:55:11PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > Just like you have to trust your plane's pilot eventhough you don't
> > know him personally.
> 
> Funny you should make that analogy. Remember that germanwings pilot?
> People trusted him too.
> 
> Now imagine if the plane had protection against insane pilots... some of
> those people might still be alive, who knows...

Sure but despite this case many people continue to take the plane because
it's their only option to cross half of the world in a reasonable time.

Boris, I'm *not* contesting the performance resulting from the fixes,
and I would never have been able to produce them myself had I to, so
I'm really glad we have them. I just want to be clear that the big drop
some of us are facing is not an option *at all* for certain processes
in certain environments and that we'll either continue to run with
pti=off or with pti=on + a finer grained setting ASAP.

I mean, the kernel is not the only sensitive part in a system (and
sometimes it's even not at all). A kernel + a userland processes
deliver a service, each in it role. Breaking one or the other can be
similar or sometimes the trouble can be worse for one than the other.
But for some situations, the good work condition of the combination of
the two is critical, and even a kernel compromission could be a detail
compared to the impact of something crashing at full load. Sometimes a
userspace compromission would already be critical enough that the risk
is not higher by accepting to take it for the kernel as well.

In my specific case, on LB appliances, I don't really care what happens
once haproxy has already been compromised, it's too late. End of the
game, all sensitive information are already disclosed at this point.
What I'd rather avoid however is the occasional sysop who has an account
on the machine to retrieve some stats once in a while that would suddenly
be able to get more than these stats. That's where I draw the line for
*this* use case. Plenty of others will have plenty of other perception
and that's fine.

Cheers,
Willy

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-07 22:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-03 23:09 Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/11] x86/retpoline: Define retpoline indirect thunk and macros Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/11] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/11] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/11] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/11] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/11] x86/retpoline: Finally enable retpoline for C code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:28   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04  8:30     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/11] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:35     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/11] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:51 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:00   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:09   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:12     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:15       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:19         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05  2:01           ` james harvey
2018-01-05 10:40             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 12:29               ` james harvey
2018-01-05 12:06             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:29         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:31           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:38             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:40             ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:15               ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:53                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 15:55                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04  0:20       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:26         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:18     ` David Lang
2018-01-04  1:00   ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04  1:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  1:59     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  2:11       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  8:20         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:42           ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:47             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:20               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 14:51                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 15:29                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:32                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 15:37                       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 16:15                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 20:00                       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 20:05                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 23:47                           ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-05  0:06                             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05  0:26                             ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 16:52                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 15:32                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 16:25                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:04                       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 17:40                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:13                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 17:15                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 18:05                           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 14:55                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 18:24                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:57           ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:41             ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:54               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  4:11                 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  9:59                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:28                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-08 20:42                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled tip-bot for Dave Hansen
2018-01-08 20:53                       ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 21:32                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10  0:45                           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10  1:11                             ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 16:02                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  6:49                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05  6:57                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  7:13                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:14                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:21                         ` David Lang
2018-01-07 18:49                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:44                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:55                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 22:10                             ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2018-01-08  9:18                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  9:29                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08 16:22                               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 16:53                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05 12:12                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09  1:44                   ` Samir Bellabes
     [not found]                 ` <CAL9bgJ8XNJgCtxR6+M+Vm9eDBVZ4Dyi_-Lt-Q1ei9N=TE2c6cg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-01-07  5:04                   ` Fwd: " Kiernan Hager
2018-01-07  6:39                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:01                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 17:47                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:01                         ` Ivan Ivanov
2018-01-07 18:16                           ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:26   ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:54     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 18:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 20:08       ` Jon Masters
2018-01-04  2:00 Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 11:49 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 12:09   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 13:32     ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-12  8:20 Dr. Greg Wettstein
2018-02-23 21:10 Ywe Cærlyn

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