From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add rng-seed= command line option
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2020 09:28:27 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002070850.BD92BDCA@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207150809.19329-1-salyzyn@android.com>
On Fri, Feb 07, 2020 at 07:07:59AM -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> +#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)
> +/* caller called add_device_randomness, but it is from a trusted source */
> +void __init credit_trusted_entropy(unsigned int size)
> +{
> + credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, size * 8);
> +}
> +#endif
As Ted already mentioned, I was expecting the string contents to actually
get added somewhere. Is the idea that it's already been added via the
add_device_randomness(command_line) call, and you just want to explicitly
credit those bytes? If so, that deserves a comment, and I think it should
likely not use 8 bits per character, as that's not how many bits are
possible for an alphanumeric string character; I would expect 6 bits (~32
standard letter/number) -- this likely needs fixing in the fdt patch too.
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index d319f9a1e4290..1e09eeadc613c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ struct random_ready_callback {
>
> extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
> extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
> +#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)
> +extern void __init credit_trusted_entropy(unsigned int b);
> +#else
> +static inline void credit_trusted_entropy(unsigned int b) {}
> +#endif
>
> #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
> static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> index cc0ee4873419c..ae976b2dea5dc 100644
> --- a/init/main.c
> +++ b/init/main.c
> @@ -524,24 +524,53 @@ static inline void smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int maxcpus) { }
> * parsing is performed in place, and we should allow a component to
> * store reference of name/value for future reference.
> */
> +static const char rng_seed_str[] __initconst = "rng-seed=";
> +/* try to clear rng-seed so it won't be found by user applications. */
> +static void __init copy_command_line(char *dest, char *src, size_t r)
> +{
> + char *rng_seed = strnstr(src, rng_seed_str, r);
> +
> + if (rng_seed) {
> + size_t l = rng_seed - src;
> + char *end;
> +
> + memcpy(dest, src, l);
> + dest += l;
> + src = rng_seed + strlen(rng_seed_str);
> + r -= l + strlen(rng_seed_str);
> + end = strnchr(src, r, ' ');
> + if (end) {
> + if (l && rng_seed[-1] == ' ')
> + ++end;
> + r -= end - src;
> + src = end;
> + }
> + }
> + memcpy(dest, src, r);
> + dest[r] = '\0';
> +}
> +
> static void __init setup_command_line(char *command_line)
> {
> size_t len, xlen = 0, ilen = 0;
> + static const char argsep_str[] __initconst = " -- ";
> + static const char alloc_fail_msg[] __initconst =
> + "%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n";
There's some refactoring in this patch unrelated to the seed logic. Can
you split that out? (I think these changes are good.)
>
> if (extra_command_line)
> xlen = strlen(extra_command_line);
Unrelated note: whoa this is based on linux-next which has a massive
change to the boot command line handling and appears to be doing some
bad things. I need to go find that thread...
> if (extra_init_args)
> - ilen = strlen(extra_init_args) + 4; /* for " -- " */
> + ilen = strlen(extra_init_args) + strlen(argsep_str);
>
> - len = xlen + strlen(boot_command_line) + 1;
> + len = xlen + strnlen(boot_command_line, sizeof(boot_command_line)) + 1;
>
> saved_command_line = memblock_alloc(len + ilen, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
> if (!saved_command_line)
> - panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, len + ilen);
> + panic(alloc_fail_msg, __func__, len + ilen);
>
> static_command_line = memblock_alloc(len, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
> if (!static_command_line)
> - panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, len);
> + panic(alloc_fail_msg, __func__, len);
>
> if (xlen) {
> /*
> @@ -549,11 +578,14 @@ static void __init setup_command_line(char *command_line)
> * lines because there could be dashes (separator of init
> * command line) in the command lines.
> */
> - strcpy(saved_command_line, extra_command_line);
> - strcpy(static_command_line, extra_command_line);
> + copy_command_line(saved_command_line, extra_command_line, xlen);
> + copy_command_line(static_command_line, extra_command_line,
> + xlen);
> }
> - strcpy(saved_command_line + xlen, boot_command_line);
> - strcpy(static_command_line + xlen, command_line);
> + copy_command_line(saved_command_line + xlen, boot_command_line,
> + len - xlen - 1);
> + copy_command_line(static_command_line + xlen, command_line,
> + len - xlen - 1);
>
> if (ilen) {
> /*
> @@ -562,13 +594,15 @@ static void __init setup_command_line(char *command_line)
> * to init.
> */
> len = strlen(saved_command_line);
> - if (!strstr(boot_command_line, " -- ")) {
> - strcpy(saved_command_line + len, " -- ");
> - len += 4;
> + if (!strnstr(boot_command_line, argsep_str,
> + sizeof(boot_command_line))) {
> + strcpy(saved_command_line + len, argsep_str);
> + len += strlen(argsep_str);
> } else
> saved_command_line[len++] = ' ';
>
> - strcpy(saved_command_line + len, extra_init_args);
> + copy_command_line(saved_command_line + len, extra_init_args,
> + ilen - strlen(argsep_str));
> }
> }
>
> @@ -875,6 +909,21 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
> rand_initialize();
> add_latent_entropy();
> add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
> + if (IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) {
> + size_t l = strlen(command_line);
> + char *rng_seed = strnstr(command_line, rng_seed_str, l);
> +
> + if (rng_seed) {
> + char *end;
> +
> + rng_seed += strlen(rng_seed_str);
> + l -= rng_seed - command_line;
> + end = strnchr(rng_seed, l, ' ');
> + if (end)
> + l = end - rng_seed;
> + credit_trusted_entropy(l);
> + }
> + }
Can you pull this out of line and write a new static help that does all
of the rng stuff here? Basically from rand_initialize() through
boot_init_stack_canary(), so it's all in one place and not "open coded"
in start_kernel(). (And then, actually, you don't need a separate
credit_trusted_entropy() function at all -- just call
credit_entropy_bits() directly there (and add a comment about the
command line already getting added).
> boot_init_stack_canary();
>
> time_init();
> --
> 2.25.0.341.g760bfbb309-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-07 17:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-07 15:07 Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-07 15:58 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-07 17:49 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-08 0:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-08 0:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-02-13 11:24 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-13 15:03 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-13 18:44 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-14 1:16 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-14 17:02 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 12:13 ` Mark Brown
2020-02-11 15:07 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 0/4 v2] random add rng-seed to " Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 1/4 v2] init: move string constants to __initconst section Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 2/4 v2] init: boot_command_line can be truncated Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 3/4 v2] random: rng-seed source is utf-8 Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 4/4 v2] random: add rng-seed= command line option Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 21:40 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-10 22:19 ` [PATCH 4/4 v3] " Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-07 17:28 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-02-07 17:47 ` [PATCH] " Steven Rostedt
2020-02-07 17:58 ` Mark Salyzyn
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