From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>, Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 17:11:39 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <24e30389-00a5-b4ee-9610-fa70ebf1cea6@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801100144330.2200@nanos>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1457 bytes --]
On 01/09/2018 04:45 PM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018, Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 09:53:02PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> Did my best to do the cleanest patch for tip, but I now figured Dave's
>> original comment was spot on: a _PAGE_NX clear then becomes necessary
>> also after pud_alloc not only after p4d_alloc.
>>
>> pmd_alloc would run into the same with x86 32bit non-PAE too.
non-PAE doesn't have an NX bit. :)
But we #define _PAGE_NX down to 0 there so it's harmless.
>> So there are two choices, either going back to one single _PAGE_NX
>> clear from the original Dave's original patch as below, or to add
>> multiple clear after each level which was my objective and is more
>> robust, but it may be overkill in this case. As long as it was one
>> line it looked a clear improvement.
>>
>> Considering the caller in both cases is going to abort I guess we can
>> use the one liner approach as Dave and Jiri did originally.
>
> Dave ?
I agree with Andrea. The patch in -tip potentially misses the pgd
clearing if pud_alloc() sets a PGD. It would also be nice to have that
comment back.
Note that the -tip commit probably works in *practice* because for two
adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first
will clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear). The
second call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.
The patch I think we want is attached.
[-- Attachment #2: pti-tboot-fix.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1449 bytes --]
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it. PTI
mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace. Undo
the poison to allow execution.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ning Sun <ning.sun@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix 2018-01-05 21:50:55.755554960 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c 2018-01-05 23:51:41.368536890 -0800
@@ -138,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
return -1;
set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
pte_unmap(pte);
+
+ /*
+ * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+ * name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute
+ * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+ *
+ * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
+ * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
+ */
+ pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
return 0;
}
_
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-10 1:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-03 23:09 Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/11] x86/retpoline: Define retpoline indirect thunk and macros Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/11] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/11] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/11] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/11] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/11] x86/retpoline: Finally enable retpoline for C code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 8:28 ` Greg KH
2018-01-04 8:30 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/11] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 0:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 0:35 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/11] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:51 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 0:00 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 0:09 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 0:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 0:15 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 0:19 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05 2:01 ` james harvey
2018-01-05 10:40 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 12:29 ` james harvey
2018-01-05 12:06 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 0:29 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 0:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 0:38 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 0:40 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 8:15 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:53 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 15:55 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 0:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 0:26 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04 0:18 ` David Lang
2018-01-04 1:00 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04 1:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 1:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 2:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 8:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:42 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:47 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 14:51 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 15:29 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 15:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 16:15 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 20:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 20:05 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 23:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-05 0:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05 0:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 16:52 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 15:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 16:25 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:04 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 17:40 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 17:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 18:05 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 14:55 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 18:24 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:57 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05 0:41 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05 0:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 4:11 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05 9:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:28 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-08 20:42 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled tip-bot for Dave Hansen
2018-01-08 20:53 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 21:32 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 0:45 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10 1:11 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-01-10 16:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 6:49 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05 6:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05 7:13 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:21 ` David Lang
2018-01-07 18:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:44 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 22:10 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08 9:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 9:29 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 16:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05 12:12 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09 1:44 ` Samir Bellabes
[not found] ` <CAL9bgJ8XNJgCtxR6+M+Vm9eDBVZ4Dyi_-Lt-Q1ei9N=TE2c6cg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-01-07 5:04 ` Fwd: " Kiernan Hager
2018-01-07 6:39 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:01 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 17:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:01 ` Ivan Ivanov
2018-01-07 18:16 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:26 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:54 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 18:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 20:08 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-04 2:00 Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 11:49 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 12:09 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 13:32 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-12 8:20 Dr. Greg Wettstein
2018-02-23 21:10 Ywe Cærlyn
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