From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
xin@zytor.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 22:00:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241001050110.3643764-10-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241001050110.3643764-1-xin@zytor.com>
No need to use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in the definition of array
vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs, as the macro name indicates the _possible_
maximum size of passthrough MSRs.
Use ARRAY_SIZE instead of MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS when the size of
the array is needed and add a BUILD_BUG_ON to make sure the actual array
size does not exceed the possible maximum size of passthrough MSRs.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8 +++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 9acc9661fdb2..28cf89c97bda 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ module_param(allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, bool, S_IRUGO);
* List of MSRs that can be directly passed to the guest.
* In addition to these x2apic, PT and LBR MSRs are handled specially.
*/
-static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
+static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[] = {
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD,
@@ -4182,6 +4182,8 @@ void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
return;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs) > MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+
/*
* Redo intercept permissions for MSRs that KVM is passing through to
* the guest. Disabling interception will check the new MSR filter and
@@ -7626,8 +7628,8 @@ int vmx_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
/* The MSR bitmap starts with all ones */
- bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
- bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+ bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs));
+ bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs));
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index e0d76d2460ef..e7409f8f28b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
-#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS 16
+#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS 64
struct {
DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
--
2.46.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-01 5:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-01 5:00 [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 01/27] KVM: x86: Use a dedicated flow for queueing re-injected exceptions Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-21 8:28 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-21 17:03 ` Xin Li
2024-10-22 2:47 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:30 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/27] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22 8:48 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:21 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 18:53 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 19:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 06/27] x86/cea: Export per CPU variable cea_exception_stacks Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 17:51 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 18:18 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22 9:06 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:18 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "FRED enabled" Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2024-11-26 18:02 ` [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 19:22 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 20:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 6:46 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 6:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 7:02 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 7:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 7:32 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 7:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-13 11:31 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: VMX: Pass XFD_ERR as pseudo-payload when injecting #NM Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 6:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 8:04 ` Xin Li
2024-10-28 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-05 7:16 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved when guest can use FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:18 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-12 18:48 ` Xin Li
2024-12-12 19:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-13 18:43 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:23 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-24 16:50 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Allow WRMSRNS " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 15:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:49 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 7:34 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to existence of VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 16:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 16:37 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 19:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED " Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:42 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 7:25 ` Xin Li
2024-10-28 9:07 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-28 18:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-29 17:40 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-19 0:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-02-25 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 17:04 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 18:48 ` Xin Li
2025-02-28 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
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