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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>, Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 17:11:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <24e30389-00a5-b4ee-9610-fa70ebf1cea6@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801100144330.2200@nanos>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1457 bytes --]

On 01/09/2018 04:45 PM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Jan 2018, Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 09:53:02PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> Did my best to do the cleanest patch for tip, but I now figured Dave's
>> original comment was spot on: a _PAGE_NX clear then becomes necessary
>> also after pud_alloc not only after p4d_alloc.
>>
>> pmd_alloc would run into the same with x86 32bit non-PAE too.

non-PAE doesn't have an NX bit. :)

But we #define _PAGE_NX down to 0 there so it's harmless.

>> So there are two choices, either going back to one single _PAGE_NX
>> clear from the original Dave's original patch as below, or to add
>> multiple clear after each level which was my objective and is more
>> robust, but it may be overkill in this case. As long as it was one
>> line it looked a clear improvement.
>>
>> Considering the caller in both cases is going to abort I guess we can
>> use the one liner approach as Dave and Jiri did originally.
> 
> Dave ?

I agree with Andrea.  The patch in -tip potentially misses the pgd
clearing if pud_alloc() sets a PGD.  It would also be nice to have that
comment back.

Note that the -tip commit probably works in *practice* because for two
adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first
will clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear).  The
second call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.

The patch I think we want is attached.

[-- Attachment #2: pti-tboot-fix.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1449 bytes --]


From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it.  PTI
mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace.  Undo
the poison to allow execution.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ning Sun <ning.sun@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---

 b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix	2018-01-05 21:50:55.755554960 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c	2018-01-05 23:51:41.368536890 -0800
@@ -138,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
 		return -1;
 	set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
 	pte_unmap(pte);
+
+	/*
+	 * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+	 * name of making them unusable for userspace.  To execute
+	 * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+	 *
+	 * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
+	 * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
+	 */
+	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
_

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-10  1:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-03 23:09 Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/11] x86/retpoline: Define retpoline indirect thunk and macros Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/11] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/11] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/11] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/11] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/11] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/11] x86/retpoline: Finally enable retpoline for C code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:28   ` Greg KH
2018-01-04  8:30     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/11] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:35     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-01-03 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/11] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings Andi Kleen
2018-01-03 23:51 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:00   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:09   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:12     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:15       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  0:19         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-05  2:01           ` james harvey
2018-01-05 10:40             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 12:29               ` james harvey
2018-01-05 12:06             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:29         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:31           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:38             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  0:40             ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:15               ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:53                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 15:55                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04  0:20       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  0:26         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-04  0:18     ` David Lang
2018-01-04  1:00   ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04  1:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  1:59     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  2:11       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04  8:20         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:42           ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:47             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:20               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 14:51                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 15:29                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:32                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 15:37                       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 16:15                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 20:00                       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 20:05                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 23:47                           ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-05  0:06                             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05  0:26                             ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-04 16:52                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 15:32                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 16:25                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:04                       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 17:40                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 17:13                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 17:15                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-04 18:05                           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-04 14:55                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 18:24                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:57           ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:41             ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  0:54               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  4:11                 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-05  9:59                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:28                     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-08 20:42                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled tip-bot for Dave Hansen
2018-01-08 20:53                       ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 21:32                         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10  0:45                           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-10  1:11                             ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-01-10 16:02                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05  6:49                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05  6:57                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-05  7:13                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:14                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:21                         ` David Lang
2018-01-07 18:49                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:44                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:55                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 22:10                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08  9:18                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  9:29                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-08 16:22                               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 16:53                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-05 12:12                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09  1:44                   ` Samir Bellabes
     [not found]                 ` <CAL9bgJ8XNJgCtxR6+M+Vm9eDBVZ4Dyi_-Lt-Q1ei9N=TE2c6cg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-01-07  5:04                   ` Fwd: " Kiernan Hager
2018-01-07  6:39                     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 14:01                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 17:47                       ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 18:01                         ` Ivan Ivanov
2018-01-07 18:16                           ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 11:26   ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:54     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 18:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 20:08       ` Jon Masters
2018-01-04  2:00 Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 11:49 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 12:09   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 13:32     ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-12  8:20 Dr. Greg Wettstein
2018-02-23 21:10 Ywe Cærlyn

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