From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, alex.popov@linux.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, luto@kernel.org,
mark.rutland@arm.com, will@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] stackleak: add on/off stack variants
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 12:56:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220425115603.781311-8-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220425115603.781311-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
The stackleak_erase() code dynamically handles being on a task stack or
another stack. In most cases, this is a fixed property of the caller,
which the caller is aware of, as an architecture might always return
using the task stack, or might always return using a trampoline stack.
This patch adds stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() and
stackleak_erase_off_task_stack() functions which callers can use to
avoid on_thread_stack() check and associated redundant work when the
calling stack is known. The existing stackleak_erase() is retained as a
safe default.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/stackleak.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c
index ba346d46218f5..4c3f82066d7fb 100644
--- a/kernel/stackleak.c
+++ b/kernel/stackleak.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
#define skip_erasing() false
#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
-static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
+static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack)
{
const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current);
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
* function has a fixed-size stack frame, and the current stack pointer
* doesn't change while we write poison.
*/
- if (on_thread_stack())
+ if (on_task_stack)
erase_high = current_stack_pointer;
else
erase_high = task_stack_high;
@@ -120,12 +120,41 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void)
current->lowest_stack = task_stack_high;
}
+/*
+ * Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase.
+ * Can be called from the task stack or an entry stack when the task stack is
+ * no longer in use.
+ */
asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void)
{
if (skip_erasing())
return;
- __stackleak_erase();
+ __stackleak_erase(on_thread_stack());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase.
+ * Can only be called from the task stack.
+ */
+asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void)
+{
+ if (skip_erasing())
+ return;
+
+ __stackleak_erase(true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase.
+ * Can only be called from a stack other than the task stack.
+ */
+asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void)
+{
+ if (skip_erasing())
+ return;
+
+ __stackleak_erase(false);
}
void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-25 11:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-25 11:55 [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 1/8] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 2/8] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 3/8] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:55 ` [PATCH 4/8] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 5/8] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 6/8] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 11:56 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2022-04-25 11:56 ` [PATCH 8/8] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-25 22:54 ` [PATCH 0/8] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook
2022-04-26 10:10 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 10:37 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 11:15 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 15:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-26 16:07 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-26 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-26 17:51 ` Kees Cook
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