From: peterz@infradead.org
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Chang Seok Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: Disallow RDPID in paranoid entry if KVM is enabled
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 09:24:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200821072414.GH1362448@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200821025050.32573-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 07:50:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 70dea93378162..fd915c46297c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -842,8 +842,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
> *
> * The MSR write ensures that no subsequent load is based on a
> * mispredicted GSBASE. No extra FENCE required.
> + *
> + * Disallow RDPID if KVM is enabled as it may consume a guest's TSC_AUX
> + * if an NMI arrives in KVM's run loop. KVM loads guest's TSC_AUX on
> + * VM-Enter and may not restore the host's value until the CPU returns
> + * to userspace, i.e. KVM depends on the kernel not using TSC_AUX.
> */
> - SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx
> + SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx no_rdpid=IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
> ret
With distro configs that's going to be a guaranteed no_rdpid. Also with
a grand total of 0 performance numbers that RDPID is even worth it, I'd
suggest to just unconditionally remove that thing. Simpler code
all-around.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-21 7:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-21 2:50 Sean Christopherson
2020-08-21 7:24 ` peterz [this message]
2020-08-21 7:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 7:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 8:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 8:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 9:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 9:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 9:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 9:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 10:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-22 16:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-16 16:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 9:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-08-21 9:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-21 19:55 ` hpa
2020-08-21 20:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-08-21 8:56 ` kernel test robot
2020-08-21 10:28 ` kernel test robot
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