From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <tglx@linutronix.de>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<hch@infradead.org>, <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <kenny@panix.com>, <jeyu@kernel.org>,
<rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<fenghua.yu@intel.com>, <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
<nadav.amit@gmail.com>, <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>, <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, <jannh@google.com>,
<keescook@chromium.org>, <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
<dcovelli@vmware.com>, <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 22:21:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <34f2a325-45c4-44e8-595a-187d0d37afa6@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200407204530.GR2452@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On 07/04/2020 21:45, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> POPF: Don't really want someone being able to set IOPL3. However, this
>> might quite easily show up as a false positive depending on how the
>> irqsafe infrastructure gets inlined.
> local_irq_restore() will be a POPF :/
Ok. Something to consider in an orthogonal direction. A while ago, I
put this into Xen as a security fix:
iret_exit_to_guest:
andl $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),24(%rsp)
orl $X86_EFLAGS_IF,24(%rsp)
addq $8,%rsp
.Lft0: iretq
which unconditionally fixes up the unsafe flags even if something
manages to slips through (e.g. local_irq_restore() against stack
rubble). It turns out that it has saved us several CVEs in the
intervening time.
Is this the kind of things the hardening folk would be interested in?
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> @@ -282,6 +282,68 @@ static bool insn_is_mov_DRn(struct insn
> return false;
> }
>
> +static bool insn_is_GDT_modifier(struct insn *insn)
> +{
> + u8 modrm = insn->modrm.bytes[0];
> + u8 modrm_mod = X86_MODRM_MOD(modrm);
> + u8 modrm_reg = X86_MODRM_REG(modrm);
> +
> + if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] != 0x0f)
> + return false;
> +
> + switch (insn->opcode.bytes[1]) {
> + case 0x00: /* Grp6 */
> + switch (modrm_reg) {
> + /* case 0x0: SLDT */
> + case 0x2: /* LLDT */
> + case 0x3: /* LTR */
> + return true;
Come to think of it, if you include the Sxxx variants, a sufficiently
clever compiler can collapse this entire switch statement into a single
"and $~3, modrm_reg" instruction, rather than being forced to use "and
$~1, modrm_reg; cmp $2, ...".
Probably on the extreme end of micro-optimising however.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-07 21:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-07 11:02 Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: Expose load_info to arch module loader code Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] module: Convert module_finalize() to load_info Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:53 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 14:35 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 14:55 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-07 15:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 15:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 15:44 ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 16:51 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 17:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 23:59 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08 7:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 18:26 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 21:25 ` David Laight
2020-04-07 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-08 2:10 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-08 8:09 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08 9:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-10 11:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 17:01 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:55 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 19:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:27 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 20:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:22 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 21:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 22:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 23:51 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 5:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 23:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-08 0:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 8:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 9:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 21:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 5:58 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 8:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 8:58 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 9:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 10:45 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 8:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 8:59 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 9:25 ` David Laight
2020-04-08 11:13 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 11:17 ` David Laight
2020-04-08 9:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:50 ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 13:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 15:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 15:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-08 16:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-09 8:56 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-09 10:13 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-09 21:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-09 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-10 5:37 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 15:54 ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 19:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:21 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-04-07 20:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
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