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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
Date: Mon,  5 Feb 2018 10:23:15 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182215.701214369@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>

4.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com

commit 259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05

Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac
is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx()
handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize
txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any
speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).

Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/nl80211.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
@@ -2056,20 +2057,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_param
 static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
 			    struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
 {
+	u8 ac;
+
 	if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
+	ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
 	txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
 	txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
 	txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
 	txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
 
-	if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
+	if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
 		return -EINVAL;
-
+	txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
 	return 0;
 }
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-05 18:22 [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 01/60] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 02/60] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 03/60] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 04/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 05/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 06/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 07/60] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 08/60] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 09/60] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 10/60] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 11/60] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 12/60] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 13/60] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 14/60] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 15/60] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 16/60] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 17/60] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 18/60] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 19/60] iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 20/60] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 21/60] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 22/60] KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 23/60] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 24/60] objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 25/60] objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 26/60] objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 27/60] x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 28/60] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 29/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 30/60] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 31/60] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 44/60] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 45/60] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 46/60] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 47/60] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 48/60] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 49/60] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 50/60] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 51/60] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 52/60] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 53/60] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 54/60] KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 55/60] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 56/60] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 57/60] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 58/60] KVM/SVM: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 59/60] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 60/60] fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 22:14 ` [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-06 10:33   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 23:58 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-06 10:33   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-06  0:36 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-02-06 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-06 14:32 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-06 17:00   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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