From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>,
Kechen Lu <kechenl@nvidia.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Robert Hoo <robert.hoo.linux@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 36/49] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap"
Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 22:23:33 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8de7b84a-ba77-4df0-9cec-8478f56222bb@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240517173926.965351-37-seanjc@google.com>
On 5/18/2024 1:39 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> As the first step toward replacing KVM's so-called "governed features"
> framework with a more comprehensive, less poorly named implementation,
> replace the "kvm_governed_feature" function prefix with "guest_cpu_cap"
> and rename guest_can_use() to guest_cpu_cap_has().
>
> The "guest_cpu_cap" naming scheme mirrors that of "kvm_cpu_cap", and
> provides a more clear distinction between guest capabilities, which are
> KVM controlled (heh, or one might say "governed"), and guest CPUID, which
> with few exceptions is fully userspace controlled.
>
> Opportunistically rewrite the comment about XSS passthrough for SEV-ES
> guests to avoid referencing so many functions, as such comments are prone
> to becoming stale (case in point...).
>
> No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 16 ++++++++--------
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 17 ++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 6 +++---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 16 ++++++++--------
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++--
> 11 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 16bb873188d6..286abefc93d5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) :
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
> if (allow_gbpages)
> - kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
> + guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
>
> best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
> if (best && apic) {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> index d68b7d879820..e021681f34ac 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
> @@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_is_governed_feature(unsigned int x86_feature)
> return kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature) >= 0;
> }
>
> -static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> - unsigned int x86_feature)
> +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + unsigned int x86_feature)
> {
> BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
>
> @@ -265,15 +265,15 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
> }
>
> -static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> - unsigned int x86_feature)
> +static __always_inline void guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + unsigned int x86_feature)
> {
> if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(x86_feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, x86_feature))
> - kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
> + guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
> }
>
> -static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> - unsigned int x86_feature)
> +static __always_inline bool guest_cpu_cap_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + unsigned int x86_feature)
> {
> BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
>
> @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>
> static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_legal_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
> {
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
> cr3 &= ~(X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57);
>
> return kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, cr3);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> index dc80e72e4848..cf95ea5fe29d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_pcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> static inline unsigned long kvm_get_active_cr3_lam_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM))
> return 0;
>
> return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 5095fb46713e..e18a10c59431 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -4966,7 +4966,7 @@ static void reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(&context->guest_rsvd_check,
> vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits,
> context->cpu_role.base.level, is_efer_nx(context),
> - guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
> + guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
> is_cr4_pse(context),
> guest_cpuid_is_amd_compatible(vcpu));
> }
> @@ -5043,7 +5043,7 @@ static void reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(),
> context->root_role.level,
> context->root_role.efer_nx,
> - guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
> + guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
> is_pse, is_amd);
>
> if (!shadow_me_mask)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index 55b9a6d96bcf..2900a8e21257 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> static bool nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> - if (!guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
> return true;
>
> if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
> @@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
> vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DR);
> }
>
> - if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
> + if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
> (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
> /*
> * Reserved bits of DEBUGCTL are ignored. Be consistent with
> @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> * exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
> */
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
> (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK))
> int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
> else
> @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>
> vmcb02->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
> svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
> nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
>
> @@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> * what a nrips=0 CPU would do (L1 is responsible for advancing RIP
> * prior to injecting the event).
> */
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> vmcb02->control.next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
> else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> vmcb02->control.next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
> @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> svm->soft_int_injected = true;
> svm->soft_int_csbase = vmcb12_csbase;
> svm->soft_int_old_rip = vmcb12_rip;
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> svm->soft_int_next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
> else
> svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
> @@ -724,18 +724,18 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>
> vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext &
> LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
> vmcb02->control.virt_ext |=
> (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
>
> if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
> vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
> pause_count12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count;
> else
> pause_count12 = 0;
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
> pause_thresh12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh;
> else
> pause_thresh12 = 0;
> @@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> if (vmcb12->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
> nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(svm, vmcb12);
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
> vmcb12->control.next_rip = vmcb02->control.next_rip;
>
> vmcb12->control.int_ctl = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl;
> @@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
> kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
>
> - if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
> + if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
> (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
> svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02);
> svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 57c2c8025547..7640dedc2ddc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4409,16 +4409,15 @@ static void sev_es_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> * For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
> * the host/guest supports its use.
> *
> - * guest_can_use() checks a number of requirements on the host/guest to
> - * ensure that MSR_IA32_XSS is available, but it might report true even
> - * if X86_FEATURE_XSAVES isn't configured in the guest to ensure host
> - * MSR_IA32_XSS is always properly restored. For SEV-ES, it is better
> - * to further check that the guest CPUID actually supports
> - * X86_FEATURE_XSAVES so that accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS by misbehaved
> - * guests will still get intercepted and caught in the normal
> - * kvm_emulate_rdmsr()/kvm_emulated_wrmsr() paths.
> + * KVM treats the guest as being capable of using XSAVES even if XSAVES
> + * isn't enabled in guest CPUID as there is no intercept for XSAVES,
> + * i.e. the guest can use XSAVES/XRSTOR to read/write XSS if XSAVE is
> + * exposed to the guest and XSAVES is supported in hardware. Condition
> + * full XSS passthrough on the guest being able to use XSAVES *and*
> + * XSAVES being exposed to the guest so that KVM can at least honor
> + * guest CPUID for RDMSR and WRMSR.
> */
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
> set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1);
> else
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 3d0549ca246f..2acd2e3bb1b0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
> bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
> - (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
> + (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
> (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
>
> if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
> @@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> switch (msr_info->index) {
> case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> - !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
> + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
> return 1;
> msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
> break;
> @@ -2991,7 +2991,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> switch (ecx) {
> case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
>
> - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
>
> if (!msr->host_initiated)
> return 1;
> @@ -3013,7 +3013,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>
> svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
> is_guest_mode(vcpu))
> nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
>
> @@ -4342,11 +4342,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
> - kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
> + guest_cpu_cap_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
>
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
>
> /*
> * Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU mode is Intel in order to emulate that
> @@ -4354,12 +4354,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
> */
> if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
>
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
>
> svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 97b3683ea324..08fd788d08df 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static inline bool svm_is_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
>
> static inline bool nested_vgif_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> - return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
> + return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
> (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
> }
>
> @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static inline bool nested_npt_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>
> static inline bool nested_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> - return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
> + return guest_cpu_cap_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
> (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK);
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index d5b832126e34..fb7eec29681d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -6488,7 +6488,7 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
> (vmx->nested.vmxon || vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)) {
> kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr;
> kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
> @@ -6629,7 +6629,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS)
> return -EINVAL;
> } else {
> - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa))
> @@ -6663,7 +6663,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) &&
> - (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
> + (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
> !vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 51b2cd13250a..1bc56596d653 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> [msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
> break;
> case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
> - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> return 1;
> if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
> &msr_info->data))
> @@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
> if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
> return 1; /* they are read-only */
> - if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> return 1;
> return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
> case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
> @@ -4571,7 +4571,7 @@ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
> \
> if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \
> if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name)) \
> - __enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
> + __enabled = guest_cpu_cap_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
> else \
> __enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
> vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\
> @@ -7838,10 +7838,10 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> */
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
> guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
>
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
> - kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
> + guest_cpu_cap_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM);
>
> vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
>
> @@ -7849,7 +7849,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
> vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
> FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
> FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
> @@ -7858,7 +7858,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> ~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
> FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
>
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 7160c5ab8e3e..4ca9651b3f43 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
> xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss);
> }
> @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
> xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
>
> - if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
> vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-22 14:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 185+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-17 17:38 [PATCH v2 00/49] KVM: x86: CPUID overhaul, fixes, and caching Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 01/49] KVM: x86: Do all post-set CPUID processing during vCPU creation Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:48 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 02/49] KVM: x86: Explicitly do runtime CPUID updates "after" initial setup Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 03/49] KVM: x86: Account for KVM-reserved CR4 bits when passing through CR4 on VMX Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 04/49] KVM: selftests: Update x86's set_sregs_test to match KVM's CPUID enforcement Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 05/49] KVM: selftests: Assert that the @cpuid passed to get_cpuid_entry() is non-NULL Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:58 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-11-21 18:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 06/49] KVM: selftests: Refresh vCPU CPUID cache in __vcpu_get_cpuid_entry() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 0:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 07/49] KVM: selftests: Verify KVM stuffs runtime CPUID OS bits on CR4 writes Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 08/49] KVM: x86: Move __kvm_is_valid_cr4() definition to x86.h Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 09/49] KVM: x86/pmu: Drop now-redundant refresh() during init() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 10/49] KVM: x86: Drop now-redundant MAXPHYADDR and GPA rsvd bits from vCPU creation Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:13 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:30 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 11/49] KVM: x86: Disallow KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS after " Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 19:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 18:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 7:42 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 12/49] KVM: x86: Reject disabling of MWAIT/HLT interception when not allowed Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 5:09 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-12 7:51 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-12 13:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 13/49] KVM: selftests: Fix a bad TEST_REQUIRE() in x86's KVM PV test Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 14/49] KVM: selftests: Update x86's KVM PV test to match KVM's disabling exits behavior Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 15/49] KVM: x86: Zero out PV features cache when the CPUID leaf is not present Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 16/49] KVM: x86: Don't update PV features caches when enabling enforcement capability Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 17/49] KVM: x86: Do reverse CPUID sanity checks in __feature_leaf() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 18/49] KVM: x86: Account for max supported CPUID leaf when getting raw host CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-06-19 6:17 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-06-19 8:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-07-05 1:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 19/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that ignore host kernel support Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:21 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 20:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:39 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 22:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 20/49] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_cpu_cap_mask() to kvm_cpu_cap_init() Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 6:23 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 18:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 21/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that are 64-bit only Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-17 13:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-05-17 17:38 ` [PATCH v2 22/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to precisely handle aliased 0x1.EDX CPUID features Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:25 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 18:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:06 ` mlevitsk
2024-08-05 22:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-09-11 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-22 3:17 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-11-27 14:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 23/49] KVM: x86: Handle kernel- and KVM-defined CPUID words in a single helper Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-17 14:00 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-07-24 17:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-25 19:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:07 ` mlevitsk
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 24/49] KVM: x86: #undef SPEC_CTRL_SSBD in cpuid.c to avoid macro collisions Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:30 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:54 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-26 23:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:11 ` mlevitsk
2024-08-05 21:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 25/49] KVM: x86: Harden CPU capabilities processing against out-of-scope features Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 18:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 26/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to init CPUID features that KVM emulates in software Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 22:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:58 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-27 0:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:16 ` mlevitsk
2024-08-05 19:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-09-11 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-22 3:28 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 27/49] KVM: x86: Swap incoming guest CPUID into vCPU before massaging in KVM_SET_CPUID2 Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-08 21:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 28/49] KVM: x86: Clear PV_UNHALT for !HLT-exiting only when userspace sets CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:32 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 29/49] KVM: x86: Remove unnecessary caching of KVM's PV CPUID base Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 17:59 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 30/49] KVM: x86: Always operate on kvm_vcpu data in cpuid_entry2_find() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 31/49] KVM: x86: Move kvm_find_cpuid_entry{,_index}() up near cpuid_entry2_find() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:51 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 32/49] KVM: x86: Remove all direct usage of cpuid_entry2_find() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 1:52 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 33/49] KVM: x86: Advertise TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 9:11 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 34/49] KVM: x86: Advertise HYPERVISOR " Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 35/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro to handle features that are fully VMM controlled Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:08 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 36/49] KVM: x86: Rename "governed features" helpers to use "guest_cpu_cap" Sean Christopherson
2024-05-22 14:23 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 37/49] KVM: x86: Replace guts of "governed" features with comprehensive cpu_caps Sean Christopherson
2024-06-20 2:20 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-07-05 2:10 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 18:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 38/49] KVM: x86: Initialize guest cpu_caps based on guest CPUID Sean Christopherson
2024-06-20 2:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-07-05 2:13 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 39/49] KVM: x86: Extract code for generating per-entry emulated CPUID information Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:18 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 0:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 40/49] KVM: x86: Initialize guest cpu_caps based on KVM support Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 0:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:01 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-29 15:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-05 11:16 ` mlevitsk
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 41/49] KVM: x86: Avoid double CPUID lookup when updating MWAIT at runtime Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 42/49] KVM: x86: Drop unnecessary check that cpuid_entry2_find() returns right leaf Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 43/49] KVM: x86: Update OS{XSAVE,PKE} bits in guest CPUID irrespective of host support Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 44/49] KVM: x86: Update guest cpu_caps at runtime for dynamic CPUID-based features Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 0:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 20:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-09-11 15:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-22 2:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 45/49] KVM: x86: Shuffle code to prepare for dropping guest_cpuid_has() Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 46/49] KVM: x86: Replace (almost) all guest CPUID feature queries with cpu_caps Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:34 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:01 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 47/49] KVM: x86: Drop superfluous host XSAVE check when adjusting guest XSAVES caps Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 19:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 48/49] KVM: x86: Add a macro for features that are synthesized into boot_cpu_data Sean Christopherson
2024-07-05 2:43 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-07-09 21:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-24 18:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-05-17 17:39 ` [PATCH v2 49/49] *** DO NOT APPLY *** KVM: x86: Verify KVM initializes all consumed guest caps Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17 17:54 ` [PATCH v2 00/49] KVM: x86: CPUID overhaul, fixes, and caching Paolo Bonzini
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