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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <tglx@linutronix.de>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<hch@infradead.org>, <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <kenny@panix.com>, <jeyu@kernel.org>,
	<rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<fenghua.yu@intel.com>, <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	<nadav.amit@gmail.com>, <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, <jannh@google.com>,
	<keescook@chromium.org>, <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	<dcovelli@vmware.com>, <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 22:21:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <34f2a325-45c4-44e8-595a-187d0d37afa6@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200407204530.GR2452@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On 07/04/2020 21:45, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> POPF: Don't really want someone being able to set IOPL3.  However, this
>> might quite easily show up as a false positive depending on how the
>> irqsafe infrastructure gets inlined.
> local_irq_restore() will be a POPF :/

Ok.  Something to consider in an orthogonal direction.  A while ago, I
put this into Xen as a security fix:

iret_exit_to_guest:
        andl  $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),24(%rsp)
        orl   $X86_EFLAGS_IF,24(%rsp)
        addq  $8,%rsp
.Lft0:  iretq

which unconditionally fixes up the unsafe flags even if something
manages to slips through (e.g. local_irq_restore() against stack
rubble).  It turns out that it has saved us several CVEs in the
intervening time.

Is this the kind of things the hardening folk would be interested in?

> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> @@ -282,6 +282,68 @@ static bool insn_is_mov_DRn(struct insn
>  	return false;
>  }
>
> +static bool insn_is_GDT_modifier(struct insn *insn)
> +{
> +	u8 modrm = insn->modrm.bytes[0];
> +	u8 modrm_mod = X86_MODRM_MOD(modrm);
> +	u8 modrm_reg = X86_MODRM_REG(modrm);
> +
> +	if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] != 0x0f)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	switch (insn->opcode.bytes[1]) {
> +	case 0x00: /* Grp6 */
> +		switch (modrm_reg) {
> +		/* case 0x0: SLDT */
> +		case 0x2: /* LLDT */
> +		case 0x3: /* LTR */
> +			return true;

Come to think of it, if you include the Sxxx variants, a sufficiently
clever compiler can collapse this entire switch statement into a single
"and $~3, modrm_reg" instruction, rather than being forced to use "and
$~1, modrm_reg; cmp $2, ...".

Probably on the extreme end of micro-optimising however.

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-07 21:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-07 11:02 Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: Expose load_info to arch module loader code Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:52   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] module: Convert module_finalize() to load_info Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:53   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 14:35   ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:44     ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 14:55       ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:49     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-07 15:24     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 15:28       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 15:44       ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 16:51   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 17:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 23:59       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08  7:25     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 18:26   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 21:25   ` David Laight
2020-04-07 23:15     ` Kees Cook
2020-04-08  2:10   ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-08  8:09   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08  9:56     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:15       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-10 11:25       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:13     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:49       ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:55   ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 19:38     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:27       ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 20:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:22           ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 21:27             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 22:12               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 23:51                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08  8:45                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  5:18               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 23:15             ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-08  0:22               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08  8:37                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  9:52                 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 21:48   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08  5:58     ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  8:03       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08  8:58         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  9:04           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 10:45             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  8:51       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  8:59         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  9:25           ` David Laight
2020-04-08 11:13             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 11:17               ` David Laight
2020-04-08  9:13         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:50           ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 13:27   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 15:44     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 15:46       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08 16:02         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-08 16:15         ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-09  8:56           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-09 10:13             ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-09 21:13               ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-09 22:18                 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-10  5:37                   ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 15:54       ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 19:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:11     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:45       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:21         ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-04-07 20:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:48       ` Peter Zijlstra

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