mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 27/60] x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP
Date: Mon,  5 Feb 2018 10:23:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182215.052460372@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>

4.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: William Grant william.grant@canonical.com

commit 55f49fcb879fbeebf2a8c1ac7c9e6d90df55f798

Since commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the
fixmap"), i386's CPU_ENTRY_AREA has been mapped to the memory area just
below FIXADDR_START. But already immediately before FIXADDR_START is the
FIX_BTMAP area, which means that early_ioremap can collide with the entry
area.

It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly
match CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, so the first early_ioremap slot clobbers the
IDT and causes interrupts during early boot to reset the system.

The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced,
as the fixmap has classically been preceded by the pkmap or vmalloc
areas, neither of which is used until early_ioremap is out of the
picture.

Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent
fixmap area.

Fixes: commit 92a0f81d8957 ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
Signed-off-by: William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7041d181-a019-e8b9-4e4e-48215f841e2c@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h           |    6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h |    5 +++--
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -137,8 +137,10 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
 
 extern void reserve_top_address(unsigned long reserve);
 
-#define FIXADDR_SIZE	(__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT)
-#define FIXADDR_START	(FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE)
+#define FIXADDR_SIZE		(__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define FIXADDR_START		(FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE)
+#define FIXADDR_TOT_SIZE	(__end_of_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define FIXADDR_TOT_START	(FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_TOT_SIZE)
 
 extern int fixmaps_set;
 
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h
@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ extern bool __vmalloc_start_set; /* set
  */
 #define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES	(NR_CPUS * 40)
 
-#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE				\
-	((FIXADDR_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) & PMD_MASK)
+#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE						\
+	((FIXADDR_TOT_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1))   \
+	 & PMD_MASK)
 
 #define PKMAP_BASE		\
 	((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE - PAGE_SIZE) & PMD_MASK)

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-05 18:22 [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 01/60] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 02/60] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 03/60] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 04/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 05/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 06/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 07/60] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 08/60] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 09/60] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 10/60] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 11/60] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 12/60] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 13/60] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 14/60] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 15/60] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 16/60] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 17/60] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 18/60] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 19/60] iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 20/60] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 21/60] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 22/60] KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 23/60] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 24/60] objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 25/60] objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 26/60] objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 28/60] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 29/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 30/60] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 31/60] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 44/60] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 45/60] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 46/60] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 47/60] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 48/60] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 49/60] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 50/60] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 51/60] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 52/60] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 53/60] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 54/60] KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 55/60] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 56/60] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 57/60] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 58/60] KVM/SVM: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 59/60] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 60/60] fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 22:14 ` [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-06 10:33   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 23:58 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-06 10:33   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-06  0:36 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-02-06 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-06 14:32 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-06 17:00   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180205182215.052460372@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=william.grant@canonical.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome