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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, alex.popov@linux.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, luto@kernel.org,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, will@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] stackleak: clarify variable names
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 12:55:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220425115603.781311-5-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220425115603.781311-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

The logic within __stackleak_erase() can be a little hard to follow, as
`boundary` switches from being the low bound to the high bound mid way
through the function, and `kstack_ptr` is used to represent the start of
the region to erase while `boundary` represents the end of the region to
erase.

Make this a little clearer by consistently using clearer variable names.
The `boundary` variable is removed, the bounds of the region to erase
are described by `erase_low` and `erase_high`, and bounds of the task
stack are described by `task_stack_low` and `task_stck_high`.

As the same time, remove the comment above the variables, since it is
unclear whether it's intended as rationale, a complaint, or a TODO, and
is more confusing than helpful.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 kernel/stackleak.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
index 0472956d9a2ce..8fbc1e4c21435 100644
--- a/kernel/stackleak.c
+++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
@@ -73,44 +73,42 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
 static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
 {
 	const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
-
-	/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
-	unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
-	unsigned long boundary = task_stack_low;
+	unsigned long erase_low = current->lowest_stack;
+	unsigned long erase_high;
 	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
 	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
 
 	/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
-	if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
-		kstack_ptr = boundary;
+	if (unlikely(erase_low - task_stack_low >= THREAD_SIZE))
+		erase_low = task_stack_low;
 
 	/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
-	while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
-		if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
+	while (erase_low > task_stack_low && poison_count <= depth) {
+		if (*(unsigned long *)erase_low == STACKLEAK_POISON)
 			poison_count++;
 		else
 			poison_count = 0;
 
-		kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
+		erase_low -= sizeof(unsigned long);
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
-	current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
+	current->prev_lowest_stack = erase_low;
 #endif
 
 	/*
-	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
-	 * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
-	 * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
+	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack between 'erase_low'
+	 * and 'erase_high'. We assume that the stack pointer doesn't change
+	 * when we write poison.
 	 */
 	if (on_thread_stack())
-		boundary = current_stack_pointer;
+		erase_high = current_stack_pointer;
 	else
-		boundary = current_top_of_stack();
+		erase_high = current_top_of_stack();
 
-	while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
-		*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
-		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
+	while (erase_low < erase_high) {
+		*(unsigned long *)erase_low = STACKLEAK_POISON;
+		erase_low += sizeof(unsigned long);
 	}
 
 	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
-- 
2.30.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-25 11:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-25 11:55 [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 1/8] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 2/8] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 3/8] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 5/8] stackleak: rework stack high " Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 6/8] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 7/8] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 8/8] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 22:54 ` [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook
2022-04-26 10:10   ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 10:37     ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 11:15       ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 15:51   ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-26 16:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 18:01     ` Kees Cook
2022-04-26 17:51 ` Kees Cook

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