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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	ardb@kernel.org, jarkko@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	mic@digikod.net, casey@schaufler-ca.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com,
	eric.snowberg@oracle.com, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	rdunlap@infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 09:55:05 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241017155516.2582369-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241017155516.2582369-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

Introduce system_key_link(), a new function to allow a keyring to link
to a key contained within one of the system keyrings (builtin, secondary,
or platform). Depending on how the kernel is built, if the machine
keyring is available, it will be checked as well, since it is linked to
the secondary keyring. If the asymmetric key id matches a key within one
of these system keyrings, the matching key is linked into the passed in
keyring.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
 certs/system_keyring.c        | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h |  7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index e344cee10d28..4abee7514442 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
 static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
+#define system_trusted_keys secondary_trusted_keys
+#else
+#define system_trusted_keys builtin_trusted_keys
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 static struct key *machine_trusted_keys;
@@ -420,3 +423,30 @@ void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
 	platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
 }
 #endif
+
+/**
+ * system_key_link - Link to a system key
+ * @keyring: The keyring to link into
+ * @id: The asymmetric key id to look for in the system keyring
+ *
+ * Search the system keyrings to see if one of them contains a matching "id".
+ * If there is a match, link the key into "keyring".  System keyrings always
+ * includes the builtin. If any of the following keyrings are enabled:
+ * secondary, machine, and platform they are searched as well.
+ */
+int system_key_link(struct key *keyring, struct asymmetric_key_id *id)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+
+	key = find_asymmetric_key(system_trusted_keys, id, NULL, NULL, false);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key))
+		return key_link(keyring, key);
+
+	if (platform_trusted_keys) {
+		key = find_asymmetric_key(platform_trusted_keys, id, NULL, NULL, false);
+		if (!IS_ERR(key))
+			return key_link(keyring, key);
+	}
+
+	return -ENOKEY;
+}
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 8365adf842ef..b47ac8e2001a 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
+struct asymmetric_key_id;
 
 enum blacklist_hash_type {
 	/* TBSCertificate hash */
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin(struct key *dest_keyring,
 				    const union key_payload *payload,
 				    struct key *restriction_key);
 extern __init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring);
-
+extern int system_key_link(struct key *keyring, struct asymmetric_key_id *id);
 #else
 #define restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_reject
 #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin restrict_link_reject
@@ -38,6 +39,10 @@ static inline __init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int system_key_link(struct key *keyring, struct asymmetric_key_id *id)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-- 
2.45.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-17 15:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-17 15:55 [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:13   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:50     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 13:21   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:15     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2024-10-17 16:16   ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:53     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 16:11   ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:50   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 20:34     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:16       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24  0:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:27     ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 11:43       ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE) Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:20   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 21:42     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:58       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24  0:17   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:28     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18  5:21   ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 15:42     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 16:55       ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 21:55         ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key Eric Snowberg
2025-02-06 20:13   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-07 23:09     ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-12 12:42     ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-23  2:25   ` sergeh
2024-10-23 19:25     ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-24 19:57       ` sergeh
2024-12-24 17:43   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:32     ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 12:59       ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] clavis: Allow user to define acl at build time Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] clavis: Prevent boot param change during kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] clavis: Add function redirection for Kunit support Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] clavis: " Eric Snowberg
2024-12-24  1:11   ` Mimi Zohar
2024-12-23 12:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:14   ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-04  4:48     ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06  3:40       ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 17:15         ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-27 20:41           ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-27 22:22             ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 14:08               ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-28 16:14                 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:18                   ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-03 22:38                     ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 12:53                       ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05  0:19                         ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05  1:49                           ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05  2:09                             ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05  2:20                               ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05  2:24                                 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:51                   ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-03 22:40                     ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 14:46                       ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-05  0:23                         ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 21:29                           ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-06  1:12                             ` Paul Moore
2025-03-06 22:28                               ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-07  2:46                                 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 16:24                                   ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-20 21:36                                     ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 16:37                                       ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 18:57                                         ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 21:20                                           ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 22:13                                             ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 22:56                                               ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-22  2:00                                                 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 17:22                                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-21 19:05                                         ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 22:40                                     ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 16:40                                       ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 16:55                                         ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 20:15                                           ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 20:53                                             ` James Bottomley
2025-03-24 17:44                                               ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 17:08                                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-04 22:24                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-05  0:25                         ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05  0:29                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01  2:20               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01  2:19             ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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