From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add rng-seed= command line option
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2020 10:58:28 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200207155828.GB122530@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207150809.19329-1-salyzyn@android.com>
What was the base of your patch? It's not applying on my kernel tree.
On Fri, Feb 07, 2020 at 07:07:59AM -0800, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> A followup to commit 428826f5358c922dc378830a1717b682c0823160
> ("fdt: add support for rng-seed") to extend what was started
> with Open Firmware (OF or Device Tree) parsing, but also add
> it to the command line.
>
> If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set, then feed the rng-seed
> command line option length as added trusted entropy.
>
> Always rrase all views of the rng-seed option, except early command
> line parsing, to prevent leakage to applications or modules, to
> eliminate any attack vector.
s/rrase/erase/
>
> It is preferred to add rng-seed to the Device Tree, but some
> platforms do not have this option, so this adds the ability to
> provide some command-line-limited data to the entropy through this
> alternate mechanism. Expect all 8 bits to be used, but must exclude
> space to be accounted in the command line.
"all 8 bits"?
> @@ -875,6 +909,21 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
> rand_initialize();
> add_latent_entropy();
> add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
> + if (IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) {
> + size_t l = strlen(command_line);
> + char *rng_seed = strnstr(command_line, rng_seed_str, l);
> +
> + if (rng_seed) {
> + char *end;
> +
> + rng_seed += strlen(rng_seed_str);
> + l -= rng_seed - command_line;
> + end = strnchr(rng_seed, l, ' ');
> + if (end)
> + l = end - rng_seed;
> + credit_trusted_entropy(l);
> + }
> + }
This doesn't look right at all. It calls credit_trusted_entropy(),
but it doesn't actually feed the contents of rng_seed where. Why not
just call add_hwgeneterator_randomness() and drop adding this
credit_trusted_entropy(l)?
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-07 15:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-07 15:07 Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-07 15:58 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2020-02-07 17:49 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-08 0:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-08 0:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-02-13 11:24 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-13 15:03 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-13 18:44 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-14 1:16 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-02-14 17:02 ` Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 12:13 ` Mark Brown
2020-02-11 15:07 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 0/4 v2] random add rng-seed to " Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 1/4 v2] init: move string constants to __initconst section Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 2/4 v2] init: boot_command_line can be truncated Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 3/4 v2] random: rng-seed source is utf-8 Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 14:45 ` [PATCH 4/4 v2] random: add rng-seed= command line option Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-10 21:40 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-10 22:19 ` [PATCH 4/4 v3] " Mark Salyzyn
2020-02-07 17:28 ` [PATCH] " Kees Cook
2020-02-07 17:47 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-02-07 17:58 ` Mark Salyzyn
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