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From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: hch@infradead.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org,
	kenny@panix.com, jeyu@kernel.org, rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com, nadav.amit@gmail.com,
	thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jannh@google.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, David.Laight@aculab.com,
	dcovelli@vmware.com, mhiramat@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2020 10:10:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fa0d7421-9a6a-2e28-40cf-50f1364de502@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200407111007.352324393@infradead.org>

On 4/7/2020 7:02 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
> hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
> inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.
> 
> Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan
> all out-of-tree modules' text and look for VMX instructions and refuse
> to load it when SLD is enabled (default) and the module isn't marked
> 'sld_safe'.
> 
> Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly,
> can add:
> 
>    MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");
> 
> to explicitly tell the module loader they're good.
> 

I'm thinking that it helps nothing other than telling the possible 
hypervisors "we have a new feature SLD enabled in kernel, but you seem 
not aware of it. To avoid something wrong with you and your VMs, you are 
not allowed to be loaded. Please tell me sld_safe as your assurance to 
get approval"

It's actually the bug/issue of hypervisor and it does no harm to (host) 
kernel. We can just leave it to hypervisor developer that they need to 
fix the bug in their hypervisor.

If we go the way like this patch, then whenever someone reports a 
similar bug due to new feature introduced and enabled in the future, we 
add a new xxx_safe module info?


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-08  2:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-07 11:02 [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: Expose load_info to arch module loader code Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:52   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] module: Convert module_finalize() to load_info Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 16:53   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 14:35   ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:44     ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 14:55       ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 14:49     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-07 15:24     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 15:28       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 15:44       ` Greg KH
2020-04-07 16:51   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 17:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 23:59       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08  7:25     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 18:26   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-07 21:25   ` David Laight
2020-04-07 23:15     ` Kees Cook
2020-04-08  2:10   ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2020-04-08  8:09   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-08  9:56     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:15       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-10 11:25       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-04-07 11:02 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 17:01   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:13     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:49       ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 18:55   ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 19:38     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:27       ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 20:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:22           ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-07 21:27             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 22:12               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-07 23:51                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08  8:45                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  5:18               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 23:15             ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-08  0:22               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08  8:37                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  9:52                 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 21:48   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08  5:58     ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  8:03       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08  8:58         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  9:04           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-08 10:45             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  8:51       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08  8:59         ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08  9:25           ` David Laight
2020-04-08 11:13             ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 11:17               ` David Laight
2020-04-08  9:13         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 10:50           ` Jan Kiszka
2020-04-08 13:27   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-08 15:44     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-08 15:46       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08 16:02         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-08 16:15         ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-09  8:56           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-09 10:13             ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-09 21:13               ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-09 22:18                 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-10  5:37                   ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-08 15:54       ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-07 17:23 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/module: Out-of-tree module decode and sanitize Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 19:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 20:11     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:45       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 21:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-07 20:48       ` Peter Zijlstra

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