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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: hch@infradead.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org,
	kenny@panix.com, peterz@infradead.org, jeyu@kernel.org,
	rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	fenghua.yu@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com, nadav.amit@gmail.com,
	thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jannh@google.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, David.Laight@aculab.com,
	dcovelli@vmware.com, mhiramat@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts
Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 13:02:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200407111007.352324393@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200407110236.930134290@infradead.org>

It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.

Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan
all out-of-tree modules' text and look for VMX instructions and refuse
to load it when SLD is enabled (default) and the module isn't marked
'sld_safe'.

Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly,
can add:

  MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");

to explicitly tell the module loader they're good.

Reported-by: "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200402124205.242674296@linutronix.de
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h   |    5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c  |    5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/module.c     |   87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/moduleloader.h |    2 
 kernel/module.c              |    3 -
 5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ unsigned int x86_stepping(unsigned int s
 extern void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn);
 extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+extern bool split_lock_enabled(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
 static inline void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn) {}
@@ -51,5 +52,9 @@ static inline bool handle_user_split_loc
 {
 	return false;
 }
+static inline bool split_lock_enabled(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 #endif
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPU_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -1061,6 +1061,11 @@ static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
 }
 
+bool split_lock_enabled(void)
+{
+	return sld_state != sld_off;
+}
+
 static void split_lock_init(void)
 {
 	split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
 
 #if 0
 #define DEBUGP(fmt, ...)				\
@@ -217,6 +219,78 @@ int apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechd
 }
 #endif
 
+static bool insn_is_vmx(struct insn *insn)
+{
+	u8 modrm = insn->modrm.bytes[0];
+	u8 modrm_mod = X86_MODRM_MOD(modrm);
+	u8 modrm_reg = X86_MODRM_REG(modrm);
+
+	u8 prefix = insn->prefixes.bytes[0];
+
+	if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] != 0x0f)
+		return false;
+
+	switch (insn->opcode.bytes[1]) {
+	case 0x01:
+		switch (insn->opcode.bytes[2]) {
+		case 0xc1: /* VMCALL */
+		case 0xc2: /* VMLAUNCH */
+		case 0xc3: /* VMRESUME */
+		case 0xc4: /* VMXOFF */
+			return true;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case 0x78: /* VMREAD */
+	case 0x79: /* VMWRITE */
+		return true;
+
+	case 0xc7:
+		/* VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMCLEAR, VMXON */
+		if (modrm_mod == 0x03)
+			break;
+
+		if ((modrm_reg == 6 && (!prefix || prefix == 0x66 || prefix == 0xf3)) ||
+		    (modrm_reg == 7 && (!prefix || prefix == 0xf3)))
+			return true;
+
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int decode_module(struct module *mod, void *text, void *text_end, bool sld_safe)
+{
+	bool allow_vmx = sld_safe || !split_lock_enabled();
+	struct insn insn;
+
+	while (text < text_end) {
+		kernel_insn_init(&insn, text, text_end - text);
+		insn_get_length(&insn);
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!insn_complete(&insn))) {
+			pr_err("Module text malformed: %s\n", mod->name);
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		}
+
+		if (!allow_vmx && insn_is_vmx(&insn)) {
+			pr_err("Module has VMX instructions and is not marked 'sld_safe', boot with: 'split_lock_detect=off': %s\n", mod->name);
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		}
+
+		text += insn.length;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int module_finalize(const struct load_info *info, struct module *me)
 {
 	const Elf_Ehdr *hdr = info->hdr;
@@ -253,6 +327,16 @@ int module_finalize(const struct load_in
 					    tseg, tseg + text->sh_size);
 	}
 
+	if (text && !get_modinfo(info, "intree")) {
+		bool sld_safe = get_modinfo(info, "sld_safe");
+		void *tseg = (void *)text->sh_addr;
+		int ret;
+
+		ret = decode_module(me, tseg, tseg + text->sh_size, sld_safe);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	if (para) {
 		void *pseg = (void *)para->sh_addr;
 		apply_paravirt(pseg, pseg + para->sh_size);
@@ -261,9 +345,10 @@ int module_finalize(const struct load_in
 	/* make jump label nops */
 	jump_label_apply_nops(me);
 
-	if (orc && orc_ip)
+	if (orc && orc_ip) {
 		unwind_module_init(me, (void *)orc_ip->sh_addr, orc_ip->sh_size,
 				   (void *)orc->sh_addr, orc->sh_size);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/include/linux/moduleloader.h
+++ b/include/linux/moduleloader.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct load_info {
 	} index;
 };
 
+extern char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag);
+
 /* These may be implemented by architectures that need to hook into the
  * module loader code.  Architectures that don't need to do anything special
  * can just rely on the 'weak' default hooks defined in kernel/module.c.
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -1393,7 +1393,6 @@ static inline int same_magic(const char
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_MODVERSIONS */
 
-static char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag);
 static char *get_next_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag,
 			      char *prev);
 
@@ -2521,7 +2520,7 @@ static char *get_next_modinfo(const stru
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag)
+char *get_modinfo(const struct load_info *info, const char *tag)
 {
 	return get_next_modinfo(info, tag, NULL);
 }



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-07 11:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-07 11:02 [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: Expose load_info to arch module loader code Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:52   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] module: Convert module_finalize() to load_info Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:53   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2020-04-07 14:35   ` [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:44     ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 14:55       ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:49     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-07 15:24     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 15:28       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 15:44       ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 16:51   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 17:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 23:59       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08  7:25     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 18:26   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 21:25   ` David Laight
2020-04-07 23:15     ` Kees Cook
2020-04-08  2:10   ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-08  8:09   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08  9:56     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:15       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-10 11:25       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:13     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:49       ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:55   ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 19:38     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:27       ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 20:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:22           ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 21:27             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 22:12               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 23:51                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08  8:45                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  5:18               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 23:15             ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-08  0:22               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08  8:37                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  9:52                 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 21:48   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08  5:58     ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  8:03       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08  8:58         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  9:04           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 10:45             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  8:51       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  8:59         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  9:25           ` David Laight
2020-04-08 11:13             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 11:17               ` David Laight
2020-04-08  9:13         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:50           ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 13:27   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 15:44     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 15:46       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08 16:02         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-08 16:15         ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-09  8:56           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-09 10:13             ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-09 21:13               ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-09 22:18                 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-10  5:37                   ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 15:54       ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 19:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:11     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:45       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:48       ` Peter Zijlstra

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