From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2024 12:02:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240809190319.1710470-2-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240809190319.1710470-1-seanjc@google.com>
Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't
directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must
explicitly request emulation. Unless the guest explicitly requests
emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO
SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.
But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs,
because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the
SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on
writes. Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to
emulation, the guest never gets a #VC. And since KVM simply resumes the
guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU
into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.
Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for
upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs. For TDX, it's actually possible
to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the
fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX
protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0. But there is no strong use case for
supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is
to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory.
And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the
restriction can always be lifted for TDX.
Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES
VMs that are created as type KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM. Read-only memslots can't
possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just
means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs.
Trying to deal with the ordering between KVM_SEV_INIT and memslot creation
isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.
Fixes: 26c44aa9e076 ("KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES")
Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 950a03e0181e..37c4a573e5fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2191,6 +2191,8 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
#endif
+#define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)
+
static inline u16 kvm_read_ldt(void)
{
u16 ldt;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 689e8be873a7..62a3d1c0cc07 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -715,6 +715,13 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
}
#endif
+#ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem
+static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM);
+}
+#endif
+
struct kvm_memslots {
u64 generation;
atomic_long_t last_used_slot;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index d0788d0a72cc..fad2d5932844 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1578,15 +1578,14 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD)
valid_flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM
/*
* GUEST_MEMFD is incompatible with read-only memslots, as writes to
* read-only memslots have emulated MMIO, not page fault, semantics,
* and KVM doesn't allow emulated MMIO for private memory.
*/
- if (!(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD))
+ if (kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) &&
+ !(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD))
valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY;
-#endif
if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-09 19:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-09 19:02 [PATCH 00/22] KVM: x86: Fix multiple #PF RO infinite loop bugs Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:02 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-08-14 16:31 ` [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX) Paolo Bonzini
2025-12-03 13:04 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-12-23 16:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:02 ` [PATCH 02/22] KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 11:11 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 11:42 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-14 14:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-15 8:30 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-14 16:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-14 19:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 14:22 ` Yuan Yao
2024-08-15 23:31 ` Yao Yuan
2024-08-23 0:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-23 23:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-26 20:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 16:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 05/22] KVM: x86: Retry to-be-emulated insn in "slow" unprotect path iff sp is zapped Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 06/22] KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it to last_retry_eip Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 07/22] KVM: x86: Store gpa as gpa_t, not unsigned long, when unprotecting for retry Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 08/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Apply retry protection to "fast nTDP unprotect" path Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:30 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-15 14:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-15 16:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-28 23:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 10/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive helper Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-15 14:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 11/22] KVM: x86: Move EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF to x86_emulate_instruction() Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 12/22] KVM: x86: Fold retry_instruction() into x86_emulate_instruction() Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 13/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't try to unprotect an INVALID_GPA Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Always walk guest PTEs with WRITE access when unprotecting Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-26 21:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 16/22] KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed emulation Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 17/22] KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 18/22] KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 19/22] KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on emulation failure Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 20/22] KVM: x86: Rename reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure() Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 21/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry() version Sean Christopherson
2024-08-09 19:03 ` [PATCH 22/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-15 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-30 23:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-14 17:58 ` [PATCH 00/22] KVM: x86: Fix multiple #PF RO infinite loop bugs Paolo Bonzini
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