mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add rng-seed= command line option
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2020 10:58:28 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200207155828.GB122530@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207150809.19329-1-salyzyn@android.com>

What was the base of your patch?  It's not applying on my kernel tree.

On Fri, Feb 07, 2020 at 07:07:59AM -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> A followup to commit 428826f5358c922dc378830a1717b682c0823160
> ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") to extend what was started
> with Open Firmware (OF or Device Tree) parsing, but also add
> it to the command line.
> 
> If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set, then feed the rng-seed
> command line option length as added trusted entropy.
> 
> Always rrase all views of the rng-seed option, except early command
> line parsing, to prevent leakage to applications or modules, to
> eliminate any attack vector.

s/rrase/erase/

> 
> It is preferred to add rng-seed to the Device Tree, but some
> platforms do not have this option, so this adds the ability to
> provide some command-line-limited data to the entropy through this
> alternate mechanism.  Expect all 8 bits to be used, but must exclude
> space to be accounted in the command line.

"all 8 bits"?

> @@ -875,6 +909,21 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
>  	rand_initialize();
>  	add_latent_entropy();
>  	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
> +	if (IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) {
> +		size_t l = strlen(command_line);
> +		char *rng_seed = strnstr(command_line, rng_seed_str, l);
> +
> +		if (rng_seed) {
> +			char *end;
> +
> +			rng_seed += strlen(rng_seed_str);
> +			l -= rng_seed - command_line;
> +			end = strnchr(rng_seed, l, ' ');
> +			if (end)
> +				l = end - rng_seed;
> +			credit_trusted_entropy(l);
> +		}
> +	}

This doesn't look right at all.  It calls credit_trusted_entropy(),
but it doesn't actually feed the contents of rng_seed where.  Why not
just call add_hwgeneterator_randomness() and drop adding this
credit_trusted_entropy(l)?

						- Ted

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-07 15:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-07 15:07 Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-07 15:58 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2020-02-07 17:49   ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-08  0:49     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-08  0:53       ` Steven Rostedt
2020-02-13 11:24         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-13 15:03           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-13 18:44             ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-14  1:16               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-14 17:02                 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 12:13       ` Mark Brown
2020-02-11 15:07         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-10 14:45   ` [PATCH 0/4 v2] random add rng-seed to " Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45     ` [PATCH 1/4 v2] init: move string constants to __initconst section Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45     ` [PATCH 2/4 v2] init: boot_command_line can be truncated Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45     ` [PATCH 3/4 v2] random: rng-seed source is utf-8 Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45     ` [PATCH 4/4 v2] random: add rng-seed= command line option Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 21:40       ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-10 22:19         ` [PATCH 4/4 v3] " Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-07 17:28 ` [PATCH] " Kees Cook
2020-02-07 17:47   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-02-07 17:58   ` Mark Salyzyn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200207155828.GB122530@mit.edu \
    --to=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=broonie@kernel.org \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=gor@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hsinyi@chromium.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@android.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@dominikbrodowski.net \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
    --cc=richard.henderson@linaro.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=rppt@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=salyzyn@android.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome