mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	xin@zytor.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 22:00:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241001050110.3643764-17-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241001050110.3643764-1-xin@zytor.com>

From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>

Set VMX nested exception bit in the VM-entry interruption information
VMCS field when injecting a nested exception using FRED event delivery
to ensure:
  1) The nested exception is injected on a correct stack level.
  2) The nested bit defined in FRED stack frame is set.

The event stack level used by FRED event delivery depends on whether the
event was a nested exception encountered during delivery of another event,
because a nested exception is "regarded" as happening on ring 0.  E.g.,
when #PF is configured to use stack level 1 in IA32_FRED_STKLVLS MSR:
  - nested #PF will be delivered on stack level 1 when encountered in
    ring 3.
  - normal #PF will be delivered on stack level 0 when encountered in
    ring 3.

The VMX nested-exception support ensures the correct event stack level is
chosen when a VM entry injects a nested exception.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
[ Sean: reworked kvm_requeue_exception() to simply the code changes ]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---

Change since v2:
* Rework kvm_requeue_exception() to simply the code changes (Sean
  Christopherson).

Change since v1:
* Set the nested flag when there is an original interrupt (Chao Gao).
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  5 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |  6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 14 +++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b9b82aaea9a3..3830084b569b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@ struct kvm_queued_exception {
 	u32 error_code;
 	unsigned long payload;
 	bool has_payload;
+	bool nested;
 	u64 event_data;
 };
 
@@ -2114,7 +2115,8 @@ void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, unsigned long payload);
 void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
-			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, u64 event_data);
+			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, bool nested,
+			   u64 event_data);
 void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault);
 void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    struct x86_exception *fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 3696e763c231..06c52fee5dcd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
 #define VMX_BASIC_DUAL_MONITOR_TREATMENT	BIT_ULL(49)
 #define VMX_BASIC_INOUT				BIT_ULL(54)
 #define VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS			BIT_ULL(55)
+#define VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION		BIT_ULL(58)
 
 static inline u32 vmx_basic_vmcs_revision_id(u64 vmx_basic)
 {
@@ -416,13 +417,15 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK        0x700           /* 10:8 */
 #define INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK     0x800           /* 11 */
 #define INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI		0x1000		/* 12 */
+#define INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK	0x2000		/* 13 */
 #define INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK            0x80000000      /* 31 */
-#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7ffff000
+#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7fffd000
 
 #define VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK           	INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK        	INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK    	INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK       	INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK
+#define VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK	INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK
 
 #define INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR		(EVENT_TYPE_EXTINT << 8)	/* external interrupt */
 #define INTR_TYPE_RESERVED		(EVENT_TYPE_RESERVED << 8)	/* reserved */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7fa8f842f116..e479e0208efe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4126,7 +4126,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
 				      exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR,
-				      error_code, 0);
+				      error_code, false, 0);
 		break;
 	}
 	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index d81144bd648f..03f42b218554 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1910,8 +1910,11 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
 			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
 		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
-	} else
+	} else {
 		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+		if (ex->nested)
+			intr_info |= INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK;
+	}
 
 	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
 
@@ -7290,6 +7293,7 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
 				      idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK,
 				      error_code,
+				      idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK,
 				      event_data);
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 7a55c1eb5297..8546629166e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -874,6 +874,11 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
 
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = vcpu->arch.exception.nested ||
+					      (is_fred_enabled(vcpu) &&
+					       (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected ||
+					        vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected));
+
 		vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = has_error;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.vector = nr;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
@@ -903,8 +908,13 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 
+		/* #DF is NOT a nested event, per its definition. */
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
+
 		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
 	} else {
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = is_fred_enabled(vcpu);
+
 		/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
 		   that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
 		   exception */
@@ -933,7 +943,8 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 }
 
 void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
-			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, u64 event_data)
+			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, bool nested,
+			   u64 event_data)
 {
 
 	/*
@@ -958,6 +969,7 @@ void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 	vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.payload = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.nested = nested;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.event_data = event_data;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 578fea05ff18..992e73ee2ec5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
 }
 
-- 
2.46.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-01  5:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-01  5:00 [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 01/27] KVM: x86: Use a dedicated flow for queueing re-injected exceptions Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/27] KVM: VMX: Don't modify guest XFD_ERR if CR0.TS=1 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-21  8:28   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-21 17:03     ` Xin Li
2024-10-22  2:47       ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:30         ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:28           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/27] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22  8:48   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:21     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 15:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 18:53     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 19:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 06/27] x86/cea: Export per CPU variable cea_exception_stacks Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01 16:12   ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01 17:51     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01 18:18       ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-22  9:06   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-22 16:18     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "FRED enabled" Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: VMX: Do not use MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS in array definition Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-26 18:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-26 19:22     ` Xin Li
2024-11-26 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  6:46         ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  6:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  7:02             ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  7:10               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-27  7:32                 ` Xin Li
2024-11-27  7:58                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2024-11-13 11:31   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: VMX: Pass XFD_ERR as pseudo-payload when injecting #NM Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` [PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:00 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2024-10-24  6:24   ` [PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Chao Gao
2024-10-25  8:04     ` Xin Li
2024-10-28  6:33       ` Chao Gao
2024-12-05  7:16         ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved when guest can use FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:18   ` Chao Gao
2024-12-12 18:48     ` Xin Li
2024-12-12 19:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-13 18:43         ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:23   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-24 16:50     ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Allow WRMSRNS " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 15:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:49   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  7:34     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 16:01       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to existence of VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-25 16:22   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 16:37     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 19:32       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED " Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-24  7:42   ` Chao Gao
2024-10-25  7:25     ` Xin Li
2024-10-28  9:07       ` Chao Gao
2024-10-28 18:27         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-29 17:40           ` Xin Li
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2024-10-01  5:01 ` [PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-02-19  0:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/27] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-02-25 15:24   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 17:04     ` Xin Li
2025-02-25 17:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 18:48         ` Xin Li
2025-02-28 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20241001050110.3643764-17-xin@zytor.com \
    --to=xin@zytor.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®