From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, alex.popov@linux.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, luto@kernel.org,
mark.rutland@arm.com, will@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 12:55:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220425115603.781311-4-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220425115603.781311-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
In stackleak_task_init(), stackleak_track_stack(), and
__stackleak_erase(), we open-code skipping the STACK_END_MAGIC at the
bottom of the stack. Each case is implemented slightly differently, and
only the __stackleak_erase() case is commented.
In stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() we unconditionally
add sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest stack address. In
stackleak_task_init() we use end_of_stack() for this, and in
stackleak_track_stack() we use task_stack_page(). In __stackleak_erase()
we handle this by detecting if `kstack_ptr` has hit the stack end
boundary, and if so, conditionally moving it above the magic.
This patch adds a new stackleak_task_low_bound() helper which is used in
all three cases, which unconditionally adds sizeof(unsigned long) to the
lowest address on the task stack, with commentary as to why. This uses
end_of_stack() as stackleak_task_init() did prior to this patch, as this
is consistent with the code in kernel/fork.c which initializes the
STACK_END_MAGIC value.
In __stackleak_erase() we no longer need to check whether we've spilled
into the STACK_END_MAGIC value, as stackleak_track_stack() ensures that
`current->lowest_stack` stops immediately above this, and similarly the
poison scan will stop immediately above this.
For stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() this results in no
change to code generation. For __stackleak_erase() the generated
assembly is slightly simpler and shorter.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/linux/stackleak.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
kernel/stackleak.c | 14 ++++----------
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h
index ccaab2043fcd5..67430faa5c518 100644
--- a/include/linux/stackleak.h
+++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h
@@ -15,9 +15,22 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
+/*
+ * The lowest address on tsk's stack which we can plausibly erase.
+ */
+static __always_inline unsigned long
+stackleak_task_low_bound(const struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ /*
+ * The lowest unsigned long on the task stack contains STACK_END_MAGIC,
+ * which we must not corrupt.
+ */
+ return (unsigned long)end_of_stack(tsk) + sizeof(unsigned long);
+}
+
static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
{
- t->lowest_stack = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(t) + sizeof(unsigned long);
+ t->lowest_stack = stackleak_task_low_bound(t);
# ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
t->prev_lowest_stack = t->lowest_stack;
# endif
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
index 753eab797a04d..0472956d9a2ce 100644
--- a/kernel/stackleak.c
+++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
@@ -72,9 +72,11 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
{
+ const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
+
/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
- unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
+ unsigned long boundary = task_stack_low;
unsigned int poison_count = 0;
const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
@@ -92,13 +94,6 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
}
- /*
- * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
- * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
- */
- if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
- kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
#endif
@@ -144,8 +139,7 @@ void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
/* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
- sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
- sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+ sp >= stackleak_task_low_bound(current)) {
current->lowest_stack = sp;
}
}
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-25 11:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-25 11:55 [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 1/8] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 2/8] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 4/8] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 5/8] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 6/8] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 7/8] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 8/8] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 22:54 ` [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook
2022-04-26 10:10 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 10:37 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 11:15 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 15:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-26 16:07 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-26 17:51 ` Kees Cook
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