From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
ardb@kernel.org, jarkko@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
mic@digikod.net, casey@schaufler-ca.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com,
eric.snowberg@oracle.com, ebiggers@kernel.org,
rdunlap@infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 09:55:08 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241017155516.2582369-6-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241017155516.2582369-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Introduce a new key type for keyring access control. The new key type
is called clavis_key_acl. The clavis_key_acl contains the subject key
identifier along with the allowed usage type for the key.
The format is as follows:
XX:YYYYYYYYYYY
XX - Single byte of the key type
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE 00
VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE 01
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE 02
VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE 03
VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE 04
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE 05
: - ASCII colon
YY - Even number of hexadecimal characters representing the key id
This key type will be used in the clavis keyring for access control. To
be added to the clavis keyring, the clavis_key_acl must be S/MIME signed
by the sole asymmetric key contained within it.
Below is an example of how this could be used. Within the example, the
key (b360d113c848ace3f1e6a80060b43d1206f0487d) is already in the machine
keyring. The intended usage for this key is to validate a signed kernel
for kexec:
echo "02:b360d113c848ace3f1e6a80060b43d1206f0487d" > kernel-acl.txt
The next step is to sign it:
openssl smime -sign -signer clavis-lsm.x509 -inkey clavis-lsm.priv -in \
kernel-acl.txt -out kernel-acl.pkcs7 -binary -outform DER \
-nodetach -noattr
The final step is how to add the acl to the .clavis keyring:
keyctl padd clavis_key_acl "" %:.clavis < kernel-acl.pkcs7
Afterwards the new clavis_key_acl can be seen in the .clavis keyring:
keyctl show %:.clavis
Keyring
keyring: .clavis
\_ asymmetric: Clavis LSM key: 4a00ab9f35c9dc3aed7c225d22bafcbd9285e1e8
\_ clavis_key_acl: 02:b360d113c848ace3f1e6a80060b43d1206f0487d
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
security/clavis/clavis.h | 1 +
security/clavis/clavis_keyring.c | 173 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 174 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/clavis/clavis.h b/security/clavis/clavis.h
index 5e397b55a60a..7b55a6050440 100644
--- a/security/clavis/clavis.h
+++ b/security/clavis/clavis.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
/* Max length for the asymmetric key id contained on the boot param */
#define CLAVIS_BIN_KID_MAX 32
+#define CLAVIS_ASCII_KID_MAX 64
struct asymmetric_setup_kid {
struct asymmetric_key_id id;
diff --git a/security/clavis/clavis_keyring.c b/security/clavis/clavis_keyring.c
index 400ed455a3a2..00163e7f0fe9 100644
--- a/security/clavis/clavis_keyring.c
+++ b/security/clavis/clavis_keyring.c
@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include "clavis.h"
static struct key *clavis_keyring;
@@ -11,10 +15,173 @@ static struct asymmetric_key_id *clavis_boot_akid;
static struct asymmetric_setup_kid clavis_setup_akid;
static bool clavis_enforced;
+static int pkcs7_preparse_content(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, size_t asn1hdrlen)
+{
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep = ctx;
+ const void *saved_prep_data;
+ size_t saved_prep_datalen;
+ char *desc;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ /* key_acl_free_preparse will free this */
+ desc = kmemdup(data, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Copy the user supplied contents and remove any white space. */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ desc[i] = tolower(desc[i]);
+ if (isspace(desc[i]))
+ desc[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ prep->description = desc;
+ saved_prep_data = prep->data;
+ saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
+ prep->data = desc;
+ prep->datalen = len;
+ ret = user_preparse(prep);
+ prep->data = saved_prep_data;
+ prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void key_acl_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ kfree(prep->description);
+ user_free_preparse(prep);
+}
+
+static struct key *clavis_keyring_get(void)
+{
+ return clavis_keyring;
+}
+
static bool clavis_acl_enforced(void)
{
return clavis_enforced;
}
+
+static int key_acl_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ /*
+ * Only allow the description to be set via the pkcs7 data contents.
+ * The exception to this rule is if the entry was builtin, it will have
+ * the original_description set. Since we don't have access to the key
+ * within the preparse step to determine if the entity is builtin, let
+ * it through now and this will be checked in the instantiate step.
+ */
+ if (prep->orig_description)
+ return 0;
+
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, prep->data, prep->datalen, clavis_keyring_get(),
+ VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE, pkcs7_preparse_content,
+ prep);
+}
+
+static int key_acl_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ /*
+ * The orig_description may only be used for builtin entities. All
+ * other entries must have been validated through the pkcs7 signature
+ * within the preparse stage.
+ */
+ if (prep->orig_description && !(key->flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ key->perm = KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW;
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
+ return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
+}
+
+static void key_acl_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ /* It should not be possible to get here */
+ pr_info("destroy clavis_key_acl denied\n");
+}
+
+static void key_acl_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+ /* It should not be possible to get here */
+ pr_info("revoke clavis_key_acl denied\n");
+}
+
+static int key_acl_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int key_acl_vet_description(const char *desc)
+{
+ int i, desc_len;
+ s16 ktype;
+
+ if (!desc)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ desc_len = sizeof(desc);
+
+ /*
+ * clavis_acl format:
+ * xx:yyyy...
+ *
+ * xx - Single byte of the key type
+ * : - Ascii colon
+ * yyyy.. - Even number of hexadecimal characters representing the keyid
+ */
+
+ /* The min clavis acl is 7 characters. */
+ if (desc_len < 7)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ /* Check the first byte is a valid key type. */
+ if (sscanf(desc, "%2hx", &ktype) != 1)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ if (ktype >= VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ /* Check that there is a colon following the key type */
+ if (desc[2] != ':')
+ goto invalid;
+
+ /* Move past the colon. */
+ desc += 3;
+
+ for (i = 0; *desc && i < CLAVIS_ASCII_KID_MAX; desc++, i++) {
+ /* Check if lowercase hex number */
+ if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the has is greater than CLAVIS_ASCII_KID_MAX. */
+ if (*desc)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ /* Check for even number of hex characters. */
+ if (i == 0 || i & 1)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ return 0;
+
+invalid:
+ pr_err("Unparsable clavis key id: %s\n", desc);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static struct key_type clavis_key_acl = {
+ .name = "clavis_key_acl",
+ .preparse = key_acl_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = key_acl_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = key_acl_instantiate,
+ .update = key_acl_update,
+ .revoke = key_acl_revoke,
+ .destroy = key_acl_destroy,
+ .vet_description = key_acl_vet_description,
+ .read = user_read,
+};
+
static int restrict_link_for_clavis(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload, struct key *restrict_key)
{
@@ -28,6 +195,9 @@ static int restrict_link_for_clavis(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_t
return 0;
}
+ if (type == &clavis_key_acl)
+ return 0;
+
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -93,6 +263,9 @@ static int __init clavis_keyring_init(void)
{
struct key_restriction *restriction;
+ if (register_key_type(&clavis_key_acl) < 0)
+ panic("Can't allocate clavis key type\n");
+
restriction = clavis_restriction_alloc(restrict_link_for_clavis);
if (!restriction)
panic("Can't allocate clavis keyring restriction\n");
--
2.45.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-17 15:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-17 15:55 [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 13:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:53 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 16:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 20:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:27 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 11:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE) Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 21:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2024-10-18 5:21 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 15:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 16:55 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 21:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key Eric Snowberg
2025-02-06 20:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-07 23:09 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-12 12:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-23 2:25 ` sergeh
2024-10-23 19:25 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-24 19:57 ` sergeh
2024-12-24 17:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:32 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 12:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] clavis: Allow user to define acl at build time Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] clavis: Prevent boot param change during kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] clavis: Add function redirection for Kunit support Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] clavis: " Eric Snowberg
2024-12-24 1:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-12-23 12:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:14 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-04 4:48 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 3:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 17:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-27 20:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-27 22:22 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 14:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-28 16:14 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-03 22:38 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 12:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 0:19 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 1:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:09 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 2:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:24 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:51 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-03 22:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 14:46 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-05 0:23 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 21:29 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-06 1:12 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-06 22:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-07 2:46 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 16:24 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-20 21:36 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 16:37 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 18:57 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 21:20 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 22:13 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 22:56 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-22 2:00 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 17:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-21 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 22:40 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 16:40 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 16:55 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 20:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 20:53 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-24 17:44 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 17:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-04 22:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-05 0:25 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 0:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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