From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: hch@infradead.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org,
kenny@panix.com, peterz@infradead.org, jeyu@kernel.org,
rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk, pbonzini@redhat.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com, nadav.amit@gmail.com,
thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jannh@google.com,
keescook@chromium.org, David.Laight@aculab.com,
dcovelli@vmware.com, mhiramat@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts
Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 13:02:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200407111007.352324393@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200407110236.930134290@infradead.org>
It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.
Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan
all out-of-tree modules' text and look for VMX instructions and refuse
to load it when SLD is enabled (default) and the module isn't marked
'sld_safe'.
Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly,
can add:
MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");
to explicitly tell the module loader they're good.
Reported-by: "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200402124205.242674296@linutronix.de
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/moduleloader.h | 2
kernel/module.c | 3 -
5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ unsigned int x86_stepping(unsigned int s
extern void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn);
extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+extern bool split_lock_enabled(void);
#else
static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
static inline void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn) {}
@@ -51,5 +52,9 @@ static inline bool handle_user_split_loc
{
return false;
}
+static inline bool split_lock_enabled(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPU_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -1061,6 +1061,11 @@ static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
}
+bool split_lock_enabled(void)
+{
+ return sld_state != sld_off;
+}
+
static void split_lock_init(void)
{
split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
#if 0
#define DEBUGP(fmt, ...) \
@@ -217,6 +219,78 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechd
}
#endif
+static bool insn_is_vmx(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ u8 modrm = insn->modrm.bytes[0];
+ u8 modrm_mod = X86_MODRM_MOD(modrm);
+ u8 modrm_reg = X86_MODRM_REG(modrm);
+
+ u8 prefix = insn->prefixes.bytes[0];
+
+ if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] != 0x0f)
+ return false;
+
+ switch (insn->opcode.bytes[1]) {
+ case 0x01:
+ switch (insn->opcode.bytes[2]) {
+ case 0xc1: /* VMCALL */
+ case 0xc2: /* VMLAUNCH */
+ case 0xc3: /* VMRESUME */
+ case 0xc4: /* VMXOFF */
+ return true;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 0x78: /* VMREAD */
+ case 0x79: /* VMWRITE */
+ return true;
+
+ case 0xc7:
+ /* VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMCLEAR, VMXON */
+ if (modrm_mod == 0x03)
+ break;
+
+ if ((modrm_reg == 6 && (!prefix || prefix == 0x66 || prefix == 0xf3)) ||
+ (modrm_reg == 7 && (!prefix || prefix == 0xf3)))
+ return true;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int decode_module(struct module *mod, void *text, void *text_end, bool sld_safe)
+{
+ bool allow_vmx = sld_safe || !split_lock_enabled();
+ struct insn insn;
+
+ while (text < text_end) {
+ kernel_insn_init(&insn, text, text_end - text);
+ insn_get_length(&insn);
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!insn_complete(&insn))) {
+ pr_err("Module text malformed: %s\n", mod->name);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+
+ if (!allow_vmx && insn_is_vmx(&insn)) {
+ pr_err("Module has VMX instructions and is not marked 'sld_safe', boot with: 'split_lock_detect=off': %s\n", mod->name);
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+ }
+
+ text += insn.length;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int module_finalize(const struct load_info *info, struct module *me)
{
const Elf_Ehdr *hdr = info->hdr;
@@ -253,6 +327,16 @@ int module_finalize(const struct load_in
tseg, tseg + text->sh_size);
}
+ if (text && !get_modinfo(info, "intree")) {
+ bool sld_safe = get_modinfo(info, "sld_safe");
+ void *tseg = (void *)text->sh_addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = decode_module(me, tseg, tseg + text->sh_size, sld_safe);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
if (para) {
void *pseg = (void *)para->sh_addr;
apply_paravirt(pseg, pseg + para->sh_size);
@@ -261,9 +345,10 @@ int module_finalize(const struct load_in
/* make jump label nops */
jump_label_apply_nops(me);
- if (orc && orc_ip)
+ if (orc && orc_ip) {
unwind_module_init(me, (void *)orc_ip->sh_addr, orc_ip->sh_size,
(void *)orc->sh_addr, orc->sh_size);
+ }
return 0;
}
--- a/include/linux/moduleloader.h
+++ b/include/linux/moduleloader.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct load_info {
} index;
};
+extern char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag);
+
/* These may be implemented by architectures that need to hook into the
* module loader code. Architectures that don't need to do anything special
* can just rely on the 'weak' default hooks defined in kernel/module.c.
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -1393,7 +1393,6 @@ static inline int same_magic(const char
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MODVERSIONS */
-static char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag);
static char *get_next_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag,
char *prev);
@@ -2521,7 +2520,7 @@ static char *get_next_modinfo(const stru
return NULL;
}
-static char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag)
+char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag)
{
return get_next_modinfo(info, tag, NULL);
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-07 11:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-07 11:02 [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: Expose load_info to arch module loader code Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] module: Convert module_finalize() to load_info Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2020-04-07 14:35 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 14:55 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-07 15:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 15:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 15:44 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 16:51 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 17:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 23:59 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08 7:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 18:26 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 21:25 ` David Laight
2020-04-07 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-08 2:10 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-08 8:09 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08 9:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-10 11:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:55 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 19:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:27 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 20:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:22 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 21:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 22:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 23:51 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 5:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 23:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-08 0:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 8:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 9:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 21:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 5:58 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 8:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 8:58 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 9:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 10:45 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 8:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 8:59 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 9:25 ` David Laight
2020-04-08 11:13 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 11:17 ` David Laight
2020-04-08 9:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:50 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 13:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 15:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 15:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-08 16:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-09 8:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-09 10:13 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-09 21:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-09 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-10 5:37 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 15:54 ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 19:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200407111007.352324393@infradead.org \
--to=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=David.Laight@aculab.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dcovelli@vmware.com \
--cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=hch@infradead.org \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jeyu@kernel.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kenny@panix.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thellstrom@vmware.com \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®