From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>,
Kechen Lu <kechenl@nvidia.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Robert Hoo <robert.hoo.linux@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 36/49] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap"
Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 10:39:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240517173926.965351-37-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240517173926.965351-1-seanjc@google.com>
As the first step toward replacing KVM's so-called "governed features"
framework with a more comprehensive, less poorly named implementation,
replace the "kvm_governed_feature" function prefix with "guest_cpu_cap"
and rename guest_can_use() to guest_cpu_cap_has().
The "guest_cpu_cap" naming scheme mirrors that of "kvm_cpu_cap", and
provides a more clear distinction between guest capabilities, which are
KVM controlled (heh, or one might say "governed"), and guest CPUID, which
with few exceptions is fully userspace controlled.
Opportunistically rewrite the comment about XSS passthrough for SEV-ES
guests to avoid referencing so many functions, as such comments are prone
to becoming stale (case in point...).
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 17 ++++++++---------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++--
11 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 16bb873188d6..286abefc93d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) :
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
if (allow_gbpages)
- kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
+ guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
if (best && apic) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index d68b7d879820..e021681f34ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_is_governed_feature(unsigned int x86_feature)
return kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature) >= 0;
}
-static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned int x86_feature)
+static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
@@ -265,15 +265,15 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
}
-static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned int x86_feature)
+static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
{
if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(x86_feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, x86_feature))
- kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
+ guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
}
-static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- unsigned int x86_feature)
+static __always_inline bool guest_cpu_cap_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
{
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
cr3 &= ~(X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57);
return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, cr3);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index dc80e72e4848..cf95ea5fe29d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_cr3_lam_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
return 0;
return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 5095fb46713e..e18a10c59431 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4966,7 +4966,7 @@ static void reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(&context->guest_rsvd_check,
vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits,
context->cpu_role.base.level, is_efer_nx(context),
- guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+ guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
is_cr4_pse(context),
guest_cpuid_is_amd_compatible(vcpu));
}
@@ -5043,7 +5043,7 @@ static void reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(),
context->root_role.level,
context->root_role.efer_nx,
- guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+ guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
is_pse, is_amd);
if (!shadow_me_mask)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index 55b9a6d96bcf..2900a8e21257 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static bool nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- if (!guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
return true;
if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DR);
}
- if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
/*
* Reserved bits of DEBUGCTL are ignored. Be consistent with
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
* exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
*/
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK))
int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
else
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
* what a nrips=0 CPU would do (L1 is responsible for advancing RIP
* prior to injecting the event).
*/
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb02->control.next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb02->control.next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
svm->soft_int_injected = true;
svm->soft_int_csbase = vmcb12_csbase;
svm->soft_int_old_rip = vmcb12_rip;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
svm->soft_int_next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
else
svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
@@ -724,18 +724,18 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext &
LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |=
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
pause_count12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count;
else
pause_count12 = 0;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
pause_thresh12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh;
else
pause_thresh12 = 0;
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (vmcb12->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(svm, vmcb12);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb12->control.next_rip = vmcb02->control.next_rip;
vmcb12->control.int_ctl = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl;
@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
- if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02);
svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 57c2c8025547..7640dedc2ddc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -4409,16 +4409,15 @@ static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
* For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
* the host/guest supports its use.
*
- * guest_can_use() checks a number of requirements on the host/guest to
- * ensure that MSR_IA32_XSS is available, but it might report true even
- * if X86_FEATURE_XSAVES isn't configured in the guest to ensure host
- * MSR_IA32_XSS is always properly restored. For SEV-ES, it is better
- * to further check that the guest CPUID actually supports
- * X86_FEATURE_XSAVES so that accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS by misbehaved
- * guests will still get intercepted and caught in the normal
- * kvm_emulate_rdmsr()/kvm_emulated_wrmsr() paths.
+ * KVM treats the guest as being capable of using XSAVES even if XSAVES
+ * isn't enabled in guest CPUID as there is no intercept for XSAVES,
+ * i.e. the guest can use XSAVES/XRSTOR to read/write XSS if XSAVE is
+ * exposed to the guest and XSAVES is supported in hardware. Condition
+ * full XSS passthrough on the guest being able to use XSAVES *and*
+ * XSAVES being exposed to the guest so that KVM can at least honor
+ * guest CPUID for RDMSR and WRMSR.
*/
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1);
else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 3d0549ca246f..2acd2e3bb1b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
- (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
switch (msr_info->index) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
+ !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
break;
@@ -2991,7 +2991,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
switch (ecx) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
if (!msr->host_initiated)
return 1;
@@ -3013,7 +3013,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
is_guest_mode(vcpu))
nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
@@ -4342,11 +4342,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
- kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+ guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
/*
* Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU mode is Intel in order to emulate that
@@ -4354,12 +4354,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
*/
if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 97b3683ea324..08fd788d08df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static inline bool svm_is_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
static inline bool nested_vgif_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+ return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
}
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static inline bool nested_npt_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
static inline bool nested_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
+ return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index d5b832126e34..fb7eec29681d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -6488,7 +6488,7 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
(vmx->nested.vmxon || vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)) {
kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr;
kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
@@ -6629,7 +6629,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return -EINVAL;
if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa))
@@ -6663,7 +6663,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return -EINVAL;
if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) &&
- (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
+ (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
!vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 51b2cd13250a..1bc56596d653 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
break;
case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return 1;
if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
&msr_info->data))
@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
return 1; /* they are read-only */
- if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return 1;
return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
@@ -4571,7 +4571,7 @@ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
\
if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \
if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name)) \
- __enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
+ __enabled = guest_cpu_cap_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
else \
__enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\
@@ -7838,10 +7838,10 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
- kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+ guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
@@ -7849,7 +7849,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
@@ -7858,7 +7858,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 7160c5ab8e3e..4ca9651b3f43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss);
}
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
- if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
}
--
2.45.0.215.g3402c0e53f-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-17 17:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 185+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-17 17:38 [PATCH v2 00/49] KVM: x86: CPUID overhaul, fixes, and caching Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 01/49] KVM: x86: Do all post-set CPUID processing during vCPU creation Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:48 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 02/49] KVM: x86: Explicitly do runtime CPUID updates "after" initial setup Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 03/49] KVM: x86: Account for KVM-reserved CR4 bits when passing through CR4 on VMX Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 04/49] KVM: selftests: Update x86's set_sregs_test to match KVM's CPUID enforcement Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 05/49] KVM: selftests: Assert that the @cpuid passed to get_cpuid_entry() is non-NULL Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:58 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-11-21 18:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 06/49] KVM: selftests: Refresh vCPU CPUID cache in __vcpu_get_cpuid_entry() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 07/49] KVM: selftests: Verify KVM stuffs runtime CPUID OS bits on CR4 writes Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 08/49] KVM: x86: Move __kvm_is_valid_cr4() definition to x86.h Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 09/49] KVM: x86/pmu: Drop now-redundant refresh() during init() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 10/49] KVM: x86: Drop now-redundant MAXPHYADDR and GPA rsvd bits from vCPU creation Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:13 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:30 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 11/49] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS after " Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 7:42 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 12/49] KVM: x86: Reject disabling of MWAIT/HLT interception when not allowed Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 5:09 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-12 7:51 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-12 13:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 13/49] KVM: selftests: Fix a bad TEST_REQUIRE() in x86's KVM PV test Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 14/49] KVM: selftests: Update x86's KVM PV test to match KVM's disabling exits behavior Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 15/49] KVM: x86: Zero out PV features cache when the CPUID leaf is not present Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 16/49] KVM: x86: Don't update PV features caches when enabling enforcement capability Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 17/49] KVM: x86: Do reverse CPUID sanity checks in __feature_leaf() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 18/49] KVM: x86: Account for max supported CPUID leaf when getting raw host CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-06-19 6:17 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-06-19 8:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 19/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that ignore host kernel support Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:21 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 20:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:39 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 22:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 20/49] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_cpu_cap_mask() to kvm_cpu_cap_init() Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 6:23 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 18:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 21/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that are 64-bit only Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-17 13:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 22/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to precisely handle aliased 0x1.EDX CPUID features Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:25 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 18:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:06 ` mlevitsk
2024-08-05 22:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-09-11 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-22 3:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-11-27 14:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 23/49] KVM: x86: Handle kernel- and KVM-defined CPUID words in a single helper Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-17 14:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-24 17:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 19:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:07 ` mlevitsk
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 24/49] KVM: x86: #undef SPEC_CTRL_SSBD in cpuid.c to avoid macro collisions Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:30 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:54 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-26 23:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:11 ` mlevitsk
2024-08-05 21:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 25/49] KVM: x86: Harden CPU capabilities processing against out-of-scope features Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 18:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 26/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that KVM emulates in software Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 22:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:58 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-27 0:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:16 ` mlevitsk
2024-08-05 19:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-09-11 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-22 3:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 27/49] KVM: x86: Swap incoming guest CPUID into vCPU before massaging in KVM_SET_CPUID2 Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 28/49] KVM: x86: Clear PV_UNHALT for !HLT-exiting only when userspace sets CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 29/49] KVM: x86: Remove unnecessary caching of KVM's PV CPUID base Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 30/49] KVM: x86: Always operate on kvm_vcpu data in cpuid_entry2_find() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 31/49] KVM: x86: Move kvm_find_cpuid_entry{,_index}() up near cpuid_entry2_find() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 32/49] KVM: x86: Remove all direct usage of cpuid_entry2_find() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:52 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 33/49] KVM: x86: Advertise TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 9:11 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 34/49] KVM: x86: Advertise HYPERVISOR " Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 35/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to handle features that are fully VMM controlled Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:08 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-05-22 14:23 ` [PATCH v2 36/49] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap" Binbin Wu
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 37/49] KVM: x86: Replace guts of "governed" features with comprehensive cpu_caps Sean Christopherson
2024-06-20 2:20 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-07-05 2:10 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 18:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 38/49] KVM: x86: Initialize guest cpu_caps based on guest CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-06-20 2:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-07-05 2:13 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 39/49] KVM: x86: Extract code for generating per-entry emulated CPUID information Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:18 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 0:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 40/49] KVM: x86: Initialize guest cpu_caps based on KVM support Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 0:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:01 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-29 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:16 ` mlevitsk
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 41/49] KVM: x86: Avoid double CPUID lookup when updating MWAIT at runtime Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 42/49] KVM: x86: Drop unnecessary check that cpuid_entry2_find() returns right leaf Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 43/49] KVM: x86: Update OS{XSAVE,PKE} bits in guest CPUID irrespective of host support Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 44/49] KVM: x86: Update guest cpu_caps at runtime for dynamic CPUID-based features Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 0:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-09-11 15:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-22 2:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 45/49] KVM: x86: Shuffle code to prepare for dropping guest_cpuid_has() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 46/49] KVM: x86: Replace (almost) all guest CPUID feature queries with cpu_caps Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:01 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 47/49] KVM: x86: Drop superfluous host XSAVE check when adjusting guest XSAVES caps Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 48/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro for features that are synthesized into boot_cpu_data Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:43 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 21:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 49/49] *** DO NOT APPLY *** KVM: x86: Verify KVM initializes all consumed guest caps Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:54 ` [PATCH v2 00/49] KVM: x86: CPUID overhaul, fixes, and caching Paolo Bonzini
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