mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 6/6] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 18:29:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180124172931.GG16646@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516813025-10794-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 04:57:05PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> We don't refuse to load the affected microcodes; just refuse to use SPEC_CTRL
> if they're detected.
> 
> AMD has a feature bit for "PRED_CMD only", which Intel didn't do. When disabling
> SPEC_CTRL we can actually turn on that AMD bit to allow IBPB to still be used.
> 
> We handle the other AMD bits here too, because hypervisors *may* have been
> exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control of what's
> available.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 76 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> index b720dac..f5c7f61 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> @@ -102,6 +102,64 @@ static void probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  		ELF_HWCAP2 |= HWCAP2_RING3MWAIT;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
> + * Information taken from;
> + * • https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
> + * • https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
> + * • Microcode revisions observed in the wild
> + * • releasenote from 20180108 microcode release
> + */
> +struct sku_microcode {
> +	u8 model;
> +	u8 stepping;
> +	u32 microcode;
> +};
> +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x80 },
> +	/* Corrected typo in Intel doc */
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x80 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x80 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x80 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x80 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003C },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0x000000C2 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0x000000C2 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x0000001B },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x7000011 },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x0000001B },
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 },
> +	/* Dropped repeat of KBL Desktop 906E9, 0x80 */
> +	{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
> +	/* Dropped repeat of SKX 50654, 0x200003c */

Nit, but why comment that you dropped a repeat?  No one cares, do they?
You already said above where this info came from.

Anyway, not a big deal at all:

Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-24 17:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-24 16:56 [PATCH v3 0/6] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:18   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:18   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:20   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 17:57     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 22:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-02-20 15:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:16   ` Greg KH
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:26   ` Greg KH
2018-01-26 12:14   ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-26 12:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:27     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26 15:30       ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-26 16:47     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 16:57 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:29   ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-01-24 17:58     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 21:29     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-26 12:16   ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-01-26 12:27     ` David Woodhouse

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180124172931.GG16646@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=karahmed@amazon.de \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome