From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
xin@zytor.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 22:01:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241001050110.3643764-27-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241001050110.3643764-1-xin@zytor.com>
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
As real hardware, nested VMX performs checks on various VMCS fields,
including both controls and guest/host states. Add FRED related VMCS
field checkings with the addition of nested FRED.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 45a5ffa51e60..1fbdeea32c98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -2975,6 +2975,8 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ bool fred_enabled = (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) &&
+ (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED);
if (CC(!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls,
vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_low,
@@ -2993,6 +2995,7 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 intr_type = intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK;
bool has_error_code = intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
bool should_have_error_code;
+ bool has_nested_exception = vmx->nested.msrs.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
bool urg = nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST);
bool prot_mode = !urg || vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE;
@@ -3006,7 +3009,9 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
/* VM-entry interruption-info field: vector */
if (CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR && vector != NMI_VECTOR) ||
CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && vector > 31) ||
- CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT && vector != 0))
+ CC(intr_type == INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT &&
+ ((!fred_enabled && vector > 0) ||
+ (fred_enabled && vector > 2))))
return -EINVAL;
/* VM-entry interruption-info field: deliver error code */
@@ -3025,6 +3030,15 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (CC(intr_info & INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * When the CPU enumerates VMX nested-exception support, bit 13
+ * (set to indicate a nested exception) of the intr info field
+ * may have value 1. Otherwise bit 13 is reserved.
+ */
+ if (CC(!has_nested_exception &&
+ (intr_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* VM-entry instruction length */
switch (intr_type) {
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
@@ -3034,6 +3048,12 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
CC(vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len == 0 &&
CC(!nested_cpu_has_zero_length_injection(vcpu))))
return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case INTR_TYPE_OTHER_EVENT:
+ if (fred_enabled && (vector == 1 || vector == 2))
+ if (CC(vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len > 15))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
}
}
@@ -3096,9 +3116,30 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (ia32e) {
if (CC(!(vmcs12->host_cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS &&
+ vmcs12->secondary_vm_exit_controls & SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED) {
+ /* Bit 11, bits 5:4, and bit 2 of the IA32_FRED_CONFIG must be zero */
+ if (CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_config &
+ (BIT_ULL(11) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 4) | BIT_ULL(2))) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp1 & GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp2 & GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp3 & GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp1 & GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp2 & GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp3 & GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_config & PAGE_MASK, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp1, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp2, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_rsp3, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp1, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp2, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->host_ia32_fred_ssp3, vcpu)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
} else {
if (CC(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) ||
CC(vmcs12->host_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->host_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED) ||
CC((vmcs12->host_rip) >> 32))
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -3242,6 +3283,43 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
CC((vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (ia32e) {
+ if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED) {
+ /* Bit 11, bits 5:4, and bit 2 of the IA32_FRED_CONFIG must be zero */
+ if (CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_config &
+ (BIT_ULL(11) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 4) | BIT_ULL(2))) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp1 & GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp2 & GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp3 & GENMASK_ULL(5, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp1 & GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp2 & GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp3 & GENMASK_ULL(2, 0)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_config & PAGE_MASK, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp1, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp2, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_rsp3, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp1, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp2, vcpu)) ||
+ CC(is_noncanonical_address(vmcs12->guest_ia32_fred_ssp3, vcpu)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED) {
+ unsigned int ss_dpl = VMX_AR_DPL(vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
+ if (CC(ss_dpl == 1 || ss_dpl == 2))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ss_dpl == 0 &&
+ CC(!(vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes & VMX_AR_L_MASK)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ss_dpl == 3 &&
+ (CC(vmcs12->guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) ||
+ CC(vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (CC(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (nested_check_guest_non_reg_state(vmcs12))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.46.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-01 5:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-01 5:00 [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 01/27] KVM: x86: Use a dedicated flow for queueing re-injected exceptions Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-21 8:28 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-21 17:03 ` Xin Li
2024-10-22 2:47 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:30 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/27] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22 8:48 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:21 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 18:53 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 19:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 06/27] x86/cea: Export per CPU variable cea_exception_stacks Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 17:51 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 18:18 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22 9:06 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:18 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "FRED enabled" Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-26 18:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 19:22 ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 20:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 6:46 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 6:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 7:02 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 7:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27 7:32 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27 7:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-13 11:31 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: VMX: Pass XFD_ERR as pseudo-payload when injecting #NM Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:00 ` [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 6:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 8:04 ` Xin Li
2024-10-28 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-05 7:16 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved when guest can use FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:18 ` Chao Gao
2024-12-12 18:48 ` Xin Li
2024-12-12 19:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-13 18:43 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:23 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-24 16:50 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Allow WRMSRNS " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 15:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:49 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 7:34 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to existence of VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 16:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 16:37 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 19:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED " Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24 7:42 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25 7:25 ` Xin Li
2024-10-28 9:07 ` Chao Gao
2024-10-28 18:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-29 17:40 ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 5:01 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2024-10-01 5:01 ` [PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-19 0:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-02-25 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 17:04 ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 18:48 ` Xin Li
2025-02-28 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
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